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ABSTRACT

Since the United States enacted the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) in 1969, nations all around the world have adopted similar statutes.
What started as a unique response to the American environmental movement
grew to become a nearly global standard. Although the details of the regimes
vary from country to country, there are two constants: (1) the regimes force the
government to consider environmental impacts before conducting or authorizing projects, and (2) they allow some degree of public participation. This Article focuses on the latter of these two features.
Public participation in NEPA-style regimes generally means public
consultation: Information is disseminated and civil society is allowed to comment. Depending on a range of factors-some political and some legal-
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comments may influence the circumstances under which a project takes place
or whether it occurs at all. Though the public's influence is often limited in
practice, the mere fact of public participation at the project level-as opposed
to participation at the candidate level through elections or at the issue level
through referenda-is exceptional. In the United States and many other countries, NEPA and its counterparts represent a break from the normal rule of executive decision-making by encouraging public involvement and deliberative,
participatory democracy.
Despite the progress, critics have accused these regimes of falling
short. In practice, public consultation under NEPA-style frameworks is severely limited in terms of who participates, how many participate, and the extent to
which this participation impacts the decision-making process. This is not surprising. By its very nature, consultation implies limited influence.
In this Article, I argue that policy-makers, both domestic and foreign,
should replace consultation with consent as the public-participation requirement in certain cases. Although the concerns leading to the inclusion of public
consultation in NEPA and its foreign counterparts were many, one of the more
important ideas was that those persons affected by environmentally significant
projects should have a say in the matter. Unfortunately, the consultation approach has proven increasingly ineffective. If the goal is to match influence
with stake, consultation is the wrong mechanism.
Requiring consent, even in a limited number of cases, may seem like an
extreme remedy. Not so. It is an attractive way to respond to a situation inherent in many major public works (especially infrastructure and energy projects)
and in large-scale private endeavors on public land (especially extractive projects). While the benefits of these projects are often spread around an entire nation or large region, the environmental costs are frequently concentrated within
a small, local community (the site community). Requiring the consent of the
local site community insures that its interest is adequately accounted for in the
decision-making process.
I.

INTRODUCTION

When the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was enacted in
1969,1 it was hailed as a victory for both conservation and democracy.2 Although NEPA did not introduce any specific conservation standards, it required
the government to analyze the environmental impact of a proposed project,
consider other options, and present its analysis to the public for comment and

I

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2012).
Sam Kalen, The Devolution of NEPA: How the APA Transformed the Nation's Environmental Policy, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 483, 484 (2009) ("Early reactions to the
Act suggested that it would become the environmental Magna Carta.").
2
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debate.3 By forcing the government to consider the environmental factor-and
to do so transparently-NEPA would have the effect of screening out unsound
projects.4 Even if the public's consent were not required per se, governmental
agencies would be unlikely to push forward with a project that met overwhelming resistance.5 Public consultation would introduce an element of deliberative,
participatory democracy; the government would make better decisions, and the
public would be more likely to support those decisions. Even if some people
disagreed with the ultimate outcome, they would be more likely to accept it
having participated in the decision-making process. 6
Since its enactment over forty years ago, the NEPA model of public
consultation has spread to become a nearly global standard.7 Despite its popularity among governments, however, critics complain that it neither leads to environmentally sound choices nor promotes deliberative, participatory democracy. 8 In this Article, I argue for a new model: one of consent rather than
consultation.
There are many reasons why consent should be favored over consultation, but before summarizing those reasons, let me be clear about what I envision. First, I do not propose that every government project should be subjected
to a national vote. The consent I envision is community consent: Only the
community or communities most affected by the project should have the right
to vote. The broader population should maintain the right to consultation, but
its consent should not be a prerequisite to the project's implementation.
Second, not every government project should be subject to consent.
Only those projects having a "significant" impact on the local environment
could even potentially trigger the government's obligation to obtain community
approval. Because "significant" is already well-defined under NEPA law-and
exists as a criterion, in some form or another, in NEPA's foreign counterparts-debates over its meaning would not spiral out of control.9 To put it dif-

See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348-50 (1989).
4
Cf Philip Weinberg, It's Time to Put NEPA Back on Course, 3 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 99, 112
(1994) (suggesting that state "mini-NEPAs" have been more effective at screening out faulty projects in the first instance).
s
See, e.g., Jeff Juel, Idaho PanhandleNationalForest Abandons ORV Expansion Project,
WILDLANDS CPR (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.wildlandscpr.org/blog/idaho-panhandle-nationalforest-abandons-orv-expansion-project.
6
See Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of Informed Environmental Decisionmaking, 78
TEMP. L. REv. 659, 677 (2005).
7
See Richard Lazarus, The NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A
Reappraisaland a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEo. L.J. 1507, 1520 (2012).
8
See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 342 (2004);
Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy Act's
Processfor Citizen Participation,26 ENVTL. L. 53, 85-92 (1996).
9
See infra Part IV.B.1.a.
3
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ferently, only those projects that currently require preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under NEPA could possibly trigger the requirement of community consent.' 0 What other condition must pertain? As
elaborated in more detail below, the consent requirement would ultimately turn
on the presence of a profound disconnect between those who benefit from the
project and those who suffer its environmental costs. This would limit the consent component to major projects that display an acutely lopsided distribution
of costs and benefits-projects that dramatically affect the local environment
but fail to confer even marginally commensurate benefits on the local community-while at the same time preserving, to the extent possible, the regulatory
structure already in place.
Third, the consent regime would not require absolute approval. The
community would express its consent through a majority vote; minority views
would still be considered by the responsible agency, but they could not block a
finding of community consent.
Finally, and related to the previous point, is the idea that consent would
not equal authorization. The government would not have the green light to go
forward with the project simply because it obtained community consent. Community consent would be a necessary but not sufficient condition. Regardless,
the responsible agency would still conduct (or, rather, have conducted) the regular analysis to determine whether the project should in fact be executed. Recognizing that local communities may sometimes misjudge environmental impact-or grant approval due to ancillary factors such as perceived economic
benefits--community consent should not be dispositive.
To make the case for consent rather than consultation, I begin by discussing the role of public participation in the law of environmental impact assessment (EIA). Because public input is also central to another emerging body
of law-indigenous rights associated with free, prior, and informed consent
(FPIC)-I take care to distinguish the role of public participation within these
two doctrinal contexts. Having made this distinction, I devote the rest of Part II
to describing the NEPA consultation model and how it has spread to become a
global standard. Tracing its history and theoretical underpinnings, we see that
the consultation model was at least partially intended to address the complaint
that public projects were being designed and executed without adequately considering local concerns. For instance, even if the construction of a dam makes
sense from a regional or national perspective-its economic benefits outweighing the environmental harms in the aggregate-it may be a tragedy from a local
perspective. To at least some degree, the consultation model was supposed to
ensure that the local perspective was taken into account and given due weight.
With this in mind, I use Part III to discuss the pros and cons of this
model and to evaluate the extent to which NEPA and its foreign counterparts

1o

42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2012).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6
114

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116

actually pay respect to local interests. I focus in particular on how public participation under this model is at once too limited and too broad. It is too limited in
the sense that consultation fails to account for the fact that the most serious environmental impacts of many projects are often concentrated in relatively small
areas. Because these small communities have to live with the consequences of
environmentally significant projects, their say-so should be required. At the
same time, the consultation model is overbroad. By inviting all to opine on a
project without differentiating between local and outside stakeholders, the concerns of locals are diluted. While non-locals should be free to comment, giving
community residents the right to vote would better match the weight of the
relative interests.
In Part IV, I outline a model of community consent that would enhance
protection for local interests without upsetting the basic regulatory scheme. Incorporating the limitations I mention above, the community consent requirement would be narrowly tailored to achieve its principal objective: Governmental decision-making that takes proper account of the reality that the benefits of
environmentally-impactful projects are often relatively diffuse, while the negative impacts tend to be focused within a small, regional community."
In Part V, I address several possible objections to my proposal. These
include the contentions that consent would derail sustainable development; that
consent would enable a minority to stymie the legitimate desires of the majority; and that consent for non-indigenous peoples would dilute emerging rights
associated with indigenous peoples.
I conclude by urging policy-makers, both foreign and domestic, to consider amending their decision-making regimes so as to incorporate elements of
consent. As I demonstrate in this Article, a policy shift towards consent would
make sense normatively, ecologically, and-perhaps surprisingly-even economically.

I Throughout this paper I discuss the demographical disconnect between those who receive
the benefits and those who feel the harms of large public works, especially infrastructure and extractive projects. This phenomenon has been observed in various contexts, including freeways,
see, e.g., Roger Nober, Federal Highways and Environmental Litigation: Toward a Theory of
Public Choice andAdministrative Reaction, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 229, 237 (1990), dams, see,
e.g., FRED PEARCE, WHEN THE RIVERS RUN DRY 104 (2006), mines and other extractive projects,
see, e.g., Marcia Langton & Odette Mazel, Poverty in the Midst ofPlenty: AboriginalPeople, the
'Resource Curse' and Australia's Mining Boom, 26 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 31, 36
(2008), and energy production, see, e.g., Kirk Herbertson & David Hunter, Emerging Standards
for SustainableFinance of the Energy Sector, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 4, 4 (2007). But
see Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 315, 348 (2002) (arguing that environmental regulations in the energy context tend to harm low-income peoples disproportionately by raising the cost of energy).
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II. NEPA AND THE CONSULTATION PROCESS: THE DOMINANT GLOBAL
MODEL FOR ASSESSING GOVERNMENT PROJECTS

In this Part, I describe the basic contours of NEPA and EIA law, taking
care to illustrate the role and theoretical roots of public participation in environmental decision-making, as well as the related but distinct role of consent in
emerging norms of indigenous rights. I draw out this distinction-between the
indigenous-rights approach to consent and the EIA approach to public participation-in order to establish the primary normative foundation of my argument: the democratic rationale. I then discuss the way in which the NEPA public-consultation model has grown over the last few decades to become a nearly
global standard, informing national and international EIA law around the
world. Finally, I discuss one of the main advantages of public participation in
environmental decision-making: its ability to give voice to local concerns that
decision-makers might otherwise ignore or fail to recognize.
A.

Democracy, Consent, and the Law ofEnvironmentalImpact
Assessment

Before discussing NEPA and EIA in general, I should first explain the
selection of this body of law as the analytical starting point. If one wanted to
argue that consent should be required for certain environmentally-disruptive
projects, EIA law would be only one of two prime candidates. The other would
come from emerging norms of indigenous law. Through the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the international
community has recognized that states should not sponsor certain projects in indigenous territory unless the people within that territory have given their "free,
prior, and informed consent" (FPIC).12 UNDRIP is not legally binding, the
range of projects to which FPIC extends is unclear, and whether FPIC implies a
veto right is hotly contested.' 3 Still, there is a growing consensus that consultation alone is insufficient when indigenous peoples are involved.14
So, one might wonder, wouldn't it make more sense to ground my argument in indigenous law rather than EIA law? In other words, shouldn't I be
arguing for the expansion of FPIC to non-indigenous communities rather than
for the modification of EIA regimes from consultation to consent? The intuitive
12
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
13
See Brant McGee, The Community Referendum: ParticipatoryDemocracy and the Right to
Free, Prior and Informed Consent to Development, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 570, 572, 591
(2009); Siegfried Wiessner, Re-Enchanting the World: Indigenous Peoples' Rights as Essential
Parts ofa Holistic Human Rights Regime, 15 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 239, 281 (2010).
14
See Anne Perrault, Kirk Herbertson & Owen J. Lynch, Partnershipsfor Success in Protected Areas: The Public Interest and Local Community and Rights to PriorInformed Consent
(PIC), 19 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 475, 489-94 (2007).
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appeal of indigenous law notwithstanding, EIA is the better starting point because the rationale behind the public-consultation component of EIA applies
more convincingly to my proposal than does the rationale behind FPIC for indigenous communities.
FPIC for indigenous peoples is a corollary of the right to selfdetermination, or the right of indigenous peoples to shape their own destinies.is
In UNDRIP, the foundational right to self-determination expresses itself in the
more specific rights of FPIC, the right to develop and maintain juridical institutions, the right to maintain languages, the right to develop educational systems,
and so forth.16 But to say that FPIC grows out of the broader right to selfdetermination is hardly sufficient to explain why FPIC has been associated
most strongly with indigenous peoples. To do that, one must probe the relationship between self-determination and indigenous peoples. A full account of this
relationship is beyond the scope of this paper, but it bears noting the key characteristics of this relationship; by so doing, we see that FPIC, informed as it is
by self-determination, fails to offer the democratic rationale that underlies
much of NEPA and other EIA regimes.' 7 It is this democratic rationale that
forms the thrust of my argument.
To return to the key characteristics of self-determination, then, we see
that this right is associated with indigenous peoples for the related reasons of
(1) property, (2) sovereignty, (3) decolonization, and (4) cultural integrity.' 8
The property justification is essentially this: Indigenous peoples are-or should

15
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political,Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, 41, Human Rights Council, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/12/34 (July 15, 2009) (by James Anaya); Akilah Jenga Kinnison, Indigenous Consent: Rethinking U.S. Consultation Policies in Light of the U.N. Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1301, 1323-24 (2011).
16
UNDRIP, supra note 12.
1
See Nicholas A. Robinson, InternationalTrends in Environmental Impact Assessment, 19
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 591, 594 (1992) ("EIA facilitates democratic decisionmaking and consensus building regarding new development.").
1
See KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: RIGHTS,

CULTURE, STRATEGY 78-79 (2010) (describing the drafting history of UNDRIP); Rebecca M.
Bratspies, Human Rights andEnvironmentalRegulation, 19 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 257 (2012)
[hereinafter "Human Rights and EnvironmentalRegulation"] (stating that UNDRIP "emphasizes
prior informed consent as an aspect of the right to property, the right to culture and the right to
indigenous people's sovereignty"); Kinnison, supra note 15, at 1323-27; McGee, supra note 13,
at 571 ("The concept of free, prior and informed consent is based on the rights of participation
and consultation, self-determination, and indigenous property rights."); id. at 582 ("Exploitation
without consent represents the greatest threat to the ability of these minority populations to protect their cultural traditions, social structures, means of livelihood, and way of life from myriad
forms of destruction."); id at 579 ("The right to property and land ownership is another foundation of FPIC.").

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss1/6

8

Fromhertz: From Consultation to Consent: Community Approval as a Prerequisit
2013]

FROM CONSULTATION TO CONSENT

117

be-the owners of their traditional lands. 19 Just as any citizen in the United
States has control over her land, and can refuse government takings of her land
absent eminent domain,20SO too should indigenous peoples be able to block activities on their traditional lands.2 1 Starting at least with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there has been an increasing movement to recognize property rights in communal or other lands traditionally possessed by
indigenous peoples.22 If indigenous peoples have a property claim in their
lands, the theory goes, they should also have the right to self-determination
(and thus FPIC) with respect to those lands.23
This property justification ties into (but does not fully account for) the
notion of sovereignty. Indigenous peoples are thought to be sovereign or quasisovereign populations not simply because they own or possess lands, but because they possess all or some of the attributes of sovereign peoples. 24 In addition to land, the classic criteria include a form of government, a population, and
the capacity to enter into relations with other sovereigns. 25 Although these cri1
See Sarah S. Matari, Mediation to Resolve the Bedouin-Israeli Government Disputefor the
Negev Desert, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1089, 1101 (2011) ("Persistent international efforts to
promote the customary land rights of indigenous persons culminated in [UNDRIP].").
20
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1944).
21
See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001) (recognizing the property
rights of the Awas Tingni community and concluding that Nicaragua had violated those rights by
initiating logging on traditional lands without community consent). Note, however, the interaction between this property rationale and the sovereignty rationale: If indigenous peoples are fully
sovereign, then their property rights should not be subject to eminent domain. See Lawrence B.
Landman, InternationalProtectionfor American Indian Land Rights?, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 59, 8586 (1987).
22
See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Human Rights and Arctic Resources, 15 Sw. J. INT'L LAw 251,
269 (2009).
23
See Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 131 (2002) (imploring national governments to recognize
communal property rights of indigenous peoples and to ensure that these rights are not relinquished in the absence of FPIC).
24
See Glenn T. Morris, International Law and Politics: Toward a Right to SelfDetermination for Indigenous Peoples, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE,

COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 55, 78 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992) ("Most indigenous peo-

ples argue that because their territories have been invaded and incorporated into states without
indigenous consent, self-determination does not constitute secession, but merely the exercise of
inherent sovereign powers that have never been relinquished."); cf Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism,
Constitutionalism, and CulturalPluralism: Where Do IndigenousPeoples Fit Within Civil Society?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 357 (2003) ("Universally recognized as being the 'first' inhabitants of subsequently colonized lands, indigenous peoples across the globe have an ambiguous
status-alternatively considered by their encompassing nation-states to be 'quasi-sovereign nations,' 'tribes,' or 'ethnic minorities."').
25
See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-
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teria are difficult to square with contemporary global conditions, indigenous
peoples can often engage with these criteria more successfully than others.26
The decolonization and cultural integrity rationales pick up where sovereignty leaves off. If indigenous peoples around the world find it difficult to
satisfy the traditional criteria of sovereignty, it is due to the lingering effects of
colonization, the overwhelming influence of globalization, and the difficulty of
maintaining a distinct culture in the face of these forces. 2 7 Accordingly, selfdetermination at once grows out of historical conditions supporting recognition
of sovereignty and responds to the pressures assaulting these conditions in the
colonial and contemporary eras.28
Thus understood, the theoretical justifications supporting FPIC for indigenous peoples do not readily lend themselves to the extension of this right to
non-indigenous peoples. Should the right to grant or withhold consent only exist when people can claim a property right? Should it only occur when an affected community can describe itself as sovereign or quasi-sovereign? Should
consent only pertain when the people of the site community have been "colonized" or otherwise historically oppressed? These are all good reasons to insist
upon consent, but they are not the only reasons to insist upon this right. And so
I place FPIC for indigenous peoples to the side, and pursue EIA law-and the
participatory principle upon which it is built-as the foundation for my argument. 29

34 (1979);

Nit LANTE WALLACE-BRUCE,

CLAIMS TO STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51

(1994).
26
To say that indigenous peoples can engage with the classic criteria of sovereignty is not to
say that they can, as a legal matter, make the argument with absolute success. See Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Recognition in InternationalLaw: Theoretical Observations, 30 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 177, 202 (2008) ("[1]ndigenous peoples as international legal actors do not occupy the same
international legal plane as sovereign States."). Rather, it is simply to recognize the "growing
acceptance of indigenous peoples' collective identity and distinct rights in international law and
practice." Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of
InternationalLaw?, 7 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 33, 35 (1994).
27
See Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and
Continuing Challenges,22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 129 (2011).

28

See id.

See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (explaining
that preparation of an EIS "guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to the
larger audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision"); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(d) (2013) ("Federal agencies shall to the fullest extent
possible . .. facilitate public involvement in decisions which affect the quality of the human environment."); Albert C. Lin, Clinton's National Monuments: A Democrat's Undemocratic Acts?,
29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 732 (2002) ("The public notice and participation requirements of NEPA
have a strong democratic element in their emphasis on direct citizen participation."); cf Madeline
June Kass, A NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse Gases into Account in Threshold Significance Determinations,42 IND. L. REv. 47, 50-51 (2009) ("The NEPA review process ideally
serves an informational role by encouraging informed federal decisionmaking and promoting
29
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NEPA Basics

The stated purpose of NEPA is to require the federal government to
"use all practicable means . . . to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony . . . .'.30 Although this sounds
like it contains both procedural and substantive components, NEPA is famous
for not mandating any particular results or outcomes. 3 1 Declarative purpose
aside, it is largely a procedural statute.32
Under NEPA, all federal agencies must incorporate environmental considerations in the analysis of "major" projects. 33 The depth of the analysis depends on the likely impact to the environment. The three basic levels of analysis are (1) a categorical exclusion, (2) an environmental assessment (EA), and
(3) an environmental impact statement (EIS).34
As the name suggests, a categorical exclusion operates to preclude any
substantial analysis. 35 If the project in question is one that, as a category, has
been found to result in no significant environmental impact, the agency may
proceed with the project right away.36 Projects that are categorically excluded
from the NEPA analysis are often straight-forward, routine, and wellunderstood. In the transportation context, for instance, categorically excluded
projects include constructing bike paths and rest areas, resurfacing highways,

public awareness. Secondary benefits include fostering collaborative government and participatory democracy.").
30
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012).
3'
See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351; Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462
U.S. 87, 97 (1983) ("Congress in enacting NEPA, however, did not require agencies to elevate
environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations. Rather, it required only that the
agency take a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences before taking a major action.").
32 See Bait. Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 97 (describing NEPA's "twin aims"); see also RICHARD

J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 68 (2004) ("By the end of the 1970s,.

.

. the

U.S. Supreme Court had rejected any such substantive dimensionto NEPA, ruling instead that
NEPA's mandate was 'essentially procedural."'); cf William Murray Tabb, The Role of Controversy in NEPA: Reconciling Public Veto with Public Participationin Environmental Decisionmaking, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 175, 211 (1997) (stating that NEPA's "re-

quirements, although not directed to achieve a particular outcome, are intended to ensure the
integrity of the process and hopefully achieve better decisionmaking").
3
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). The Council on Environmental Quality has defined "major
[flederal actions" as "actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to
Federal control and responsibility." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2013).
34
Ted Boling, Making the Connection: NEPA Processesfor NationalEnvironmental Policy,
32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 313, 318-19 (2010).
3s
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Role ofNEPA in FossilFuel Resource Development and Use in
the Western United States, 39 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 283, 300 (2012).
36 See, e.g., Colo. Wild v. U. S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2006).
37

See Boling, supra note 34, at 319.
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and landscaping. As one might imagine, requiring analysis of these sorts of
projects would consume far too many agency hours, rendering them prohibitively expensive.39 Given the known and relatively minimal environmental impact of these projects, the benefits of detailed analysis are outweighed by the
costs. 40
Assuming a project does not fit within one of the categorical exclusions-and likewise assuming the project does not fall within a category that
typically requires an EIS-the sponsoring agency must prepare an EA. 4 1 An
EA is a concise analysis that gauges the likely impact of the proposed project
and possible alternatives. 42 Practically, its main purpose is to determine whether the agency should conduct the more detailed analysis accompanying an
EIS.4 3 An EA generally describes the need for the project, available alternatives, the environmental impacts of the proposed action and alternatives, and
the agencies and persons consulted in preparing the document.4 If in the course

23 C.F.R. § 771.117(c)-(d) (2013).
3
See Boling, supra note 34, at 319 (explaining that categorical exclusions "were designed to
avoid repetitive analysis of actions that normally do not involve significant impacts"). Many
complain that NEPA compliance is already too costly. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
3

QUALITY,

EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A
STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS (1997) [hereinafter, CEQ STUDY] (ob-

serving that NEPA compliance often requires too much in the way of money and time); Irma S.
Russell, Streamlining NEPA to Combat Global Climate Change: Heresy or Necessity?, 39
ENvTL. L. 1049 (2009) (arguing that NEPA should be streamlined in the context of clean energy
projects to encourage development in this direction).

See Kevin H. Moriarty, Circumventing the National Environmental Policy Act: Agency
Abuse of the CategoricalExclusion, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2312, 2322 (2004) ("The public need not
participate in minor decisions, and requiring them to do so would only distract them from environmentally significant decisions and unnecessarily burden agencies. Categorical exclusions thus
promote agency efficiency and avoid masses of paper that might otherwise divert attention away
40

from federal actions with real environmental effects.").

41

Mark A. Chertok et al., Overview of the National Environmental Policy Act: Environmen-

tal Impact Assessments and Alternatives, http://www.sprlaw.com/pdf/sprnepaeli_05.pdf (last
visited Sept. 5, 2013).
42
NEPA Documents, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/nepa/nepa-documents
(last

visited Sept. 5, 2013).
43
See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 546 (11th Cir. 1996).
National Environmental Policy Act: Basic Information, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/nepa.html (last updated June 25, 2012). Under NEPA,
"significance" is measured in terms of both "context" and "intensity." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27
(2013). The consideration of "context" requires agencies to judge "the significance of an action . . . in several contexts such as society as a whole (human, national), the affected region, the

affected interests, and the locality." Id. § 1508.27(a). The "intensity" analysis bears more directly
on the question of impact and requires agencies to consider (1) "both beneficial and adverse" impacts, (2) the effect on public health and safety, (3) "unique characteristics of the geographic area," (4) the extent to which the impacts on the "human environment are likely to be highly controversial," (5) the extent to which the risks to the human environment are unknown or uncertain,
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of preparing the EA the agency determines that the project will have no significant impact on the environment, it issues a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI). Assuming the FONSI is not challenged in court, the agency may then
break ground or issue the permit.45
The law on public participation in EAs is somewhat muddled. 46 Although, according to the Council of Environmental Quality itself, CEQ regulations "do not require agencies to prepare a draft EA or circulate a draft or final
EA for public review or comment,'" 7 they do direct agencies to generally inform and engage the public throughout the decision-making process.48 On this
basis, some courts have inferred a duty to solicit public comment on draft
EAs.4 9 Other courts have held the opposite.so Whether out of an abundance of
caution or a genuine sense of duty, most agencies have taken it upon themselves to make draft EAs available to the public and to receive input before issuing a FONSI, at least in controversial cases.

(6) the extent to which the project decision could establish a precedent or signal a decision in
principle about a future action, (7) "whether the action is related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts," (8) the extent to which the action may
negatively affect sites of historic, scientific, or cultural importance, (9) whether the action will
negatively impact a species (or its critical habitat) listed as endangered or threatened under the
Endangered Species Act, and (10) whether the action will threaten violation of federal, state, or
local requirements designed to protect the environment. Id. § 1508.27(b).
45
Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 599 (9th
Cir. 2010).
46
See Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1279 (10th Cir. 2004)
("NEPA's public involvement requirements are not as well defined when an agency prepares only an EA and not an EIS.").
47
Nancy H. Sutley, Memorandumfor Heads ofFederal Departments and Agencies: Improving the Processfor PreparingEfficient and Timely Environmental Reviews under the National
Environmental
Policy
Act,
COUNCIL
ON
ENvTL.
QUALITY
11-12,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/nepa improving efficiencydraft_g
uidance.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2013).
48
40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(b), 1506.6(a) (2013).
49
Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2003);
see Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 674 F. Supp. 2d 783 (S.D. W. Va.
2009).
5o
Montrose Parkway Alts. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 405 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D.
Md. 2005); see Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Forest Service, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (E.D.
Cal. 2007); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthome, 525 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2007).
s1
See, e.g., Bureau of Land Management, BLM Seeks Comments on EA for Wind River/Bighorn Basin DistrictPortionofAugust 2013 Oil and Gas Lease Parcels,U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.blm.gov/wy/st/en/info/news room/2013/january/25wrbbdleasesale.html (seeking public comment on EA in connection with proposal to grant oil-and-gas
leases on up to 98,000+ acres in Wyoming's Wind River Range); NEPA Documentation, U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., http://www.environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/docuea.asp (last visited Sept.
5, 2013) (stating agency policy that "EAs do not need to be circulated but they must be made

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

122

[Vol. 116

If the agency determines that the project will result in significant impact, it must prepare a full-blown EIS.5 2 An EIS typically has four main sections: (1) an introduction that sets forth the purpose and need of the project; (2)
a description of the environment at issue; (3) the various alternatives to the project, one of which must be a "no action" alternative; and (4) an analysis of the
expected environmental impact of each alternative, including the impact on endangered species, air, water, historical and cultural sites, the local economy,
and the public fisc. 53 If the project is expected to have a particularly profound
impact on the environment, the EIS will also normally include an environmental mitigation plan (EMP).54 An EMP is a set of design and operational
measures that aim to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts.
The EIS process is characterized by stricter participation requirements.
If an agency decides to prepare an EIS, the public has an opportunity to get in
on the ground floor through involvement in scoping.56 Scoping is the step during which the agency identifies the issues to be considered in the EIS.57 Federal
regulations require agencies to actively seek input from the public and other
agencies on scoping determinations.s Following scoping, the agency prepares a
draft EIS and makes it available for public comment.59 The agency must give
the public a minimum of forty-five days to respond.60 Although the agency retains discretion over whether to hold a public hearing, the agency must do so
when there is "[s]ubstantial environmental controversy concerning the proposed action or substantial interest in holding the hearing." 6' After receiving
comments from the public and other agencies-whether written or submitted at
a hearing-the agency must then prepare a final EIS addressing the "responsiavailable to the public through notices of availability in local, state, or regional clearinghouses,
newspapers and other means").
52
Again, the efficient use of limited agency resources is key. "The EIS process reflects a prioritization of agency resources to focus on those environmental effects deemed 'significant."'
Tabb, supranote 32, at 206.
5
40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.13-1502.16 (2013).
54
Even if the agency does not include a full mitigation plan, mitigation should be discussed
in the EIS. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989); League of
Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002).
5s
See,
IMPACT

e.g., DEP'T OF ENERGY,
ASSESSMENT

BELIZE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL
REVISED
25-26
(2008),
available
at

http://www.doe.gov.bz/documents/EIA/Solid%20Waste/003%20SW%2Rev%20EIA%2Exec
%20Summary.pdf.
56
40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2013).
57

Id § 1501.7(a)(2)-3).

5

Id
Id. § 1502.19.
Id. § 1506.10(c).
Id. § 1506.6(c).

5
60
61

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss1/6

14

Fromhertz: From Consultation to Consent: Community Approval as a Prerequisit
2013]

FROM CONSULTATION TO CONSENT

123

ble" concerns raised with respect to the draft.62 Thirty days after distributing the
final EIS, the agency may render its ultimate decision.
Judicial review of agency decisions under NEPA is deferential.6 "The
role of the courts is simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered
and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not
arbitrary or capricious." 65 Whether the agency analysis resulted in a FONSI or a
decision approving the project with modifications following an EIS, the court
will only reverse the decision if the agency failed to take the requisite "hard
look" at the potential environmental impacts. Generally speaking, this is not a
difficult showing for the agency to make.67
C.

The NEPA Framework Goes Global

So how did the basic consultation framework of NEPA expand beyond
U.S. borders to become a nearly global standard?68 For one thing, the environmental movement of the 1960s and 70s69 was not limited to the United States. 70

Id. § 1502.9(b).
Id. §§ 1505.2, 1506.10(b)(2).
64
Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, JudicialActivism and Restraint in the Supreme
Court'sEnvironmentalLaw Decisions,42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 371 (1989).
65
Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983).
66
Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989); Young v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 99 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (D.D.C. 2000). Note, however, that if a plaintiff challenges the agency's decision to forgo an EIS on the basis of a FONSI, the plaintiff must only show "substantial
questions" as to the issue of "significant impact." Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 843 F.2d
1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988).
67
See Dorothy W. Bisbee, NEPA Review of Offshore Wind Farms: Ensuring Emission Reduction Benefits Outweigh Visual Impacts, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 349, 351 (2004) ("[I]t is
settled that courts apply a highly deferential standard of review to NEPA decisions.").
68
See Ann Hironaka, The Globalization of EnvironmentalProtection: The Case of Environmental Impact Assessment, 43 INT'L J. OF COMP. Soc. 65, 66 (2002) ("Environmental Impact Assessments were first developed in the United States in 1969, but have diffused rapidly to many
other countries in the following decades."); Nicholas Robinson, Enforcing Environmental
Norms: Diplomatic and JudicialApproaches, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 387, 404
(2003) ("NEPA has served as a model for counterpart laws within the United States ... and in
other nations."). I use the term "global standard" to describe the increasingly harmonious evolution of both national laws within various countries and international laws among such countries.
In this sense, my use of the term is similar to Yang and Percival's description of "global environmental law." See Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environ62
63

mental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009).
69
Though the environmental movement exploded onto the political scene during this time
period, it would be a mistake to think that the movement was somehow spontaneous or without
historical build-up. LAZARUS, supra note 32, at 44.
70
See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 140 (4th ed.

2011) ("A similar transformation was occurring throughout the industrialized world as many
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Activists staged protests and gained political ground in Europe, ' Asia,72 Australia,73 Latin America,74 and Africa, raising concerns over water pollution, air
contamination, species loss, and more.
In terms of legal reform, the biggest event was the Stockholm Conference and Declaration of 1972.77 Creating the first UN body exclusively devoted

countries passed national environmental laws and established environmental institutions in the
late 1960s and early 1970s.").
71
See, e.g., Christopher Rootes, The Transformation of Environmental Activism: An Introduction, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST INWESTERN EUROPE 1, 9-11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003)
(discussing the history of Germany's Green Party); Do-Wan Ku, The Structural Change of the
Korean Environmental Movement, 25 KOR. J. OF POPULATION & DEv. 155, 156 (1996) (describing protests in the 1960s and the emerging environmental movement in Korea); see also HILARY
F. FRENCH, GREEN REVOLUTIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL RECONSTRUCTION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND
THE SOVIET UNION 30 (1990) (identifying the Chernobyl crisis as the pivotal moment for the environmental movement in the Soviet Union); cf Douglas Lind, The Crane, the Swamp, and the
Melancholy: Nature and Nihilism in Soviet EnvironmentalLiterature and Law, 23 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 381, 386 (2009) ("Not until the 1960s did the Soviet Union begin anew
to enact laws protective in any meaningful way of the environment and natural resources."). But
see Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon:Rule of Law, Politics ofEnforcement, and
Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 267,
280-81 (2007) ("China was at least two decades behind the United States and Western Europe in
introducing domestic environmental laws .... ").
72
See, e.g., JEFF HAYNES, POLITICS INTHE DEVELOPING WORLD: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION
229-30 (2002) (describing the history of the "Chipko Movement," or the practice of individuals
wrapping themselves around trees to prevent them from being felled, which started in northern
India in the 1970s).
7
See generally GREG BUCKMAN, TASMANIA'S WILDERNESS BATTLES: A HISTORY (2008).
74
In Brazil, for instance, the mid-1970s saw the initiation of a campaign by rubber-tappers to
halt the destruction of rainforest by encroaching ranchers. Although the campaign managed to
save 1.2 million acres of rainforest, its leader, Francisco "Chico" Mendes, was brutally murdered
in 1988. Anthony L. Hall, Land Tenure and Land Reform in Brazil, in AGRARIAN REFORM AND
GRASSROOTs DEVELOPMENT: TEN CASE STUDIES 205, 213 (Roy L. Posterman et al. eds., 1990).
7
In South Africa, for instance, concerns of environmental justice-particularly the fair distribution of water-took center stage during the transition from apartheid to democracy in the
early 1990s. See Rose Francis, Water Justice in South Africa: Natural Resources Policy at the
Intersection of Human Rights, Economics, and PoliticalPower, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
149, 156-57 (2005).
76
Although protests and corresponding legal reforms occurred in all these areas, however, the
environmental movement did seem to pick up more steam in the developed world-at least in the
1960s and 1970s. There are at least two reasons for this: (1) with many of the worst environmental problems stemming directly from industrialization, developing nations did not experience the
full force of these problems; and (2) developing nations had more urgent challenges, like widespread poverty and hunger and the formation of new governments in the post-colonial era. See
HUNTER ET AL., supra note 70, at 140-41. By the late 1980s, environmental protection had become a policy priority in developing countries as well. See generally Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Frameworkon Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 526 n.455
(1993).
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to environmental issues-the United Nations Environment Programme-the
Stockholm Conference also generated movement towards establishing EIAs
and public comment as a global standard. 7 8 Five of the recommendations coming out of the conference encouraged nations to assess potential environmental
impacts before breaking ground on public projects.79 As it now stands, over
70% of nations require ElAs in at least certain types of public works.80 And
even if a few nations still do not require EIAs, they may eventually find themselves legally bound to do so under evolving standards of customary law.
That being said, there is still a great amount of diversity among regional and national approaches to environmental decision-making.82 In the Europe-

n
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16,
1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.48/14 (June 16, 1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
78
See Joan R. Goldfarb, ExtraterritorialCompliance with NEPA amid the Current Wave of
EnvironmentalAlarm, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 543, 583 (1991).
7
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 77. Although EIAs vary from country to country, the
basics remain largely the same. Professor Hironaka describes the global standard as follows:
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are reports of predicted environmental consequences that are typically a prerequisite to development projects
such as roads or buildings. Ideally, an EIA fulfills three tasks. First, the EIA
describes the proposed project and the predicted environmental effects of the
project in the immediate and long-term future. Second, the EIA lays out the
alternatives for the decision-maker and calculates the costs and benefits of
each alternative. Third, the public and relevant interest groups are informed
about the contents of the EIA and are allowed to negotiate over the details of
the plan.
Hironaka, supra note 68, at 66 (internal citations omitted).
80
Kevin R. Gray, InternationalEnvironmental Impact Assessment: Potentialfor a Multilateral Environmental Agreement, 11 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 83, 89 (2000); see also
Caleb W. Christopher, Success by a Thousand Cuts: The Use of Environmental Impact Assessment in Addressing Climate Change, 9 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 549, 553 (2008) ("The NEPA model was
adopted in varying forms by over 100 nations within their domestic law.").
8
See HUNTER, ET AL., supra note 70, at 309 ("Frequently mentioned candidates for customary status include .. . the principle that State actions should be undertaken only after conducting
an environmental impact assessment."). But see id. at 310 ("Although [this and other principles']
frequent reiteration in international documents of every kind provides evidence of possible opinio
juris, State practice may be too new and insufficiently uniform to satisfy the consistent State
practice requirement."). Even where an EIA is not statutorily required, some states have recognized it as the usual and proper practice. See, e.g., Save Guana Cay Reef Association Ltd. v. The
Queen & Ors [2009] UKPC 44, [12] (Bahamas) ("The preparation of the EIA in this case, and its
submission to The Bahamas Environment, Science and Technology Commission (BEST Commission) was in accordance with what has become the usual practice, but it is not a practice required by statute.").
82
See Mark Squillace, An American Perspective on Environmental Impact Assessment in
Australia, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 43, 45 (1995) ("Although EIA legislation has become commonplace throughout the world, marked contrasts exist in the manner in which EIA has developed and been implemented."); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE, GUIDEBOOK FOR
EVALUATING MINING PROJECT EIAs 87 (2010) ("Public participation requirements and imple-
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an Union, for instance, the process is similar to NEPA at the surface level, but
significant deviations appear once we dive into the details. One point of distinction lies in the identity of the entity charged with preparing the impact state83
ment. Whereas NEPA
places this duty with the agency, 84 in the EU the statement is "prepared by or on behalf of the developer, not a neutral party, and so is
likely to give a distorted picture of the true environmental impact."" While this
difference is somewhat technical in nature-being the product of specific legislation-other differences between the American approach and its foreign counterparts arise from more fundamental rules. In Australia, for instance, citizen
suits challenging agency action are impeded by the "English rule" of cost and
fee assessment (requiring the losing party to pay the winning party's reasonable
costs and attorney's fees). Despite these differences, the commonality is far
more striking: Nations around the world have adopted laws that (1) require
government to consider the environmental impacts of a project prior to approval and (2) allow some measure of public input.
mentation vary widely, depending on the particular EIA system. Some laws require extensive
public involvement as part of the EIA process, while others make it discretionary, or are silent on
the matter.").
83
Louis L. Bono, The Implementation of the EC Directive on EnvironmentalImpact Assessment with the English PlanningSystem: A Refinement of the NEPA Process, 9 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 155, 174 (1991). Another distinction is the way in which projects are singled out for EIAs.
Whereas NEPA vaguely requires EISs for actions "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012), the EU directive specifically identifies the projects for which an EIA must be prepared, Council Directive 97/11, 1997 O.J. (L 73) 5, Annex I
(EC).
84
Bono, supra note 83, at 174.
85
DAVID WILKENSON, ENVIRONMENT AND LAW 118 (2002); see also DONALD M. GOLDBERG,
CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAW, A COMPARISON OF Six ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
REGIMES: THE UNITED STATES, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, SLOVAKIA, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,

THE WORLD BANK, THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 9-10 (1993),
available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/AComparisonof6EnvReg.pdf (outlining difference
between NEPA and EU law as it concerns responsibility for statement preparation). This is also
the case in Taiwan. See Dennis Te-Chung Tang, New Developments in EnvironmentalLaw and
Policy in Taiwan, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 245, 258-59 (1997).
Squillace, supra note 82, at 56; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English
Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 329 (2013).
87
See Gray, supra note 80, at 90; Yuhong Zhao, Public Participationin China's EIA Regime: Rhetoric or Reality?, 22 OXFORD J.OF ENvTL. L. 8990 (2010) [hereinafter Public Participation in China] ("Public participation forms an essential part of any efforts to tackle environmental problems. It is treated as the cornerstone of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in
the West, which has critical value in informing decision-makers of the potential environmental
harms of a proposed project or action."). Whether these laws are enforced is another matter altogether. Particularly in the developing world, EIA laws that impress as written are often paper tigers. See, e.g., Yuhong Zhao, Assessing the Environmental Impact of Projects: A Critique of the
EIA Legal Regime in China, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 485, 500 (2009) ("The 2005 'storm of environmental protection' has revealed the common practice of many project proponents . . . to start
8
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Underlying this movement is the ascendancy of a political outlook that
sees citizen input as fundamental to government decision-making regarding the
environment. As expressed in 1992's Rio Declaration:
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of
all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information
concerning the environment that is held by public authorities,
including information on hazardous materials and activities in
their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage
public awareness and participation by making information
widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided."
In addition, citizen input now plays an important, though less significant, role in international environmental law (as opposed to national law in
place throughout the world's countries). 89 In Europe, for instance, environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been recognized as "legitimate bearers of procedural rights on behalf of affected publics." 90 Rather than
just observing the design of international conventions and treaties, NGOs are
beginning to actively participate in the process.9 1
construction first and then, if caught by the enforcement authority, submit an EIA document and
continue with construction.").
88
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June
3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 10, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1
(Vol.
I),
Annex
I (Aug.
12,
1992),
available at
http://search.yahoo.com/r/ylt-AOoG7nq4fl dSpXIAb4FXNyoA;jlu=X3oDMTEzNGtpY3AyB
HN1YwNzcgRwb3MDMgRjb2xvA2FjMgR2dGlkAlZJUDI4NF8x/SIG=12nqn7si2/EXP=1381
494840/**http%3a//sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda2 1.pdf.
89
See Michael Mason, Citizenship Entitlements Beyond Borders?Identifying Mechanisms of
Access and Redress for Affected Publics in International Environmental Law, 12 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 283, 284 (2006) ("There is an emerging body of international law that, although
state centered in its formulation and implementation, is attuned both to safeguarding collective
ecological interests and to allowing at least some input from public actors in administering its
constituent environmental obligations."); Peter H. Sand, The Evolution of InternationalEnvironmental Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 29,41 (Daniel
Bodansky et al. eds., 2007) (describing the "participatory revolution" that occurred at Rio in
1992).
90
Mason, supra note 89, at 283.
91
Id That being said, we should be careful not to exaggerate the growing influence of civil
society and NGOs vis-i-vis the environmental decision-making process. From a normative
standpoint, we might wish to reach a place where civil society and governmental agencies stand
on an equal footing, but that does not make it so as a matter of fact. See Zoe Pearson, NonGovernmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of
InternationalLaw, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 243, 247-48 (2006) ("Some commentators ... present
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To cite one recent example of citizen input in the design of international environmental law,92 consider the process behind the Voluntary Guidelines
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the
Context of National Food Security ("Land Tenure Guidelines"), adopted in
2012 by the UN Committee on World Food Security.93 Three years in the mak-

a very rosy picture of the nature and extent of NGO influence on international law, though often
with little empirical evidence to substantiate their claims."). As it now stands, the notion of genuine parity between state and non-state actors seems more myth than accurate description of reality. Still, there are signs of progress. See Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and Its
Implicationsfor InternationalLaw, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 13 (1997).
92
The Land Tenure Guidelines and the Rio Declaration are but two examples of soft-law instruments that emphasize the importance of public participation in environmental lawmaking.
Other examples include United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declarationon Environment andDevelopment, Agenda 21,
ch. 23, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), available at
http://search.yahoo.com/r/_ylt-AOoG7nq4fl dSpXlAb4FXNyoA;_ylu=X3DMTEzNGtpY3AyB
HNlwNzcgRwb3MDMgRjb2xvA2FjMgR2dGlkAl ZJUDI4NF8x/SIG=12nqn7si2/EXP=138149
4840/**http%3a//sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf; International
Conference on Water and the Environment, Jan. 26-31, 1992, The Dublin Statement on Water
and Sustainable Development, princ. 2 (Jan. 31, 1992), available at http://www.undocuments.net/h2o-dub.htm; and the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg
Declaration on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Afr., Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002, Report
of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, princs. 4, 26, 138, 141, 164, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 199/20 (Sept. 4, 2002). Among binding legal instruments, the following treaties or conventions require some level of public consultation: Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection
and the Sustainable Use of the Waters of the Spanish-Portuguese Hydrographic Basins, Port.Spain, art. 6, Nov. 30, 1998, 2099 U.N.T.S. 275; Aarhus Convention, Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention], availableat http://
www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf; Helsinki Convention, Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes ("Helsinki Convention"),
arts. 11(3), 16(1)-(2), Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269; Ramsar Convention, Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, art. 3(a), Feb. 2, 1971,
996 U.N.T.S. 245; Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, art. 16(2), July 9, 1985, available at
http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/RE/FullEn/TRE00082O.txt;
Canada-MexicoUnited States North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, art. 1(h), Sept. 14,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480; Framework Convention on the Protection and Sustainable Development of
the
Carpathians,
art.
13(1),
May
22,
2003,
available
at
http://
www.carpathianconvention.org/text-of-the-convention.html; Revised African Convention on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources arts. XVI, XX, July 11, 2003, available at
http://www.au.int/en/content/african-convention-conservation-nature-and-natural-resourcesrevised-version; Tripartite Interim Agreement Between the Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland for Co-Operation on the Protection and
Sustainable Utilization of the Water Resources of the Incomati and Maputo Watercourses,
Mozam.-S.
Afr.-Swaz.,
art.
12,
Aug.
29,
2002,
available
at
http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/TROO 1811 .doc.
9

COMM. ON WORLD FOOD SEC., VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE

OF TENURE OF LAND, FISHERIES AND FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY
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ing, the Land Tenure Guidelines were the result of broad-based consultation,
including ten regional, one private sector, and four civil society meetings. Attended by nearly 1,000 people from over 130 countries, "[t]he participants represented government institutions, civil society, private sector, academia and UN
agencies." 94
In keeping with the trend, the Land Tenure Guidelines identified "consultation and participation" as one of the key implementation principles. 95 According to the Guidelines, governments seeking to implement new land policies
should "engag[e] with and seek[] the support of those who . .. could be affected by decisions[] prior to decisions being taken."96 In a victory for marginalized
peoples, the Committee on World Food Security further advised governments
to take "into consideration existing power imbalances between different parties" while "ensuring active, free, effective, meaningful and informed participation of individuals and groups in associated decision-making processes."97
In addition to building upon the Rio Declaration, instruments like the
Land Tenure Guidelines expand upon the principles annunciated in the regional
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (better known as the "Aarhus
Convention"). The 1998 Aarhus Convention stands out as an international
agreement exclusively aimed at ensuring public participation and the right to
know in the context of environmentally sensitive projects. Although limited by
its regional scope-its signatories are countries in Europe and Central Asiathe Aarhus Convention distinguishes itself as the most progressive binding international legal document speaking to the issue of public participation in environmental decision-making.99
As it now stands, then, national and international law-making institutions have largely embraced the idea of citizen consultation as a key component

Tenure
Land
[hereinafter
(2012)
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf.

Guidelines],

available

at

94
FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, About the Voluntary Guidelines on the
Responsible Governance of Tenure, http://www.fao.org/nr/tenure/voluntary-guidelines/en/ (last
visited Sept. 6, 2013).
9
Land Tenure Guidelines, supranote 93, at 6.
96

Id. at 5.

97

Id.

Aarhus Convention, supra note 92.
99
See U.N. ECON. COMM'N OF EuR., THE AARHUS CONVENTiON: AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE,
at v, U.N. Doc. ECE/CEP/72, U.N. Sales No. E.00.II.E.3 (2000), available at
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/acig.pdf ("Although regional in scope, the significance of the Aarhus Convention is global. It is by far the most impressive elaboration of principle
10 of the Rio Declaration, which stresses the need for citizens' participation in environmental
issues and for access to information on the environment held by public authorities.").
98
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in environmental decision-making. 0 0 What's more, if the Land Tenure Guidelines and other like documents are any evidence, they are beginning to recognize that public consultation processes should take into account the power imbalance that exists within civil society. The thought is that more weight should
be given to the interests of local, marginalized communities (i.e., the people
most likely to suffer the severest consequences) than to the interests of other
parties.
D.

Local Concerns as a Driverfor the Adoption ofNEPA-Style Regimes

One of the main reasons the United States and other nations have
adopted NEPA-style regimes is to address the perceived failure of government
agencies to give due weight to local concerns. 0 1 The perception was one of
agencies executing the whim of political and economic interests, many of
which were only loosely tied to the site community.102 Thus, although NEPA
and its foreign counterparts were certainly pushed forward by a general sentiment that public projects were being designed and executed without adequate
environmental analysis, there was also the feeling that local communities had
no say in the matter.'0 3
To give an example, imagine that the Department of Energy (DOE) is
contemplating where to locate a nuclear-waste facility. Even if the DOE were
required to analyze the potential environmental impacts and consider alternatives, the absence of a public-consultation requirement would undermine the
ability of the local community (i.e., the community surrounding the site) to ex-

100 The trend of citizen input is not limited to environmental law. Across all areas, "participation in the global constitutive process of authoritative decision has been greatly democratized" in
recent decades. LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
POLICY ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 23 (2d ed. 2001).
101 See Paul J. Culhane, NEPA's Impacts on FederalAgencies, Anticipated & Unanticipated,
20 ENVTL. L. 681, 691-92 (1990); see also Roger Nober, FederalHighways and Environmental
Litigation: Toward a Theory of Public Choice and Administrative Reaction, 27 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 229, 269 (1990) ("The public hearing provisions of the EIS process require that local concerns and considerations be heard, considered, and integrated into the project's design.").
102
As arms of the Executive Branch, federal agencies in the pre-NEPA days would often
speak with a united voice, following the lead of the White House in lock-step. See, e.g., William
H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and Recruitment in EnvironmentalLaw, 20 ENvTL. L.
485, 489-90 (1990) (describing this phenomenon in the context of the supersonic airplane project
under the Nixon administration); see also id. at 490 ("Twenty years later, after the experience of
a generation with NEPA, we would be surprised to see the major agencies of the federal government address a controversial environmental issue (for example, oil development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge) with a single voice.").
103
See Ryan M. Seidemann & James G. Wilkins, Blanco v. Burton: What Did We Learnfrom
Louisiana'sRecent OCS Challenge?, 25 PACE ENVTL L. REv. 393, 400 (2008) ("The general idea
is that the decision makers in Washington may not be aware of the local environmental impacts
of their decisions that are made thousands of miles away.").
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press unique concerns. At a minimum, the community would be prevented
from giving voice to: (1) non-obvious environmental factors, (2) non-obvious
economic factors, and (3) socio-cultural considerations. Of course, if the local
community were unable to present these concerns, the agency charged with
making the decision would be less likely to consider them in its analysis. The
inclusion of a public-comment requirement was a direct response to this.'0
It was not just that agencies operating in a pre-NEPA world were failing to consider local interests; it was that they were failing to consider some local interests more than others.os If a local organization or business stood to
gain or lose in an obvious and immediate (read: economic) way, the agency
would likely consider such interests.'0 6 But if the local interests were more generalized-the interests we all have in the environmental quality of our surrounding ecosystems-they would receive short shrift.107 It was this asymmetrical consideration of local interests that public participation aimed to remedy.
Understood in this manner, public participation in agency decisions seems a rather appropriate response to the limited space afforded to prospective litigants
under modem standing doctrine.108 Public participation under NEPA calls
standing's bluff: Of course we should all have a say, it affirms, because these
decisions affect everyone.

Yet, even so, our embrace of public participation implicitly recognizes
the need for a different type of asymmetry. All members of the public have a
right to participate, but the concerns raised by some members of the publiclocals, and especially locals without an investment stake-should be given
more credit than others. 0 9 Whether we think of this as a counterweight (to the
10
The idea of a public-comment requirement was one of the most important concepts to arise
from 1969's landmark Conference on Law and the Environment. See LAZARUS, supra note 32, at
48. Led by policy advocates such as Ralph Nader and legal academics such as Professor David
Currie-who would later author the 1970 Illinois Environmental Protection Act-the Conference
concluded that the country needed "an early warning system about major environmental modifications and proposals, permitting public comment and criticism before the event." Philip H. Hoff

and Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr., Conclusion, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 368, 372-74 (Mal-

colm F. Baldwin and James K. Page, Jr. eds., 1970). This "early warning system" for the broader
public is exactly what we have in NEPA. LAZARUS, supra note 32, at 48.
105 See Culhane, supra note 101, at 687 ("Citizen participation had been the centerpiece
of attempts to democratize urban programs in the late 1960s, and carried the 'power to the people'
flavor of 1960s radicalism. Public interest groups saw the NEPA process as a mechanism for participation in agency decision processes from which they felt systematically excluded, although
economic interests with a contractualstake in the decision were naturally included in decision
negotiations." (emphasis added)).
106

See id.

107

id

See Nicholas A. Fromherz & Joseph W. Mead, Equal Standing with States: Tribal Sovereignty and Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 134 (2010).
109
This is not to suggest that NEPA has been implemented in a way that grants heightened
importance to local interests. Indeed, as I argue below, the reality has been quite the opposite.
108
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heavy emphasis granted to pro-development business interests) or a protective
measure (to prevent the people's voice from being drowned out), the basic idea
remains the same: Public participation was intended, at least in part, to bring us
closer to a world where influence is commensurate with interest, with interest
defined broadly.
III. PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING: THE
BENEFITS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CONSULTATION MODEL

In this Part, I discuss the pros and cons of the consultation model, both
in the United States under NEPA and in other nations under their respective
EIA regimes. I begin by acknowledging the ground-breaking nature of NEPA's
public-participation scheme, highlighting in particular the shift this has worked
towards heightened transparency of agency decision-making and the impact it
has had on government initiatives that affect the environment. I then gauge the
breadth and depth of public participation under NEPA specifically and EIA
generally, concluding that, despite the hype, consultation has failed to give a
meaningful voice to the public. I elaborate on this theme by mapping consultation's failure to encourage deliberative democracy, its tendency to cater to the
well-educated and well-off, its inadequacy as a lever for local site communities,
and its inability to consistently secure legitimacy and public acceptance for the
projects and initiatives to which it applies. I end by returning to the specific
provisions of NEPA, examining one way in which the statute appears-but ultimately fails-to accommodate the opposition that might be mounted by a disproportionally affected site community.
A.

Credit Where It's Due

Although NEPA and its foreign counterparts fail to involve the public
to a sufficient degree, this sort of legislation has not been a complete flop in
terms of democratizing agency decision-making. As Jonathan Poisner explains,
NEPA represents "a grand experiment in democracy."'1 10 Through it, "[t]he administrative agencies .

.

. have opened their decision-making processes to un-

Recognizing this problem, the Task Force on Improving NEPA advised CEQ in 2005 "to prepare
regulations giving weight to localized comments." TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING THE NAT'L ENVTL
POLICY ACT AND TASK FORCE ON UPDATING THE NAT'L ENVTL POLICY ACT, INITIAL FINDINGS
available
at
26
(2005),
AND
DRAFT
RECOMMENDATIONS
The
http://ncfp.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/nepataskforcenepareportfinaldraftl22105-1.pdf.
logic was quite simple: Influence in the decisional process should be commensurate with stake.
See id. ("When evaluating the environmental impacts of a particular major federal action, the issues and concerns raised by local interests should be weighted more than comments from outside
groups and individuals who are not directly affected by that proposal.").
110 Poisner, supranote 8, at 53.
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paralleled levels of citizen input and scrutiny.""' To contend that NEPA has
not gone far enough with respect to citizen input is not to deny the progress that
it has achieved."12
Prior to NEPA, decision-making by executive agencies was much more
4
opaque.' The public learned of the results, but not much else.1 Regular citizens were usually not privy to the analysis leading up to the decision, let alone
invited to participate in that analysis."l5 By inviting public comment, executive
agencies in the post-NEPA era have been more likely to modify projects in
light of expressed concerns and to consider alternatives proposed by interested
-116
citizens.
In addition to what we might call the "value-added" benefit of public
involvement-helpful modifications to projects and initiatives that are teased
out through public scrutiny and feedback-the transparency demanded by
NEPA has acted as a powerful screen. As Robert Dreher puts it, "NEPA's most
significant effect has been to deter federal agencies from bringing forward pro'
Id.
112 See Stark Ackerman, Observations on the Transformation of the Forest Service: The Ef-

fects of the National Environmental Policy Act on U.S. Forest Service Decision Making, 20
ENvTL. L. 703, 703 (1990) (observing that NEPA "accelerated and stimulated" positive changes
in the Forest Service); Dinah Bear, Some Modest Suggestionsfor Improving Implementation of
the NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 931, 931 (2003); Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 HARV.
ENvTL. L. REv. 203, 205, 207 (1998) (concluding that NEPA has "improved the quality of public
planning and decisionmaking"); Culhane, supra note 101, at 681-93 (identifying the following
benefits vis-A-vis agency decision-making: (1) the consideration of environmental impacts, (2)
the transformation of agency staffs away from homogeneity, and (3) some degree of public participation); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 906 (2002) ("NEPA transformed the institutional landscape in its revolutionary youth, bringing important and lasting
changes to the way government does business.").
113
See Mathew P. Reinhart, The NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act: What Constitutes an Adequate Cumulative Environmental Impacts Analysis and Should It Require an Evaluation of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 17 U. BALT. J. ENvTL. L. 145, 148 (2010) ("Before NEPA was enacted federal agencies could plan and construct large facilities such as highways, bridges and
dams without having to provide Congress, other governmental agencies or the public with any
advanced notice of a proposed facility and its likely adverse environmental impacts, or without
having to solicit public input about the proposed facility and its environmental impacts."). But cf
Culhane, supra note 101, at 691-92 (noting that several federal agencies sought public input prior to NEPA's enactment).
114 See Reinhart, supra note 113, at 148.
115 See id. But see Culhane, supra note 101, at 691-92 (noting exceptions).
116 Today, almost every significant federal environmental law incorporates elements of public
participation. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1287 (2012); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2012); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987, 6974(b) (2012); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 § 117, 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9628 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (2012).
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posed projects that could not withstand public examination and debate."' 17 In
other words, while public involvement improves some projects-taking them
from marginal to reasonable-the specter of public involvement screens out
truly bad ideas from ever being proposed in the first place." 8
B.

Gauging the Breadth and Depth ofPublicParticipation

Despite their achievements, NEPA and EIA have failed to deliver in
several ways. Among the more notable of these failures is the lack of meaningful public participation. Giving a voice to the public is not the same as listening
to the public." 9 In the United States and around the world, EIA has created the
largely false impression that government is responsive to the environmental
concerns of civil society.120 Given the gravity of this failure, we might want to
check our applause for the proliferation of NEPA-like regimes. Though it
would be exaggerating to call the spread of EIA a negative development, there
is legitimate concern that EIA acts as a deceptive veneer, allowing us to feel
better about projects that are rotten at the core.121 If NEPA and other consultation regimes fail to engender-and, more importantly, prompt government to
act upon-public input, then what is the point? 22
All around the world, nations have adopted EIA laws that envision
public notice and comment. Yet, in many of these nations, citizen participation
in the decision-making process is extremely limited or of little consequence.123
In China, for instance, EIA law discriminates between government projects and
private projects.12 4 Unlike NEPA, which applies to "major [flederal actions,"l 2 5
"
Robert G. Dreher, NEPA Under Siege: The PoliticalAssault on the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act, 2005, GEO. ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y INST., at 6, availableat
http://www.arcticgas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2005-nepaundersiege.pdf.
118 The "screening" effect of NEPA is not simply the product of the public-consultation requirement. Another structural adjustment that contributes to screening is NEPA's command that
the agency with decision-making authority circulate its opinion to other interested agencies.
Rodgers, supranote 102, at 489.
"9 See Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions:
Evolving Obstacles and PotentialSolutions Through Partnershipwith Experts and Agents, 27
PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 151, 165 (2009) ("1 contend that the benefits of public participation accrue
generally where the participation has effect. Such effective participation alters the course of the
subject process, by material change, or the substantial potential for material change to either the
substantive outcome or to the underlying process.").
120
David R. Hodas, The Role of Law in Defining Sustainable Development: NEPA Reconsidered, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 8 (1998).
121
122

123
124

Id. at 8.
See Mihaly, supra note 119, at 165.
See, e.g., PublicParticipationin China,supra note 87, at 99-100.
Julie A. Lemmer, CleaningUp Development: EIA in Two of the World's Largest and Most

Rapidly Developing Countries, 19 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 275, 290 (2007).
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the Chinese regime primarily targets private endeavors. 126 With only a few exceptions, government works are off the table.127 And while the Chinese law
technically applies to a broad range of private projects, the proponent need only
solicit comments from the public with respect to one category of projects-socalled "Special Projects" for the development of industry, agriculture, animal
husbandry, forestry, energy, water conservation, communications, construction,
tourism, and natural resources1 28 -and even then only when the project is expected to directly harm the "environmental rights and interests of the public."1 2 9
This opportunity, limited as it is, can be lifted for "cases in which secrecy is required."1 30 Coupled with the Chinese public's understandable reluctance to criticize the government, 13 it comes as no surprise that the first public hearing
held by China under its EIA law did not occur until 2005, 132 some three years
after the EIA law was promulgated.133 Even so, the hearing was riddled with
procedural problems (including viewpoint discrimination, a scheduled time of
only three-and-a-half hours, and no access to key information prior to the day
of the hearing) that muffled the public's voice.134 And this was in the context of
a high-profile project on the grounds of the Imperial Summer Palace in Beijing.13 1 In the run of cases, "the overwhelming practice of engaging the public
in the EIA process still remains at the preliminary stage of nonparticipation or
tokenism."'

12

126

42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
Ruoying Chen, Information Mechanisms and the Future of Chinese Pollution Regulation, 7

CHI. J. INT'L L. 51, 55 (2006).
127
Id.
128
Huanjing Yingxiang Pinggu Fa (f
OiliJi1fftA) [Environmental Impact Assessment
Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept.
1, 2003) 2002 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 77, art. 7 (China) [hereinafter EIA
Law 2002], availableat http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/09/content_75327.htm.
129
Id at art. 11.
130
Id All told, only "3 to 5 percent of all construction projects subject to the EIA requirement" are required to solicit public comment. Yuhong Zhao, Assessing the EnvironmentalImpact
of Projects: A Critique of the EIA Legal Regime in China, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 485, 498
(2009); see also Public Participationin China, supra note 87, at 91.
1 See Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting "the Chinese government
has frequently used force and coercion to suppress political dissent"); see also Public Participation in China, supra note 87, at 91 (explaining that "it has not been the tradition in China to involve the public in the government decision-making process, which is usually shrouded in secrecy").
132 PublicParticipationin China, supra note 87, at 99-100.
13
EIA Law 2002, supra note 128; id. at art. 21 (public-hearing mechanism).
134
PublicParticipationin China, supra note 87, at 100-01.
135
Id. at 97.
131 Id. at 107.
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Variations on this theme can be seen in Peru (where, as of 2009, only
one major mining project had ever been halted at the EIA stage due to public
opposition), 37 India (where officials declared a public consultation for a 1,200
MW power plant satisfactory even though public participation was limited to
one 20-minute hearing held over 35 kilometers away from the site village, effectively precluding local input),138 Nigeria (where public participation is not
yet required by statute),13 9 and countless other countries around the world.14 0
Assessing the situation in three African nations, three Asian nations, nine European nations, and ten Latin American nations, the World Resources Initiative
found that, as of 2008, "public participation has not been mainstreamed at the
project level in about half of the countries assessed."1 4 1 Even where the law envisions an open participatory process, hurdles on the ground include insufficient lead time, unavailable project documents, or consultations that are held
too late in the project cycle to make a real difference.142
In the United States, the birthplace of EIA, the perception of public
participation is mixed. On the one hand, the broader population-comprised
mostly of people who have never submitted a comment or attended a hearinghas a generally positive impression of participation.14 3 The opportunity for participation creates the impression that environmental decision-making is subject
to influence through direct democracy. On the other hand, this vague, uninformed impression is conspicuously absent among many experienced parties.144
137

Fabiana Li, DocumentingAccountability: EnvironmentalImpact Assessment in a Peruvian

Mining Project, 32 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 218, 220 (2009).
138
Kanchi
Kohli,
Myth
of a Public Hearing, CIVIL SOC'Y (July

2010),
http://civilsocietyonline.com/Archive/jul10/jull012.asp; Menju Menon, The Sites of New
Knowledge: Citizens' Participationin EnvironmentalDecisionmaking, RITIMO (Aug. 1, 2011),
availableat http://www.ritimo.org/article948.html.
139 Nerry Echefu & E. Akpofure, Environmental Impact Assessment in Nigeria: Regulatory
Background and Procedural Framework, in STUDIES OF EIA PRACTICE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 63, 72 (Mary McCabe & Barry Sadler eds., 2003).
140
See generally ECON AND TRADE BRANCH, UNITED NATIONS ENv'T PROGRAM, STUDIES OF
EIA PRACTICE INDEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Mary McCabe & Barry Sadler eds., 2003).

141

JOSEPH FOTI ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., VOICE AND CHOICE: OPENING THE DOOR TO

ENVIRONMENTAL

DEMOCRACY

xiii

(2008),

available

at

http://www.accessinitiative.org/sites/default/files/voice-and-choice.pdf.
142

d

CEQ STUDY, supra note 39, at x (describing general impression that NEPA has "open[ed]
the federal process to public input" and "that this open process has improved the effectiveness of
project design and implementation").
14
See, e.g., Ren6 H. Germain et al., Public Perceptions of the USDA Forest Service Public
ParticipationProcess, 3 FOREST POL'Y & ECON. 113, 113 (2001) (describing a nationwide survey
of 178 appellants of Forest Service management decisions and finding that "public participants
who appeal agency decisions are dissatisfied with the equity of the public participation process");
see also Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, TailoredParticipation:Modernizing the APA Rulemaking Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 335 (2009) ("The conclusion is that in certain
143
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Those who have repeatedly engaged in the process know two things: (1) it is
not user-friendly,14 5 and (2) many comments seem to fall on deaf ears.146 EISs
typically range from 200 to more than 2,000 pages in length.14 7 As explained
below, they invite review by experts and attorneys, not lay persons.
One might argue that pre-decision public participation is less important
given the opportunity to attack decisions after the fact in court. In reality, however, challenges to NEPA documents are the exception to the rule. In 2008,
federal agencies submitted 543 EISs to the EPA,14 8 while only 132 NEPA challenges were filed that year in federal court.14 9 Of course, this is to say nothing
of the relative costs associated with ex-post litigation versus ex-ante participation.
Although efforts to solicit input through web-based applications show
promise--engaging more people and encouraging more productive dialogue
among participants' so-they also bear the risk of further diluting the voices of
marginalized communities.'15 While access to the Internet is increasing around
the world, the rural poor are still far less likely to be connected, and they are far
more likely to struggle with literacy.15 2 Even in a world of universal connectivicases all Notice and Comment procedures achieve is pro forma participation, rather than providing a way to give power or a real say to stakeholders or the public.").
145
As those "who practice public participation law know, in environmental cases members of
the general public rarely prepare or present the effective public comment and testimony. It is the
class of professionals, usually attorneys and the consultant experts they retain, who conceive,
write (or edit), and orchestrate the presentation of public testimony." Mihaly, supra note 119, at
154.
146
Unfortunately, it appears that no one has conducted an empirical study of the outcome relationship between public participation and agency decisions.
147 NEPA TASK FORCE, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION
65 (2003), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/6753 1/metadc31140/.
148
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CALENDAR YEAR 2008 FILED EISs, available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20130701000000*/http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/Calendar Year 2008
Filed EISs.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (accessed by searching Internet Archive index).
149
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 2008 NEPA LITIGATION SURVEY, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/query?type-urlquery&url=http%3A%2F%2Fceq.hss.doe.gov%2Fnep
a%2FNEPA2008LitigationSurvey.pdf&Submit-Go+Wayback%21 (last visited Oct. 12, 2013)
(accessed by searching Internet Archive index).
150

See THOMAS C. BEIERLE,

DEMOCRACY ON-LINE: AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL

DIALOGUE ON PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN EPA DECISIONS (2002); Martin Nie, Administrative Rule-

making and Public Lands Conflict: The Forest Service's Roadless Rule, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J.
687, 735-37 (2004) (discussing electronic rulemaking possibilities).
151 World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva, Switz. and Tunis, Tunis.,
Dec. 10-12,
2003 and Nov. 16-18, 2005, Declaration of Principles, para. 10, U.N. Doc WSIS03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (discussing the "digital divide" and observing that the "benefits of the
information technology revolution are today unevenly distributed between the developed and developing countries and within societies").
152
See generally United Nations Conference On Trade and Development, The DigitalDivide
Report: ICT Diffusion Index 2005, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/2006/5 (2006), available at
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ty, online forums might simply increase participation by groups that are already
engaged, rather than bring new voices to the fold. And, perhaps most importantly, increased public inut will not necessarily correspond with increased
consideration by the agency.
C.

Does The ConsultationModel Under NEPA EncourageDeliberative
Democracy?

One of the purposes of public participation under NEPA is to promote
deliberative decision-making. 154 A deliberative process is characterized by a
"dialogue based in reason," where the parties to the conversation transcend
their personal interests and initial opinions in favor of an emerging conception
of the common good. 5 5 The resulting decision may favor some individuals
more than others, but the guiding force is collective well-being, and dispositions are expected to evolve through dialogue. 15 6 Participants do not simply
change their minds in response to the pressure of arriving at a consensus, but
rather because the deliberative process has broadened their perspective.
"When things work well, the ideals of participation and deliberation converge;
the optimal mix of participation and deliberation will ensure breadth as well as
depth and focus in agency decisions."' 5 8
Has public consultation under the NEPA model delivered on this front?
According to the literature, it has not. Jonathan Poisner probed the issue by asking seven questions: (1) Does NEPA promote "[d]ialogue [a]mong [c]itizens?";
http:// www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20065 en.pdf; Mauro F. Guilldn & Sandra L. Sudrez, Explaining the Global Digital Divide: Economic, Political and Sociological Drivers of CrossNational Internet Use, 84 Soc. FORCES 681, 681 (2005). The rural-urban divide has also been
documented in the United States. See generally Curt Stamp, Left Behind: The Lack ofAdvanced
Telecommunication Services in RuralAmerica and Its Strain on Rural Communities-Policy Options for Closing the DigitalDivide, 7 DRAKE J.AGRIC. L. 645 (2002).
153 See Lawrence Susskind & Liora Zion, Can America's Democracy
be Improved? (Consensus Bldg. Inst. and MIT-Harvard Pub. Disputes Program, Draft Working Paper, 2002), available
at
http://www.lawrencesusskind.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Improving-AmericanDemocracy-Negotiation-Susskind-Zion.pdf
154 See Jeffrey Rudd, The Evolution of the Legal Process School's "InstitutionalCompetence"
Theme: Unintended Consequencesfor EnvironmentalLaw, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1045, 1061 (2006)
(discussing NEPA's aim to "engage the public's views through interactive deliberative processes").
1ss
Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok: The Costs of Mass Participationfor Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 173, 205-06 (1997); see also Poisner,supra note 8,
at 56 ("At the risk of great oversimplification, deliberative decision making refers to a mode of
discussion in which participants engage in reasoned discourse about what action serves the common good of the community involved.").
156 See Rossi, supra note
155.
157

Id.

1ss

Id. at 179.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss1/6

30

Fromhertz: From Consultation to Consent: Community Approval as a Prerequisit
2013]

FROM CONSULTATION TO CONSENT

139

(2) To the extent there is a dialogue, does it focus on the "common good"?; (3)
Does the dialogue engender "[c]ritical [r]eflection on the [v]alues [u]nderlying
the [p]roposal?"; (4) Does the process foster the development of "character
traits consistent with deliberative decision-making"?; (5) Does it involve live,
face-to-face communication?; (6) Does the process involve citizens speaking
for themselves, or does it tend to involve representatives hired to speak for others?; and (7) Does NEPA include input from all "[s]ignificant [s]ectors of the
[c]ommunity?"l 5 9 The answers Poisner found are troubling. With respect to
every criterion, NEPA came up short.16 0
Poisner's conclusions are largely consistent with those reached by the
CEQ in its 1997 study on NEPA's efficacy.' 6 ' Looking back over twenty-five
years of NEPA practice, the CEQ determined that study participants (including
agencies, NGOs, academics, businesses, and lay persons) generally perceived
federal agencies to be more accountable under NEPA.16 2 The consensus view
was that NEPA was a helpful "framework for collaboration."' 6 3 But participants' approval of the overall framework hardly meant they were satisfied. Indeed, frustration with the regime was wide-spread, pointing to fundamental
problems with the NEPA decision-making model.16 As the CEQ put it:
[T]he Study determined that frequently NEPA takes too long
and costs too much, agencies make decisions before hearing
from the public, documents are too long and technical for
many people to use, and training for agency officials, particularly senior leadership, is inadequate. According to many federal agency NEPA liaisons, the EIS process is still frequently
viewed as merely a compliance requirement rather than as a
tool to effect better decision-making. Because of this, millions
of dollars, years of time, and tons of paper have been spent on
65
documents that have little effect on decisionmaking.
Beyond these more basic shortcomings, the CEQ's findings on the
quality of citizen participation suggest a process all but devoid of meaningful
deliberation. 66 Citizens reported feeling like "adversaries rather than welcome

159

Poisner, supra note 8, at 86-92.

160

Id. at 86.
CEQ STuDy, supra note 39.

161

Id.; Poisner, supra note 8, at 54 (noting that "public confidence in the administration of
government appears to have gone down, not up, during this period").
163 CEQ STUDy, supra note 39, at 7.
164
id
162

165
166

Id. (emphasis added).
id.
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participants."06 7 They saw public hearings as stages where parties just
"'talk[ed] past each other,"' doing "very little listening."' While they seemed
to understand that the process is not intended to accommodate every possible
complaint, citizens lamented the dearth of "satisfying explanations for why
suggestions were not incorporated."l 69As a result, many citizens viewed litigation as their only vehicle to achieve meaningful participation.' 70
Citizen frustration notwithstanding, the blame cannot be laid entirely at
the doorstep of the agencies. Input from lay citizens often fails to engage the
issues in a productive way-though this is perhaps unsurprising given the decision-making approach under NEPA and existing asymmetries in power and information. "[M]ost comment letters from private individuals are either emotional expressions or personal preferences or form letters with the same content
but different signatures."' 7 1
Lack of information and expertise provide a partial explanation for this
phenomenon, but the fact that this sort of value-laden input is not useful points
to a deeper identity crisis within NEPA.172 Essentially, NEPA is at war with itself, trying to mesh together synoptic and pluralist forms of decision-making.173
The synoptic way relies on the expertise of agencies.' 74 Though it finds common ground with pluralist (and, in some ways, deliberative) decision-making in
the goal of maximizing overall social utility, the synoptic way supposes that
this end is best achieved when "professionals exchange data so that they can
then apply preset scientific rules to determine the optimal decision."' 7 5 Pluralist
decision-making, on the other hand, is characterized by political bargaining.
Under the pluralist model, there is no "common good" per se; the optimal result
is simply the bargain struck between different interests competing on a level
playing field.'76 As one might imagine, these two models will often point to different results. Yet, while NEPA incorporates both of these forms of decision167

Id at 18.

168

id

169Id
170

Id
Rossi, supra note 155, at 226 (quoting Young-Seok Oh, Public Participationin the Environmental Impact Statement Process: Policy Influence in Forest Service Land Management
Planning 38 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northern Illinois University) (on file with
Northwestern University Law Review)).
172
See also Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 393, 401 (1981) ("The synoptic model demands that values be clearly and authoritatively
articulated before any individual policy decisions are made.").
173
See Poisner,supra note 8, at 75-85.
174
Poisner, supra note 8, at 57.
SId.
(citing Driver, supra note 172, at 396-99, 413-2 1).
176
Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participationand the Paradigm
Paradox, 17 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 21 (1998).
171
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making, it makes no effort to reconcile them." 7 If there is an "inherent tension
between science and politics,"' 78 the NEPA model only exacerbates it.179
This internal tug-of-war also explains why NEPA fails to promote deliberative decision-making. 8 0 In practice, the struggle has not been "resolved"
but has simply devolved into a status quo where the synoptic model usually has
the upper hand,' 8' with the pluralist model exerting light pressure through participatory events that feel hollow, part of a "compliance" scheme rather than
"tool[s] to effect better decision-making." 82 In the end, "NEPA citizen participation generates more heat than light, creating citizen participation pathologies
that leave both citizens and agencies frustrated by the process."' 83
The federal government is well aware of this frustration and, to its
credit, has devoted considerable resources to identifying a remedy. The CEQ
and the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Natural Resources have
both proposed a series of draft reforms that would, among other things, enhance
communication and information sharing, educate the public on effective participation, develop a citizen's guide to NEPA, expand public outreach beyond the
Federal Register notice-and-comment period, clarify public involvement in the
context of EAs, produce more user-friendly EISs through stricter page limits,
and give decision-makers the ability to assign greater value to comments from
local stakeholders.18 4 Unfortunately, Congress has not acted upon these proposals.
That being said, it is not clear that these reforms would do much to foster deliberative decision-making. Even if they were to increase public participation both quantitatively and qualitatively-injecting greater force into the pluralist side of the equation-there would still be the clash with the synoptic
framework that undergirds so much of NEPA and the administrative apparatus

177

Poisner, supra note 8, at 85-86.

1s
Robert H. Nelson, Government as Theater: Toward a New Paradigmfor the Public Lands,
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 348 (1994).
179
See Poisner, supra note 8, at 85.

'

Id. at 86.

Id. at 85-86 (describing the relative influence of the pluralist and synoptic models); cf
Gauna, supra note 176, at 25 ("Environmental decision-making today continues to operate within
a pluralistic structure, advancing utility maximization by agencies that provide opportunities for
representation of recognized interests while maintaining agency neutrality.").
182
CEQ STUDY, supra note 39, at 7.
183
Poisner, supra note 8, at 55.
184
NEPA TASK FORCE, COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, supra note 147; H. COMM. ON
RES.,
106th CONG., RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND UPDATE THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
http://www.nma.org/pdf/NEPATaskForce
(Comm.
Print
2006),
POLICY
ACT
Final Report.pdf.
181
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in general. To surmount this impasse, a fundamental reorientation of NEPA and
its foreign counterparts is needed.185
D.

No Room for Plebes: The Problem ofExpert-DominatedDebates

An analysis of who is able to participate meaningfully in environmental
decision-making reveals a disturbing strain of exclusivity. To influence the
process, non-governmental actors-be they citizen groups, NGOs, think tanks,
industry representatives, etc.-must command resources to which many ordinary people do not have access. Specifically, they must possess or have access
to (1) expert training, and (2) adequate financial resources to overcome the
economic hurdles to participation. This Section deals with the de facto requirement of expertise. I discuss consultation's financial exclusivity in the Section that follows.
Although lay citizens may speak their piece without the benefit of
technical expertise or legal representation, such input will, by and large, go unheeded.' 86 Environmental decision-making under NEPA and similar regimes is
simply too complicated and nuanced for raw public input to have an effect.187
When a new environmental issue emerges-when the public and policy-makers
must forge initial positions and basic legislation-that is when lay input, valueladen as it is, can make a difference.' 88 But value-formation and policy-making
quickly give way to implementation, and that is when, at least under NEPA, the
currency of lay input plummets.' 89 Paradoxically, these statutes that were designed to engage the public "have operated to create a new forum for expertise
more than empower the general public, and in the process ... have given rise to
a new class of professionals," environmental consultants.190 Even when lay citizens attend public hearings, they tend to be more technically sophisticated than
the broader public.'9 1 Another characteristic of NEPA case-law that tends to
diminish the importance of public involvement is limited consideration of aesAlthough some scholars have suggested that broad public participation is at odds with deliberative decision-making, see, e.g., Rossi, supra note 155, at 175, this difference of opinion only underscores the point of agreement: Public participation in agency decision-making is not
promoting genuine deliberation.
186
Mihaley, supra note 119, at 167-68.
185

18

See id. at 169-72.

... See id at 170-71; Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts, The Agencies, and NEPA Threshold
Issues, 55 TEX. L. REv. 801, 811 (1977) ("[C]itizen input is particularly important for broad policy decisions.").
189
See Mihaley, supra note 119, at 170-72.
'90 Id. at 198-99 (citing Josh Ashenmiller, Paper Presentation at the Annual Law and Society
Ass'n meeting: Apres NEPA, Le Deluge: Citizen Suits and the Reported Demise of the Interests
(May 27, 2004)).
19' CHARLES ECCLESTON, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
PROJECT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING 74 (2000).
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thetic concerns.' 92 Again, the input that makes a difference-the input that
agencies and courts credit-is largely the stuff of expertise. 193
Exceptional cases exist-such as when public opposition becomes so
widespread as to force decision-makers to consider the political viability of a
projectl 94-but then decision-makers are being influenced in response to generic pressure rather in response to specific content. One might argue that a referendum on consent would be the ultimate tool for the exercise of raw political
power. If citizens were allowed to vote up or down on a project for any reason,
valid or not, then wouldn't this swing the pendulum too far in the other direction, replacing technocracy with mob rule? Without a check, it would. This is
precisely why community consent should only apply in certain cases (defined
below) and, more importantly, should be a necessary but insufficient condition
for moving forward with a project. Granted, this still leaves a major role for citizen participation in cases where the majority of the affected community opposes a project. As I explain below, this role is justified from both a normative
and practical standpoint.
E.

No Room for the Poor: How ConsultationFavors the Wealthy

The late Professor Svitlana Kravchenko dedicated much of her scholarship to examining public participation models and how they consistently exclude the poor.195 Indeed, the title of one article in particular-The Myth of
Public Participationin a World of Poverty-sums up Kravchenko's view: Despite formal access, meaningful input by the poor is more legend than fact.196
Tracking the findings of the World Resources Institute, Kravchenko
identifies three main reasons why this is so: (1) "literacy (reading skills, language, and technical content)"; (2) "costs (of travel, official fees, forgoing

See Tabb, supra note 32, at 229-30 (citing Friends of the Ompompanoosuc v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 968 F.2d 1549 (2d Cir. 1992)).
193
This runs counter to one of NEPA's main goals: "to facilitate widespread discussion and
consideration of environmental risks and remedies associated with the pending project."
LaFlamme v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 852 F.2d 389, 398 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 1980)).
194
See Mihaley, supra note 119, at 167 ("It is true that in some situations, content may not
matter and participation can have an effect by its mere presence even if it is amateurish, repetitive and without substance.... The quantity, unilateral nature, or vehemence of citizen testimony
may sway a decision-maker in marginal or heavily politicized settings, especially where the ultimate decision-maker is comprised of elected officials.").
192

195

See, e.g., SVITLANA KRAVCHENKO & JOHN BONINE, HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

259-310 (2008); Svitlana Kravchenko, ProceduralRights as a Crucial Tool to Combat Climate
Change, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 613, 646 (2010); Svitlana Kravchenko, The Myth of Public
Participationin a World ofPoverty, 23 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 33 (2009) [hereinafter The Myth ofPublic Participation].
196
The Myth ofPublic Participation,supra note 195.
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work, child care, and others)"; and (3) "personal and property risks from participating."1 9 7 Although the relationship between these factors and diminished
participation may seem obvious, it is worth exploring in some detail. Beyond
poverty's inherent tendency to hamper participation, we should pay especially
close attention to the tendency of consultation models to aggravate the poor's
already disadvantaged position.
In many areas of the developing world, adult literacy rates remain
astonishingly low. According to UN statistics, the adult literacy rate for all of
South Asia is a mere 62%.'19 It is only 63% for Sub-Saharan Africa, 77% for
the Middle East and North Africa, and a still troubling 91% for Latin America
and the Caribbean (with Haiti checking in at only 49%). 199As with many statistics related to the developing world, these figures become far more shocking
when compared with those of developed nations. For "Industrialized Countries/Territories," the UN reports an adult literacy rate of 99%.200 The relationship between poverty and illiteracy, then, is a direct one. It is the poorer nations
that struggle with literacy, and it is the poorer people within those nations who
struggle the most. Incidentally, it is also these people who are more likely to be
seriously affected by large public projects.20' It is not just that the poor are
more likely to be illiterate; it is that they are also more likely to live in rural areas and to earn livings through farming, hunting, fishing, forestry or other
means dependent upon a reasonably stable and healthy environment. 202
The question becomes, does consultation hold any relative advantages
for the poor in light of the literacy problem? Not really. Meaningful participation is informed participation, and one who cannot read faces obvious challenges in acquiring the necessary information. Although there are other ways to acquire information-television, radio, conversation-these media are often
inferior. More importantly, the public perception of consultation works against
acquiring sound information through such media. The perception in developing
nations that consultation is often little more than a charade 2 03 tends to sap the

197

Id. at 46-47.

198 Adult Literacy Rate, U.N. DATA, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SOWC&f=inlD%3A74
(last updated June 19, 2013).
199

Id.

200

id.
See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Fighting Back Against a Power Plant: Some Lessons
From the Legal and OrganizingEfforts of the Bayview-Hunters Point Community, 3 HASTINGS
W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 407, 418-19 (1996).
202 See, e.g., Andy Weiner, The Forest and the Trees: Sustainable Development and Human
Rights in the Context of Cambodia, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1559-60 (2003) (explaining that
"impoverished communities [in Cambodia are] more commonly located in rural areas and [are]
more dependent on natural resources for their survival").
201

203 See, e.g., La Consulta Es Teatro de Mala Calidad, EL DIA (Bolivia), Sept. 9, 2012,
http://www.eldia.com.bo/index.php?cat-386&pla=3&id-articulo-98806 (describing the consul-
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public's enthusiasm to gather the necessary information and then participate.
This critique may have more to do with how consultation is implemented than
with its very essence, but there is still something of the latter. No matter how
well implemented, consultation suffers from a problem of ambiguity (discussed
in more detail below).2 04 It leads people to question the extent of their influence
on the process, and thus to refrain from investing resources in gathering information. For the illiterate poor, who already lack the best means to inform themselves and may suffer from a more generalized feeling of disenfranchisement,
this is especially problematic.
In addition to illiteracy, the poor are less likely to participate in public
consultation because of the process's high costs. 2 05 Under these circumstances,
the poor often elect not to involve themselves in the process or do so in only the
most superficial of ways.206 Meaningful participation in consultation entails, at
the least, a serious investment of time. Gathering the necessary information, attending meetings, waiting one's turn to speak, or (assuming literacy) taking the
time to submit a written comment-these steps take a fair amount of time and,
because of that, money. If a person is struggling to make ends meet and working with little job security, taking time off from work to participate may not be
an option. 2 0 7 If the person has children-and birth rates are still much higher
for the world's poor 2 08 -the situation becomes even more difficult. In addition,
transportation costs can be prohibitive. Even if the government makes reasonable efforts to hold a consultation in a convenient location, the nature of rural
demographics means that some people will still have to travel a fair distance,
often without easy recourse to cars or buses. 20 9 Meaningful participation thus
becomes a luxury of the relatively well-off.
tation process in Bolivia as "theatre of poor quality"); Lantau Kim Chai, Public Consultationfor
Incinerator Proposal is Just a Charade, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 5, 2011,
http://www.scmp.com/article/986867/public-consultation-process-incinerator-proposal-justcharade; Cyril Mychalejko, Guatemala: The Violence of "Free Trade, " 117 AGAINST THE
CURRENT, July-Aug. 2005, available at http://www.solidarity-us.org/site/node/262 ("Consultation is more of a public relations exercise than a meaningful legal process.").
204
See infra Part III.F-G.
205
See Joshua Glasgow, Not In Anybody's Backyard? The Non-DistributiveProblem With Environmental Justice, 13 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 115 (2005) ("Many avenues for public participation are more open to communities with greater resources.").
206
Id
207
Rodolfo Mata, Hazardous Waste Facilities and Environmental Equity: A Proposed Siting
Model, 13 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 375, 392 ("At the same time,... residents of a poor community may
not have adequate free time to participate at even a minimal level.").
208

JULIE DAVANZO & DAVID M. ADAMSON, FAMILY PLANNING INDEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN
UNFINISHED
SUCCESS
STORY
2
(1998),
available
at

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/issuepapers/2005/IP176.pdf.
209

PAUL STARKEY

ET AL.,

IMPROVING

RURAL MOBILITY: OPTIONS FOR DEVELOPING
IN RURAL AREAS V (2002), available at

MOTORIZED AND NONMOTORIZED TRANSPORT

http://www4.worldbank.org/afr/ssap/Resources/WoldBank-TechnicalPapers/TP525.pdf.
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To overcome these economic barriers, international organizations have
recommended financing NGOs to mobilize the poor or serve as their proxies. 210
Within the rubric of the consultation model, this seems like a reasonable approach. The problem, however, is that NGOs frequently misrepresent (unintentionally or otherwise) the feelings of the poor.2 1 1 It is, in effect, a form of representative democracy, but without the degree of accountability that comes with
election. If the NGOs are also responsible for disseminating information about
the proposed project, their ability to manipulate increases further. There is also
a real problem with capture. Putting aside the possibility of government simply
creating an NGO for consultative purposeS212-- designed in a way to advance
government interests-organically formed NGOs are subject to capture by the
economic interests that may have been their erstwhile opponents. Poorly funded NGOs may accept funding by pro-development interests, and slowly modify
their stance in favor of their funders' agenda. In other words, NGOs are subject
to capture by the very forces they seek to confront.2 13 This is not a blanket argument against NGO involvement in the consultative process, but rather an
acknowledgement that the consultative process, by its costly nature, requires
spokespersons for the poor. As I argue below, consent can avoid some of this.
Finally, there is the problem of personal and financial risks associated
with participation. Again, this problem is most acute for the world's poor, people who are generally more vulnerable to threats, intimidation, and actual violence.214 This problem, too, is aggravated by the consultation model. Although
many consultation schemes provide for anonymous input-made easier with
the aid of the Internet-this form of participation is not a viable option in many
See WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL POLICY, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 4.01, para. 14,
available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/
EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:20064724-menuPK:64701637-pagePK:64709096-piPK:64
709108-theSitePK:502184,00.html.
211
See OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, LEGITIMIZING HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs: LESSONS FROM
AFRICA 123-50 (2006); Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice?Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction
with Democratic Principles,92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1107-08 (2004) ("The same concerns about
NGOs that arise in a domestic political setting-such as the lack of accountability of many, the
pernicious aims of some, and the phenomenon of capture by well-financed interest groups-are
also relevant in transnational settings. The most influential NGOs operating transnationally tend
to be supported by financially privileged sectors and staffed by professional elites."); but see Sophie Smyth, NGOs and Legitimacy in InternationalDevelopment, 61 U. KAN. L. REv. 377, 407
(2012) ("Unlike government representatives, NGOs cannot afford to fall out of touch with their
constituents. Their very existence requires them to convey their constituents' views both at a national and an international level .... ).
212
The Myth ofPublicParticipation,supranote 195, at 45-46.
213
Ramiro Salvochea, Clientelism in Argentina: Piqueteros and ReliefPayment Plansfor the
Unemployed - Misunderstandingthe Role of Civil Society, 43 TEx. INT'L L.J. 287, 319 (2008).
214
See Gary Haugen & Victor Boutros, And Justicefor All: Enforcing Human Rights for the
World's Poor, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2010), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/garyhaugen/and-justice-for-all-enfor_b_583217.html.
210

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss1/6

38

Fromhertz: From Consultation to Consent: Community Approval as a Prerequisit
FROM CONSULTATION TO CONSENT

2013]

147

parts of the developing world. 215 Even if the community at issue has ready access to the Internet, the literacy problem once again complicates matters. For
these and other reasons, live consultations provide the most realistic avenue for
widespread participation by the poor in developing nations. Unfortunately, they
also expose participants to intimidation and retribution.
F.

ConsultationGives Insufficient Voice to Local Concerns

Although NEPA was pushed forward by a growing sense of concern
regarding the state of the environment at large, there was also a sense that current rules failed to take into account community interests. One of the more interesting phenomena of the 1960s was the "freeway revolts" that sprung up in
response to the construction of the Interstate Freeway System.216 The freeways
were designed mainly with regional and national interests in mind; how they
would affect local communities was either not considered or simply dismissed
as collateral damage.2 17 From Atlanta to Washington, D.C., citizens organized
and protested.218 Their efforts produced mixed results: Some freeway plans
were scrapped, others modified, and others executed as originally designed.2 19
In addition, though, the freeway revolts informed the design and enactment of
NEPA. 2 2 0 To at least some extent, NEPA was supposed to ensure that local
concerns were considered and not automatically subordinated to the national or
regional interests served by major development projects.22 1
Does the consultation and public-comment process accomplish this
goal? Only if our standards are very low. Comments by individual citizens are
often dismissed or given little weight, even when a number of citizens echo
each other.222 Comments by groups or organizations have far more influence,
and even then there is evidence that participation by public-interest groups has
been eclipsed in recent years by business.223 And although much of the publicDigital Divide Closing, but Still Significant, Says United Nations Telecoms Agent, U.N.
2012),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
NEWS
CENTRE
(Oct.
11,
43265&Cr-digital+divide&Crl- #.URwSD2fAFNY.
216
Domonic A. Bearfield & Melvin J. Dubnick, All Mega-ProjectsAre Local? Citizen Participation Lessons from the Big Dig, 21 J. OF PUB. BUDGETING, AcCT. & FIN. MGMT. 392, 402
(2009).
215

217

See id

218

Id

Id. (citing Raymond A. Mohl, Stop the Road: Freeway Revolts in American Cities, 30 J.
URB. HIST. 675 (2004), availableat http://juh.sagepub.com/content/30/5/674.full.pdf).
220
See Bearfield & Dubnick, supra note 216.
221
See id. at 405.
222
See Poisner,supra note 8, at 91.
223
See generally Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias towards Business? AssessingInterest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006) (finding a "bias
219
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choice scholarship suggests that small interest groups are the most likely to organize, and thus wield disproportionate influence,224 this hardly means that
small interest groups represent the policy preferences of "small" or marginalized peoples. 225 Quite to the contrary, the most organized and sophisticated
groups often represent narrow but powerful economic interests-not to be confused with the public good-leaving local concerns, especially local concerns
that hold little weight in the broader economy, overlooked.226
But why should that matter? Or, to put it more precisely, why should
we be particularly concerned about a failure to consider local opposition as opposed to a failure to consider any opinion-in favor or opposed-no matter the
source? The reason is that not all opinions are created equal. Though we might
not wish to limit input entirely to those who have a direct stake in the environmental impact of a project, it seems reasonable to insist that people with a large
stake should have a meaningful say in what happens, one that is commensurate
with their stake. If an upstream community opposes a dam project because it
will force relocation and destroy its pastoral economy, most would accord that
concern more weight-at least per capita-than the support of a community far
outside the watershed that looks forward to cheaper electricity.
Unfortunately, the consultation model fails to account for the fact that
large public works, especially infrastructure and extraction projects, distribute
costs and benefits in an uneven manner. The local site community-often numerically small-bears the brunt of the costs, while the larger regional community enjoys most of the benefits. This phenomenon of uneven cost and benefit
distribution has been observed in a number of contexts, including roads,227
dams, 2 2 8 mines,229 and oil and gas extraction and processing sites. 230

towards business" based on a study of comments submitted in connection with forty rulemakings
by four different agencies).
224
See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
(1965). On the other hand, "if the group is large, individual members have
little incentive to participate because participation is personally costly and contributes little to the
group's chances for successful joint action." John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism,99 HARv. L. REV. 713, 724 (1986).
225
Consider, for instance, the fact that "[t]he oil and gas industry outspent environmentalists
nearly eight-fold [in 2010] in federal lobbying on climate change legislation." Jessica Durando,
Oil Lobby's Spending Blows Away Environmental Groups, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2010,
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/greenhouse/post/2010/08/climate-change-environmentgroups/1#.Ud72Brjn_IU.
226
See Gary Minda, Interest Groups, PoliticalFreedom, and Anti-Trust: A Modern Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 947 (1992) ("Public choice theorists ... predict that political activity is likely to be dominated by small interest groups seeking to
advance their own special interests, frequently at the expense of the public good.").
227
See Nober, supranote 11, at 232.
228
See, e.g., PEARCE, supra note 11.
229 See, e.g., Langton & Mazel, supra note 11, at 36.
THEORY OF GROUPS
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It is important to distinguish this situation from classic "not in my back
yard" behavior ("NIMBYism"). NIMBYism describes the phenomenon where
individuals hope to enjoy the benefits of a certain activity or project but seek to
avoid the costs. 2 3 1 Thus, for instance, a NIMBY might favor wind turbines in
the abstract (because she likes the idea of renewable energy for environmental
and economic reasons) but oppose their construction offshore of her local
beach (because it would obstruct the ocean view). The phenomenon I describe
does not entail this sort of selective advocacy. The local opposition with which
I am concerned is not characterized by simultaneous support for the activity or
project in another place. NIMBYs want the project, just "not in my back yard."
The opponents I have in mind don't want the project at all (or are largely indifferent to whether it occurs in some other place).23 2 This is because they do not
see themselves as ever truly benefiting from these projects. The rural poordisconnected from the economic machinery that these projects tend to serveare the most visible members of this group.
G.

Consultation'sFailureto Secure Legitimacy and Acceptance

One of the more basic rationales for public participation is that it tends
to breed acceptance of outcomes, even when those outcomes are inconsistent
with public desires.233 In the United States, this is especially important in the
case of decisions made by agencies, whose directors and staffs lack direct ac-

See James B. Lebeck, Liquefied Natural Gas Terminals, Community Decisionmaking, and
the 2005 Energy Policy Act, 85 TEX. L. REV. 243, 243 (2006) ("In contrast to the[ir] extremely
localized costs, the majority of the benefits derived from constructing an LNG [liquefied natural
gas] terminal are quite diffuse.").
231 Another useful acronym is SOBBY ("some other bugger's back yard"). SOBBY and
NIMBY seem to be interchangeable, though the former emphasizes the pro-development stance
of the individual while the latter emphasizes her core objection.
232
This point lies at the heart of the distinction. Although some authors have described the
NIMBY problem as the very distribution problem I have in mind, see, e.g., Barak D. Richman,
Mandating Negotiations to Solve the NIMBY Problem: A Creative Regulatory Response, 20
UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 223, 223 n. 1 (2002), most have emphasized to some degree the unprincipled nature of the NIMBYist objection, see, e.g., Michael Wheeler, Negotiating NIMBYs:
Learningfrom the Failureof the Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 241, 245-46
(1994) (articulating argument that NIMBYism is parochial and selfish). "NIMBY" is pejorative
not simply because NIMBYs want to avoid sacrifice, but because they want to reap benefits
while avoiding sacrifice (i.e., they want to externalize the costs).
233
Discussing NEPA in Congress, Senator Henry M. Jackson stated that "[a] primary purpose
of the bill is to restore public confidence in the Federal Government's capacity to achieve important public purposes and objectives." 115 CONG. REC. 19,010 (1969); see also Rossi, supra
note 155, at 187 ("Persons and entities subject to agency regulations are more likely to view
agency decisions as legitimate if the procedures leading to their formulation provide for fair consideration of their views.").
230
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countability through the ballot box.234 The importance of a just, participatory
process looms even larger in the case of decisions affecting the environment,
where solutions satisfying everyone are almost impossible to come by. 235 Theoretically, then, the arrival of NEPA's consultation process should have given
way to increased public confidence in agency decisions.
It does not appear that this has actually happened. Although the data is
incomplete, the information we do possess is cause for concern. Even while
U.S. citizens have ostensibly enjoyed increased opportunities to participate in
agency decisions over the last 40-plus years, public confidence in government
has gone down, not up. 2 3 6 Small-scale studies have confirmed that confidence
increases when agencies engage the public in earnest under NEPA,23 7 and there
is little reason to doubt the overall correlation between participation and confidence.238 The problem, instead, appears to be a combination of poor implementation and the uncomfortable relationship between participation and the dominant synoptic model.
H.

The "Controversial"Factor:NEPA's Mirage

The rationale in favor of moving from consultation to consent is largely
rooted in the idea that government should not be able to foist major projects on
communities over their objection. Before laying out the details of this position,
however, we should examine whether NEPA accommodates this idea in any
way. Certainly, NEPA and other consultation-driven statutes do not provide for

234
235

Rossi, supranote 155, at 182-83.
Aryeh Botwinick & Peter Bachrach, Democracy and Scarcity: Toward a Theory ofPartic-

ipatory Democracy,4 INT'L POL. SCI. REv. 361 (1983).
236
See Poisner,supra note 8, at 54; Rossi, supra note 155, at 177; Richard Morin & Dan
Balz,

Americans Losing Trust in Each Other and Institutions: Suspicion of Strangers Breeds Widespread Cynicism, WASH. POST., Jan. 28, 1996, at Al (describing survey results that show loss of
public confidence in government); Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in Government Remains Low: Only
26% Are Satisfied with Way Nation is Being Governed, GALLUP (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/110458/trust-govermment-remains-low.aspx ("Gallup's annual Governance poll finds a continued deterioration in public confidence in U.S. government institutions."); see also Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
EnvironmentalLaw, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 351 (1991) ("An important lesson of the
last twenty years is that EPA simply cannot do its job effectively without greater public confidence in the agency.").
237
See, e.g., J. Douglas Wellman & Terence J. Tipple, Governance in the Wildland-Urban
Interface: A Normative Guide for Natural Resource Managers, in CULTURE, CONFLICT AND
COMMUNICATION IN THE WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE 337, 345-46 (Alan W. Ewert et al. eds.,
1993) (discussing survey and benefits of public participation in management of Upper Delaware

Scenic and Recreational River).
238

See also NEPA TASK FORCE, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 147, at xiii-xiv

(finding that collaborative approaches to engaging the public and assessing the impacts of federal
actions under NEPA can increase public trust and confidence in agency decisions).
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this directly; by definition, "consultation" implies something less than a community veto.239 Yet, as a statutory matter, NEPA does account for widespread
opposition to a project, even if the weight it attaches to that factor is less than
satisfying. 240
In determining whether a federal action will "significantly" affect the
environment, thus triggering the duty to prepare an EIS, 24 1 agencies must consider several factors.242 One of these factors is "[t]he degree to which the effects
on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial." 24 3 Courts have interpreted this as referring to cases in which there is a
substantial dispute about the nature or effect of a major federal action, rather
than the mere existence of opposition. 2 44 To give rise to controversy, the concerns should have "some technical or professional focus, as manifested by differences among experts, quarrels over predictions, or doubts about the extent of
pollution that might ensue." 2 4 5 In addition to this qualitative limitation, there is
also a quantitative limitation: Almost every project will ruffle a few feathers,
but courts are looking for a "critical mass" of opposition, something that a few
naysayers won't be able to muster.246
This approach is insufficient to account for public opposition for two
reasons. First, a determination that a project is "highly controversial" has no
239

See

THE

AM.

HERITAGE

395 (5th ed. 2011), available at
http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q-consultation (defining "consultation" as, "A
conference at which advice is given or views are exchanged.").
240
For an informative, general critique of the jurisprudence in this area, see generally Tabb,
supra note 32.
241
42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(ii) (2012).
242
40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2013).
243
Id. § 1508.27(b)(4).
244
Ind. Forest Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 325 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2003); Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998).
245
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENvT. L. ININDIAN COuNTRY § 1:19 (2012).
246
See, e.g., Ind. Forest Alliance, 325 F.3d at 859 (finding a "controversy" where four bird
experts testified to the uselessness of maintaining "openings" in Hoosier National Forest); North
Carolina v. FAA, 957 F.2d 1125, 1133-34 (4th Cir. 1992) (controversy cannot be equated with
opposition lest the matter be subject to a "heckler's veto"); West Houston Air Comm. v. FAA,
784 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1986) (opposition by local residents did not render proposed airport
"highly controversial" where number of objectors was not large in relation to total population to
be served by the airport); Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986-87
(9th Cir. 1985) (finding no controversy where there was "virtual agreement among local, state,
and federal government officials, private parties, and local environmentalists," notwithstanding
disagreement by plaintiff and its two experts); Anglers of the Au Sable v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565
F. Supp. 2d 812, 828 (E.D. Mich. 2008) ("[T]he plaintiffs demonstrate only mere public opposition; they present no evidence disputing the size, nature, or effect of the [exploratory oil and gas
drilling] project."); Coal. on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 642 F. Supp. 573, 587-88 (D.D.C.
1986) (rejecting "highly controversial" argument despite 307 comments at public hearings because no agency had opposed the project).
DICTIONARY
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substantive effect. Instead, it simply serves as one of the non-dispositive factors
that will militate in favor of the agency preparing a full-blown EIS.247 If the EIS
procedure is itself an inadequate vehicle for soliciting and responding to public
opposition-as I have argued-then the controversy factor is not a gamechanger. Second, given the regulatory language and the gloss applied by courts,
only some forms of opposition are cognizable. Controversy over environmental
effects (e.g., what will happen and to what extent) tilts the scale in favor of an
EIS; general neighborhood opposition does not.248 Yet, given the comparative
advantage held by the wealthier and more sophisticated on these more technical
forms of opposition, this approach to public controversy leaves much to be desired.
IV. COMMUNITY CONSENT AS A WAY FORWARD

The idea of using consent to curb abuse and secure influence commensurate with stake is not a new one. This is, after all, the basic notion behind prior informed consent in health-care law.249 In the environmental context, however, most arguments for consent-and certainly those that have found the most
purchase-have been limited to decision-making within indigenous communities. 250 Whereas tthese arguments stem from conceptions of native sovereignty
over natural resources, the community consent I propose is rooted in different
ideas.
In this Part, I discuss (a) why consent should be favored over consultation in certain cases, (b) the extent to which consent should be required (i.e., in
which cases it should apply), and (c) the process by which communities should
express or withhold their consent. After discussing these points and setting
forth the operative rules, I then briefly analyze the consent framework from a
Rawlsian perspective. Because this framework approximates the rules society
would adopt behind a veil of ignorance, we should at the least recognize it as an
ideal towards which to aim, even if we struggle to achieve this ideal in practice.

Courts can and do affirm decisions to forgo preparation of an EIS even in the face of controversy. See, e.g., Ind.ForestAlliance, 325 F.3d at 860-61.
248
RODGERS, supra note 245.
249
Human Rights andEnvironmentalRegulation, supra note 18, at 255.
250
See, e.g., Kinnison, supra note 15; UNDRIP, supra note 12; cf U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 14, Dec. 29, 1993, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (recognizing the rights of both indigenous peoples and other local community members).
251
For another take on how this argument might be made, with special emphasis on the human-rights dimension, see Human Rights and Environmental Regulation, supra note 18, at 29196.
247
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Why Consent?

There are four main reasons why the consent of local communities
should be required in the context of environmentally significant projects: (1)
the need to give due weight to local interests; (2) the need to apportion risk according to stake; (3) the need to give voice to local knowledge; and (4) the need
to enhance legitimacy and acceptance of the resulting decision. In addition to
these four reasons pegged to local communities, we might identify a fifth reason not so exclusively pegged: reducing the risk of manipulation.25 2
1.

Voice Commensurate with Interest: Consent, Democratic
Values, and Emerging Notions of Human Rights

Giving local communities a say in environmental decisions finds support from a normative perspective. We can describe this rationale along two related lines: traditional notions of fairness (or consistency with democratic values) 253 and evolving notions of human rights.
Finding its roots in deontological justifications of democracy, the fairness argument states that individuals ought to have a say in public policy and
decisions affecting them because the first principles of liberty and equality suggest as much.254 Liberty is a person's right to choice; it is the right to decide
how to act and live. Equality balances liberty by imposing limits on the range
of acceptable choices. Equality means that the exercise of liberty must not go
so far as to impede another's liberty. In the realm of collective decisionmaking, equality means that one person's preferences are neither superior nor
inferior to another's based upon the sheer identity of the person (a person's
preferences may be superior based upon their content or deserving of more
weight based upon the proponent's stake in the matter).
Liberty and equality find voice in the notion of decision-making with
the consent of the governed. If a public project-be it a road, energy facility, or
authorization for a mine-is to occur in a specific region, liberty and equality
demand that the people living in that region have a say in some manner and to
some extent. If we subscribe to democracy in any form, that much should be a
given. Room for debate opens up with the questions of: (1) How much say

For a general discussion of some of the rationales for publication participation in agency
decision-making, see Rossi, supra note 155, at 180 (listing "increased accountability and oversight," "minimizing excessive concentration of power," "better quality information for decisionmakers and citizen participants," "proceduralist values," and "breeding citizenship").
253
See id. ("Participation is sacrosanct to modem democracy.").
254
As an inherently democratic reform-consent being more democratic than consultationthe full panoply of theoretical and empirical arguments supporting democracy could be rolled out
in favor of introducing an element of consent in environmental decision-making. See Democracy,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/.
252

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

45

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6
154

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116

should the people have?; and (2) By what means should they exercise that influence?
In many parts of the world, representative democracy responds to these
questions with the public exercising its influence by periodically electing officials. If we are accustomed to this form of democracy, a requirement of consent
may initially strike us as unusual. But that seems more a function of our conditioned expectations than the product of normative reflection. Indeed, by conventional representative democracy standards, even NEPA's public comment
regime pushes the envelope.
Nevertheless, more direct forms of democracy are not unheard of even
in large developed nations-consider the rise of the ballot measure in the United States-and there is good reason to depart from representative democracy if
it fails to satisfy the underlying demands of equality and liberty. This is often
the case with large, environmentally-significant projects, especially infrastructure and extractive projects. The persons who stand to lose the most are not
given a say commensurate with their interest. Because the projects tend to distribute benefits across wide regions with greater populations while concentrating the costs among narrower regions with lesser populations, 2 5 representative
democracy fails to produce equitable results. In situations such as this, a large
number of people with little or nothing to lose is able to override a smaller
group that is set to bear the brunt of the negative consequences.
Although taking this argument too far could wreak havoc upon government institutions and processes, modest reforms that bring us closer to democratic fairness should be carefully considered. Certainly, the idea that influence should correspond with interest is common in a slew of legal, business,
and political contexts, including: (1) standing to bring a lawsuit; 25 (2) intervention in a lawsuit;25 7 (3) joinder;2 58 (4) corporate shareholder voting; 259 and (5)
the requirement that, in the context of proving state practice for purposes of
identifying customary international law, "those States that are particularly affected by the proposed norm" be among those nations that have historically
acted in accordance with the norm.260
Another way to approach the normative case for consent is from a human-rights perspective. In an article that focuses on the link between public
participation in agency decisions and trust in outcomes-a connection I explore

See supranote 11 and accompanying text.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
257
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 132 (1967).
258
FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
259
See generally Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L.
REv. 129 (2009).
260
DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 308 (4th ed.
2011).
255

256
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later on-Rebecca Bratspies describes the emerging understanding of prior informed consent in environmental decisions as a fundamental human right.26 1 As
Bratspies notes, the notion of prior informed consent is rooted in personal autonomy and most strongly associated with health law.262 Yet, as our understanding of the relationship between environmental health and bodily health
grows-and as the "right to a healthy environment" finds increasing purchase
in policy discussions-the case for consent as a human right in the environmental context is likewise bolstered.263
Legal recognition of this idea is admittedly in the nascent stages. Only
in the last few decades have we seen prior informed consent become a relevant
concept in environmental law, and even then with limited reach and many a
qualification. In terms of binding treaty law, the international community has
embraced the idea of prior informed consent in the Basel Convention, 26 the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 265 and the Rotterdam Convention on the
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals in International Trade.266 However, all of these instruments center around the state as the
party that can give or withhold consent.267
It is only in the area of non-binding instruments, so-called "soft law,"
that we see consent at the community level. The most promising examples tend
to involve the rights of indigenous communities.268 Projects that impact indigenous communities often epitomize the uneven distribution of benefits and costs
that inheres in so many public works. Indigenous peoples frequently feel the
severest of environmental and cultural impacts while receiving little of the benefit.2 69 Given this dynamic, and their historic political vulnerability, indigenous
Human Rights and EnvironmentalRegulation, supra note 18, at 250-58.
Id. at 254.
263
Id. at 265 (citations omitted).
264
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal art. 4(l)(c), Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57, 131 (1992) ("Parties shall prohibit
or shall not permit the export of hazardous wastes and other wastes if the state of import does not
consent in writing to the specific import.").
265
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity art. 19, Dec. 29, 1993, 1760 U.N.T.S.
79 ("The Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate
procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement, in the field of the safe transfer,
handling and use of any living modified organisms resulting from biotechnology that may have
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.").
266
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade art. 1, Sept. 10, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 1734.
267
Human Rights and EnvironmentalRegulation, supra note 18, at 255.
268
See generally Wiessner, supranote 13.
269
See Melissa A. Jamison, Rural Electric Cooperatives: A Model for Indigenous Peoples'
PermanentSovereignty over Their Natural Resources, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 401, 454
(2005) ("The reality is that indigenous peoples, besides being excluded from decision-making,
also bear a significant and disproportionate amount of the harm resulting from such projects.");
261

262
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communities have often been seen as those most in need of empowerment
through prior informed consent. 27 0 Responding to this concern, UNDRIP requires states to obtain the "free, prior and informed consent" of indigenous
peoples in the event of proposed relocation,2 71 legislative or administrative
measures that may affect them, 2 72 storage or disposal of hazardous materials, 273
and "project[s] affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral,
water or other resources."2 74
Although instruments like UNDRIP bring us closer to the regime I envision, two important shortcomings must be noted. First, the gap between "soft
law" and binding law is not easily bridged. Acknowledging an aspirational
principle is one thing; committing to and enforcing it is quite another.275 Second, demanding that states seek consent from indigenous peoples is in some
ways less radical than requiring consent from local communities without the
indigenous distinction.276 In the United States, at least, indigenous peoples have
historically been afforded separate (though not satisfactory) legal treatment for
the very reason that they were considered sovereign nations.277 To the extent
that the consent requirement in UNDRIP is motivated by this distinction in conjunction with human-rights concerns, it appears more like a relatively modest
extension of the state-consent provisions in the Basel, Cartagena, and Rotterdam Conventions.

Valentina S. Vadi, When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment, Natural Resources, and
Indigenous Heritage in InternationalInvestment Law, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 797, 83637(2011).
270
See Judith Kimerling, Transnational Operations, Bi-National Injustice: Chevron-Texaco
and Indigenous Huaorani and Kichwa in the Amazon Rainforest in Ecuador, 31 AM. INDIAN. L.
REV. 445,462-63 (2007).
271 UNDRIP, supra note 12, at art. 10.
272
273

Id. at art. 19.
Id. at art. 29.2.

Id. at art. 32.2. In addition to these forward-looking provisions, UNDRIP calls for redress
for past violations (i.e., when the state took offending actions without prior informed consent).
UNDRIP, supra note 12, at art. 11.2, 28.1.
275 See Eric W. Orts, The Legitimacy of Multinational Corporations, in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW 247-66 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995), reprinted in Donald K. Anton &
274

Dinah L. Shelton, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 869 (2011) (explaining that

soft law often "amounts to ineffectual hortatory declarations") (internal quotation marks omitted); Nicholas A. Fromherz, The Case for a Global Treaty on Soil Conservation, Sustainable
Farming,and the Preservationof Agrarian Culture, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 57, 104 (2012) (discussing soft-law instruments relating to soil conservation).
276

See supra Part.II.A.

277

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
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At any rate, and despite the fact that prior informed consent at the local
level is far from a universal norm, a movement in that direction does exist. 2 78
Citing this progressive evolution, Bratspies calls upon states to "internalize the
notion that it is the government's responsibility to empower the individuals and
groups most affected by environmental problems in order to facilitate their participation in decision-making that will affect them." 2 79 One way to accomplish
that is through the consent mechanism I outline in this paper.
2.

Voice Commensurate with Risk: Consent and Moral Hazard

The tragedy of the commons teaches us that environmental stewardship
280
is more likely by an actor who has a stake in the land at issue. When an actor
has skin in the game-when she has something to lose and not just something
to gain-then she is more likely to act with due care. 2 8 1 As discussed above,
environmentally significant projects often yield concentrated risks alongside
diffuse benefits.282 If project beneficiaries have an outsized voice in the decision-making process, there is a risk of moral hazard.283 With misaligned incentives, there is a danger that project proponents will effectively decide how
much risk to take while forcing others to bear that risk.284
The imbalance between the concentration of costs and benefits is, to a
significant degree, a function of how "undeveloped" natural resources are used.
Take the case of an undammed watershed. Left to flow as nature intended, the
human benefits of the river may include healthier and more abundant fish populations, stable plant and animal environments, and the support of human riparian communities that have been built along the water over centuries. The human
costs may include unpredictable flooding, seasonal fluctuations of available
278
See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizingthe Public Trust
Doctrine:Natural Law and Constitutionaland Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 777 (2012) (discussing developments in Uganda).
279 Human Rights and EnvironmentalRegulation, supra note 18, at 258

280 See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), available at
http://www.geo.mtu.edu/-asmayer/rural-sustain/govemance/Hardin%201968.pdf.
281

Id.

Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is energy generation. Hydroelectric dams
provide cheap electricity to billions around the world, but they do so by displacing local communities and radically transforming the environment surrounding the dam-site. Coal-fired plants
provide over 20% of the U.S.'s energy needs. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, Coal, ENERGY.GOV,
http://energy.gov/coal (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). We all pay for this electricity, but those who
pay the most-breathing in the filthy smoke, drinking contaminated water-are the communities
hosting these plants.
283 See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008, at
63 (2009) (describing moral hazard as "any situation in which one person makes the decision
about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly").
284
See id.
282
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water that negatively impact irrigation, and untapped hydro-electrical resources.
Viewed in the aggregate and from an "objective" standpoint, the decision to dam may seem a toss-up. But if we remove the veil of objectivity-if
we assume an identity-we see that the decision depends upon that very identity. By and large, it is the far off, "cosmopolitan" interests that benefit from the
development of the hinterland.285 So, while costs and benefits may balance out
overall, the balance is hardly felt by impacted communities. More frequently, a
community either wins big (and that's usually the "cosmopolitan" community)
or loses big (and that's usually the rural or indigenous community).
Within the context of dams, China's Three Gorges may be the most
well-known example of this phenomenon.286 Nevertheless, an even starker example may exist along the banks of the Mekong. Hardly the longest or biggest
river by volume, the Mekong holds one very important distinction: From season to season, its flow varies more than any major river on Earth. When the
monsoon hits, the Mekong swells to fifty times its dry-season size, backing up
tributaries and flooding enormous areas of rainforest. 287 This seasonal fluctuation creates one of the world's truly robust fish nurseries, providing dependable
protein for millions of rural Cambodians. The poorest of the poor eat well. But
A growing body of literature is available on the topic of the geographic and demographic
disconnect between the costs and benefits of goods and services that rely heavily on natural resources (i.e., people in one region or economic stratum pay the cost while people in another region or economic stratum receive the benefit). See, e.g., MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
285

LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS: NATURAL ASSETS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 5, 16-22 (2005) (high-

lighting example of mangrove forests converted to for-export shrimp farms); THE WORLD BANK,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1-2 (1992) ("It is

often the poorest who suffer most from the consequences of pollution and environmental degradation."). While many observers have faulted free trade and globalization as opening the door to
the exportation of environmental costs, see, e.g., Herman Daly, Problems with Free Trade: Neoclassical and Steady-State Perspectives, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND POLICY 156 (1993), the phenomenon has a deep history within domestic contexts. Landfills

and hazardous waste sites in the U.S. are tucked away from the spotlight, foisted upon marginalized communities that usually lack the political and economic wherewithal to resist. See, e.g.,
Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Wright, Disastrous Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters:
An Environmental JusticeAnalysis Twenty-Five Years After Warren County, 26 UCLA J.ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 217, 218 (2008).
286 See Peter H. Gleick, Three Gorges Dam Project, Yangtze River, China, in THE WORLD'S
WATER, 2008-2009: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 139 (2009), available at
http://www.worldwater.org/data20082009/WB03.pdf; PEARCE, supra note 11 ("Usually urban
elites gain most, especially from hydroelectricity, while the poor in the countryside lose most, as
their fields are flooded or the rivers and wetlands on which they depend are wrecked."); Li Dun,

Death of Three Gorges Dam Architect Marks End of Era, CHINA DIALOGUE (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5182-Death-of-Three-Gorges-Damarchitect-marks-end-of-era; Sui-Lee Wee, Thousands Being Movedfrom China's Three Gorges

-Again,
REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2012),
threegorges-idUSBRE87LOZW20120822.
287

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/22/us-china-

PEARCE, supra note 11, at 95-96.
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there is fear in the air. As dams have been erected upstream over the years, the
floods have lost their strength and the catch has suffered. The flooding in 2003
was the poorest on record, and the fishing was by all accounts "terrible." 2 88 Yet
these incredible costs do not seem to impact development decisions. Again, the
answer lies in the demographic disconnect between costs and benefits. "[T]he
Mekong fishery's place in Cambodian society and its economy is largely hidden from urban elites and government. Most of the fish caught on the river
never reach commercial markets and never appear in government data." 28 9 In
other words, the incentives of decision-makers and investors are misaligned
with those of the rural poor.
This disconnect is not isolated to the developing world. Indeed, sticking with the theme of food-production, one of the best examples comes from
the United States. Over the past few decades, livestock producers in the United
States have significantly modified their operations to become more efficientat least in terms of inputs and outputs reflected in the marketplace-by converting farms into factories. 2 90 The term that has come to be associated with this
model is "CAFO," the acronym for "concentrated animal feeding operation." 2 9 1
As this term suggests, CAFOs are places where animals are housed in claustrophobic conditions and fattened on grains brought to the site from elsewhere. 2 92
Apart from the animal-welfare concerns-many hogs go insane from being
kept in gestation crates their whole lives, 2 93 and chickens are frequently debeaked to prevent cannibalization of their neighborS294 -CAFOs introduce a
slew of environmental problems. Concentrated animals yield concentrated, often unmanageable amounts of manure that can contaminate groundwater and
surface water, degrade ambient air quality, produce noxious odors, and, in
combination with digestive processes, produce significant amounts of greenhouse gases. 295

288
289

Id at 95.
Id. at 104.

290

THEIR

CARRIE HRIBRAR, UNDERSTANDING

IMPACTS

ON

CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND

COMMUNITIES

1

(2010),

available

at

http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understandingcafosnalboh.pdf.
291 What is a CAFO?, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region7/water/cafo/
(last updated Sept. 10, 2012).
292
Jodi Soyars Windham, Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: Perverse Subsidies, SocialResponsibility, andAmerica's 2007 Farm Bill, 31 ENvIRONs 1, 21 (2007).
293 The
Pork Industry, PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT
OF ANIMALS,
http://www.peta.org/issues/animals-used-for-food/pork-industry.aspx.
294
See HRIBRAR, supra note 290, at 11; Robyn Mallon, The Deplorable Standardof Living
Faced by FarmedAnimals in America's Meat Industry and How to Improve Conditions by Eliminatingthe CorporateFarm, 9 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 389, 404 (2005).
295
See also Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 492-93 (2d Cir. 2005).
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Aside from this last byproduct, the negative environmental impacts of
CAFOs are highly localized.296 The economic downsides of CAFOs are likewise concentrated in close proximity to the site. Although proponents have
leaned on job-creation, the evidence for this is scant. 2 9 7 It is dwarfed by the evidence of plummeting property values of the homes and lands that surround
these mega-farms.2 98
Of course, CAFOs have a major upside that at least partially explains
their proliferation: They "provide a low-cost source of meat, milk, and eggs,
due to efficient feeding and housing of animals, increased facility size, and animal specialization." 2 99 These cheap animal products aren't so cheap when one
considers all the externalities that, by definition, aren't reflected in the sale
price.300 But for our purposes the noteworthy point isn't that CAFOs dominate
the market by leveraging externalities; it's the fact that local communities are in
effect asked to subsidize CAFOs by bearing the brunt of these externalities
while the broader consumer market reaps the rewards of low-cost food. The
fact that people living near CAFOs also enjoy the option of lower-priced food
may render the distributional profile less lopsided, but it hardly balances things
out. People who live in cities or towns far away from CAFOs get food for the
same price without the nuisance of contaminated water, noxious odors, and depressed property values.
In sum, even if the EPA were to take a more aggressive tack under the
Clean Water Act and consistently subject CAFOs to permitting that triggers
preparation of an EA or EIS under NEPA, 30 1 there would still be the issue of
296

HRIBRAR, supranote 290, at 3.

297

Mallon, supra note 294, at 404.

298
DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, CAFOs UNCOVERED: THE
UNTOLD COSTS OF CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 61 (2008); HRIBRAR, supra note 290,

at 3.
299
300

HRIBRAR, supra note 290, at 2.
See generally GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 298 (describing externalities associated with

CAFOs and claiming that meat prices do not reflect the true cost of production).
301 EPA's regulation of CAFOs is complicated and shifting. Although the Clean Water Act
recognizes CAFOs as "point sources," 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012), and therefore seemingly requires CAFOS to obtain a NPDES permit from the EPA, the agency has been stymied in its efforts to require CAFOs to apply for permits. See Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d
738 (5th Cir. 2011) (striking down regulation that required CAFOs to apply for permits if they
"proposed to discharge," where CAFOs were said to "propose to discharge" if they were "designed, constructed, operated, or maintained such that a discharge would occur"). In addition, the
EPA lacks information on the number and location of CAFOs operating in the United States. In
2001, the EPA estimated that only 20% of CAFOs that should have permits have actually been
issued one. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. Reg.
2960, 3080 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) ("Under the existing regulation, EPA estimates that about
12,000 facilities should be permitted but only 2,530 have actually applied for a permit."). Consistent with this statement, the Government Accountability Office concluded in 2008 that "that
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moral hazard. When the lion's share of the environmental and social cost is
borne by the communities hosting CAFOs, while the economic benefits are enjoyed by a much larger population base, there is a danger that the agency will
be captured not only by the regulated industry but also by the numerically superior consumers of CAFO products. And because these CAFO "winners" aren't
being asked to live with the social and environmental costs, they (acting
through the agency) exert force against regulations that they would be much
more likely to favor if they were placed in the position of the CAFO "losers"
(i.e., the local communities that surround these operations).
Yet, as I explain below, community consent should not be required
anytime there is some geographic and demographic disconnect between costs
and benefits (or, to put it differently, any time there is some risk of moral hazard). It is only when such asymmetry rises to the level of a profound disconnect-as suggested in the above two examples-that community consent
should be the norm.
One might argue that the moral hazard framework is inapt because, in
the context of environmental harm, we all feel the effects. Project proponents,
therefore, have just as much reason to weigh these costs and mitigate where
possible. There are two problems with this logic. First, even if environmental
degradation theoretically affects everyone, it affects some more than others.
Second, moral hazard isn't eliminated simply because one has something to
lose. Rather, it persists so long as the personal (as opposed to aggregate) costs
are outweighed by the personal benefits. Situations of moral hazard throw a
monkey wrench into utilitarian calculus because some costs-those felt by others-are ignored.302
The optimal policy response to this dynamic is, admittedly, subject to
debate. There are many ways to force internalization of costs, including litigation, the imposition of fiduciary duties, and insurance.3 03 Yet consent holds at
EPA does not have comprehensive, accurate information on the number of permitted CAFOs nationwide." U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-944, CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS: EPA NEEDS MORE AND A CLEARLY DEFINED STRATEGY TO PROTECT AIR AND
at
available
CONCERN
(2008),
OF
FROM
POLLUTANTS
WATER
QUALITY
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-944. Therefore, while one can find examples of the EPA
having conducted NEPA analysis prior to issuing a permit to a CAFO, see, e.g., U.S. ENVTL.

PROT. AGENCY, COVERAGE OF THE HORIZON ORGANIC DAIRY UNDER THE NATIONAL POLLUTION
DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM GENERAL PERMIT FOR CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS INIDAHO (2013), it appears that many CAFOs go unregulated.
302
KRUGMAN, supra note 283.

303

John M. Church, Lender Liabilityfor Hazardous Waste: An Economic and Legal Analysis,

59 U. COLO. L. REV. 659, 672-75 (1988) (discussing the power of liability through litigation as a

means to force internalization); David R. Hodas, NEPA, Ecosystem Management, and Environmental Accounting, 14 NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENv'T 185, 191 (2000) (discussing insurance options); Scott H. Mollett, IntracorporateOpportunism: RedistributionalCompensation and Fixing
UnderexposedAbuses of CorporateWealth, 9 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 141, 188 (2013) ("[F]iduciary
duties help internalize the cost of opportunistic decisions in a variety of situations.").
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least one clear advantage: its directness. Rather than addressing moral hazard
by encouraging investors to internalize risk-something not easily accomplished 304 -a consent regime would confront the problem by giving those who
bear the costs a direct voice in the matter.
3.

Voice Commensurate with Knowledge: Consent and the
Search for Information

One does not have to accept the normative arguments in favor of consent to embrace it as an improvement over the current model. Starting with local knowledge, the next three arguments expand upon the practical rationale for
moving towards consent.
Local people know things about their land and society that far-off technocrats do not. "Environmental knowledge, like economic knowledge, is highly
decentralized. Specific knowledge about local ecological conditions-threats,
problems, and solutions-is more likely to be found at the local level than in a
centralized regulatory bureaucracy."30 5 Accordingly, an EIA that fails to include local input is quite likely to be data-deficient.3 06 The history of dam development in the western United States proves the point.3 07 Whereas local
knowledge of land and water would have scrubbed many a project at the planning stage, we ended up with a slew of inefficient dams drawn up by faraway
bureaucracies. 308
Even where agency staff have identified the right risks, they may not
appreciate their gravity or nuance. "Tunnel vision" may cause them to gloss
over risks that appear minor at first glance, only revealing their problematic nature upon closer examination. 3 0 9 The familiarity of local communities with local characteristics can counteract this tendency.
In the end, a regime that requires and heeds broad input from the affected community is more likely to produce informed decisions. 31 0 This is not

3
W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a DiminishedRole for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and ContemporaryRisks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J.ON REG. 65, 82 (1989)
("[I]nformation and transactions [sic] costs make complete internalization of the costs of risk impossible.").
305
Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of FederalAction on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 67, 77 (2007).

306

FRANK FISCHER, CITIZENS, EXPERTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLITICS OF LOCAL

KNOWLEDGE

30

117 (2000).

See generally MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT (1993).

Donald Snow, Wallace Stegner's "Geography ofHope, " 24 ENVTL. L. xi, xv (1994).
Celia Campbell-Mohn & John S. Applegate, Learningfrom NEPA: Guidelinesfor Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 93, 121 (1999).
310
This is the case not only because the community provides information to the agency, but
also because the agency provides information to the community. Rossi, supra note 155, at 187.
308

309
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to suggest that the public understands the situation, in all its details, better than
an agency. Rather, the idea is that communities can provide to agencies important data that may otherwise go unconsidered. This is especially true in the
case of local environmental conditions and socio-cultural factors. And, knowing that community consent is a prerequisite to major projects, agencies would
be more likely to give due weight to these concerns.
4.

Consent as a Path Towards Legitimacy, Acceptance, and a
Stable Business Environment

Democracies enjoy a perception of legitimacy to the extent they involve, or appear to involve, the public in the work of governance.3 1 1 The broader and more direct the participation, the stronger this perception of legitimacy. 3 12 Unfortunately, in environmental decision-making, consultation has failed
to lead to sufficient legitimacy and acceptance because public participation is
neither broad nor direct. 1 Moving towards consent would respond to this
deficiency.314
The potential of consent to yield legitimacy and lasting community acceptance has not been lost on private enterprise. Despite the absence of laws
requiring such action, for instance, firms engaged in mining and oil extraction
in Canada and Australia have taken it upon themselves to seek the consent of
affected indigenous communities.3 15 Though these moves might be motivated
in part by changing notions of corporate social responsibility, they also reflect
sound business judgment. As incidents around the world have shown-from
Bolivia to China-local resistance can render a project unworkable. 3 16 Even if
Id. Some scholars have argued that this might be the case even where citizen participation
is entirely futile, affecting nothing. See, e.g., Mihaley, supra note 119, at 165.
312
Zhao, Public Participationin China, supra note 87, at 90 ("[I1nvolving the public in
the
EIA process contributes to consensus building and can effectively reduce potential conflicts and
litigation at a later stage.").
313
See supra Part II.
314
See generally STEVEN HERz, ANTONIDA VINA & JONATHAN SOHN, WORLD RES.
INST.,
DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT CONFLICT: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR COMMUNITY CONSENT (2007),
available at http://pdfwri.org/development withoutconflict fpic.pdf; see also Kylie Wilson,
Access to Justicefor Victims of the InternationalCarbon Offset Industry, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 967,
1019 (2011) ("There is also a strong business case for more extensive public participation and
EIA procedures.... Stricter public participation requirements will enable project developers to
recognize and address community needs, gain community support early in the project cycle, and
avoid delays and financial risks associated with legal action or local unrest. . . .").
315
George K. Foster, Foreign Investment and Indigenous Peoples: Options for Promoting
Equilibrium between Economic Development and Indigenous Rights, 33 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 627,
646-47, 649 (2012).
311

36

OSCAR OLIVERA, TOM LEWIS & VANDANA SHIVA, COCHABAMBA!: WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA

(2004); China Wastewater Pipeline Scrapped After Protest, BBC NEWS (July 28, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-19026464.
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legally permitted, the costs of such resistance eventually take their toll. This is
particularly true in many developing nations, where direct action like road
blockades and sabotage are more common. 317 Firms are rightfully taking note;
if fiercely opposed, an otherwise profitable project may not make sense. Community consent, on the other hand, engenders stability, a rare and valuable
commodity that benefits the bottom line even as it satisfies normative
preferences.
Obtaining consent, of course, will often necessitate modifications to the
project or its execution. Such modifications will often result in projects more
aligned with the dual goals of sustainable development: ecologically sound use
of the environment and the reduction of poverty.3 18 Putting aside for the moment concerns over "buying" consent-addressed in the following section-an
otherwise meritorious project that fails to secure community approval can be
adjusted to account for specific environmental concerns or to direct more of the
benefits to the local community. In some cases, the amount and type of modifications necessary to win consent will render the project unfeasible. If the community withholds consent for reasons of local ecology or economy, this is not a
bad result. In many cases, though, the modifications will not affect the essence
of the project but nevertheless respond to local concerns in meaningful ways.
In the Philippines, for instance, Shell made significant changes to the
Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project in response to local concerns.319
The largest industrial development in the nation's history, the $4.5 billion
Malampaya project began operation in 2002, extracting natural gas from the
seabed off Palawan Island (lightly populated and described by Jacques Cousteau as the "most beautiful place" he had ever explored) 320 and pumping it over
500 kilometers to a refining plant on Luzon Island (the economic and political
center of the Philippines 321). 322 Upon refinement, the gas fuels three power

Patrick J. Garver et al., Investment Decision Making in the Extractives Industry in "Challenging"Places,58 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. INST. 2-1, 2-18 (2012) (discussing clashes over
projects in the Niger Delta, where "companies experienced widespread violence, sabotage of infrastructure, bunkering (i.e., oil theft from pipelines), kidnapping, and much more").
317

318
Scott D. Calahan, NIMBY: Not In Mexico's Back Yard? A Casefor Recognition of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment in the American States, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 409, 419
(1993).
319

HERZ ET AL., supra note 314, at 19.

320

Michell Jana Chan, The Philippines: The Islands Less Well Traveled, THE TELEGRAPH
at
available
16,
2008),
(Feb.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinationslasia/philippines/748878/Philippines-The-islandsless-travelled.html.
321

HERZ ET AL., supra note 314, at 19.

322

Id.
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plants.323 The plants are expected to supply Luzon with 2,700 megawatts of
electricity, or some 30% of national power needs.324
Well before starting construction in 1998, Shell decided to engage in a
325
consultative process with the aim of securing community consent. Although
Philippine law at the time required public participation in the EIA process, 3 26
Shell arguably went beyond the legal minimum by not only holding town-hall
meetings and public hearings, but by responding to concerns through substantial project modifications.327 For instance, during the early stages of the project,
three pipeline routes were considered for delivery of the gas to the refinery. The
cheapest route-the one initially favored by Shell-would have crossed Mindoro Island. But when community members expressed fear that the route would
disrupt areas of rich biodiversity, Shell backed down and looked to other options.32 8 The second option was an offshore route, but this too was rejected because the path went through ancestral waters of the Tagbuna tribe.329 Finally,
Shell selected an offshore route that "avoided the most significant environmental and social impacts of the other two options, and therefore averted potential
community pressure in the affected areas." 33 0 This is but one of many adjustments or accommodations made by Shell as a result of its dialogue with affected communities.331
Did Shell do this out of the kindness of its heart? Probably not. Instead,
Shell perceived the alignment between fiscal, environmental, and social responsibility. The company "estimates that its total costs of engaging the affected communities and gaining their consent-including staff time, meetings,
community compensation, changed plans, and other related expenses-was approximately $6 million." 33 2 In the context of a $4.5 billion project that generated revenues of $685.7 million between 2002 and 2004, Shell's expenditures on
engagement are a drop in the bucket.
Indeed, the company actually saved
money compared to projections because the lack of conflict allowed it to complete work ahead of schedule. 33 4 Throw in indirect benefits-a boon to compa-
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Id. at 20.
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ny goodwill and a better relationship with the government-and Shell's outlays
on public engagement look like an incredible investment.
Shell's approach in the Philippines stands in stark contrast to the approach taken by a pair of firms in Peru.3 36 In the Peruvian Andes, the open-pit
Minera Yanacocha Gold Mine Project (Yanacocha) spans some 160 square kilometers and has extracted over $7 billion worth of gold since opening in
1992. * One of the world's largest and most profitable gold mines, Yanacocha
is co-owned by United States-based Newmont Mining Corporation and Peruvian-based Compaiia de Minas Buenaventura, with the final five percent stake
held by the International Finance Corporation. Despite its massive scale, the
existing operation at Yanacocha represents only a small fraction of the overall
concession-Newmont and Buenaventura hold development rights over an additional 1500 square kilometers.338 When the operation began to yield unexpectedly high amounts of gold in the 1990s, Newmont and Buenaventura
launched a campaign of aggressive expansion. By the end of the decade, the
mine was exerting a "gravitational force" throughout the area, disrupting the
pastoral economy and way of life.339 Even though Peruvian law required that
half of all tax revenues go to local government, the mine's environmental, social, and economic impacts were the source of rising tension. While Yanacocha
provided employment for many, it also cut a deep divide between those residents able to gain work at the mine and those left out-the majority population.
Instead of seeing the mine as a boon, residents who maintained their pastoral
livelihoods saw it as a negative, damaging the local watershed upon which they
depended.34 0
The situation boiled over in 2000 when a mining contractor spilled
mercury along a local road.341 Unaware that the liquid metal was a toxic byproduct of the mining process, children played with it and some adults collected it and brought it home.342 Making a bad situation worse, management at the
mine delayed reporting the spill and allegedly paid villagers to clean up the
spill without proper safety gear. 34 3 In the end, over 1,000 residents stated that
they suffered from acute mercury poisoning. 34 4
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Shortly thereafter, things took another turn for the worse-at least from
the mine's perspective. With its eyes on developing Cerro Quilish, a site within
the concession estimated to hold 3.7 million ounces of gold, the consortium assured community members that the project would not affect water quality.3 45
Increasingly skeptical of the company line, the community threw a monkey
wrench into the plan when Cajamarca, the largest town in the area, passed a
municipal ordinance declaring Cerro Quilish off-limits. 3 46 Turning to the judiciary, the firms won back their rights when the Peruvian Supreme Court held
that Cajamarca had exceeded its authority. 347 Predictably, this ruling did not
end the controversy.348 When the miners moved equipment onto the site to
begin exploratory drilling, the people took to the streets. 3 49 They blocked the
road and, following a police crackdown, launched a general strike that culminated in 10,000 people filling the plaza. 350 Forcing negotiations, the conflict
was finally resolved when local leaders met with the Ministry of Mines and
company officials. 35' The firms apologized for their actions and petitioned the
Ministry to revoke the permit relating to Cerro Quilish.352 With an estimated
worth of $2.23 billion and low recovery expenses, the trouble at Cerro Quilish
amounted to a loss of as much as $1.69 billion in company earnings.353 New
mont's stock fell 7% during the two-week protests. 354
Although we cannot be certain the consortium would have had success
at Cerro Quilish had it first sought community consent, it only could have
helped. By failing "to meet the public's expectations of transparency, meaningful participation in decision making, and good corporate citizenship," Newmont
and Buenaventura sowed the seeds of their own destruction.35 Had they approached the matter under the rubric of consent, they might have realized that
the project was doomed from the start and cut their losses; or they might have
restructured the project to address local concerns, engaging in an iterative process marked by compromise and genuine listening. Either way, the companies
would have emerged with their reputations burnished rather than tarnished.
Apart from environmental concerns, projects often meet local resistance based on the perception (often accurate) that the benefits inure to dis346
346

347
348
349
351
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tant rather than local interests. To secure community approval, some firms have
responded to this perception by awarding subcontracts to local businesses, employing local labor, and on occasion packaging the main project with
community development projects such as schools and hospitals.356 Even if these
efforts seem an incomplete response to the economic concerns raised by site
communities-construction jobs, for instance, would hardly replace a lost
economy based on fishing and hunting-they still represent significant progress
towards sustainable development. By forcing the issue, consent makes these
approaches more likely.
Yet, reflecting on these tales, one might conclude that consultation
does work (as in the Philippines), and that it only fails to work when the effort
is half-hearted or disingenuous (as in Peru). If that is the case, the argument
continues, we should focus on implementation of the current framework rather
than supplementing consultation with consent. While the initial observation is
spot-on-there is an implementation problem, especially in the developing
world-it fails to recognize an important fact: When consultation works, the
process looks very much like consent. The cases that seem to satisfy us-like
the Malampaya project in the Philippines-do so because the people have effectively given their consent. If that is what we really want, we should adopt a
regime that requires it explicitly.
5.

Consent, Transparency, and Manipulation

The final argument in favor of consent relates to the problems of transparency and manipulation. Although a consent regime would still be vulnerable
to these problems-one need look no further than ballot irregularities in political races to recognize as much-it would be an improvement over the current
model of consultation.
As I have shown above, consultation under NEPA and similar regimes
has failed to produce public participation as advertised. 5 But even when there
has been widespread input, the nature of the consultation model precludes a
precise understanding of how much impact that participation has had on any
given decision. When the deciding body sets forth and discusses public comments in its final opinion, one might fairly assume that the body did in fact consider those comments in rendering its decision. But there is never a way of
knowing how much weight the comments actually received.35 s
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See, e.g., HERZ

AGREEMENTS:

ET AL.,

VALE

supra note 314, at 19; NATURAL RES. CAN., PARTNERSHIP
INCO-NEWFOUNDLAND

AND

LABRADOR

(2008),

http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca.minerals-metals/files/pdf/mms-smm/aborauto/pdf/vale-08-eng.pdf.
357
See supraPart II.
358
A recent case in point comes from the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cal. Trout v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission, 572 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2003). California Trout had attempted to
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The consent regime resolves this ambiguity: Community approval is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the project at issue. In cases where the
community withholds consent, the weight of its input will be absolutely clear.
In cases where the community grants consent, ambiguity may still remain, as
such approval will be but one factor in the ultimate decision to proceed with or
to abandon the project. Still, because the larger concern from the community's
perspective arises when projects are approved over its objections, consent
would resolve ambiguity problems in their most vexing form.
If ambiguity tends to undermine public confidence indirectly, manipulation of the consultative process attacks it head-on. Manipulation of public input is one of the fears fed by an ambiguous process. Under a consultation regime, this fear is often well-founded. This is especially true in many developing
countries where manipulation and corruption run rampant and oversight is
weak. 3 5 9 The Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project, completed in 2007, illustrates how governments can check the consultation box while avoiding
meaningful public input. Contrary to the requirements triggered by World Bank
funding, the process was a sham; The people themselves had virtually no input,
and "the only NGOs consulted were, for the most part, either created for the
purpose in hand or commanded no allegiance in the production region."36 0 With
a clearly defined process of consent, this sort of manipulation can be avoided.
B.

To What Extent?

The consent requirement that I envision would be rather limited. A regime that wholly turned on consent would be rightly criticized by conservationists and developmentalists alike. That is not what I propose. Rather, the requirement I envision would be limited in the following ways: (1) it would apply
only in situations passing the eligibility test (described below); (2) it would apply only to the affected local community (defined below), not the community at
large; and (3) community approval would not constitute legal authorization
(i.e., it would be a necessary but not sufficient condition).

intervene in a FERC proceeding addressing renewal of the California Aqueduct's license. FERC
denied the motion to intervene at the agency level, and the Ninth Circuit upheld on appeal. Although FERC did not allow California Trout to intervene, the appellate court noted with approval
the agency's statement that "California Trout's comments are in the record and will be given the
same weight as those of any other entity, whether a party or not." Cal. Dep't of Water Res. and
L.A., Project 2426-206, 120 FERC 1 61248, 62030 (Sept. 20, 2007); see Cal. Trout, 572 F.3d at
1017.
359 Pranab Bardhan, Corruptionand Development: A Review ofIssues, 35 J. EcoN. LIT. 1320,
1321-22 (1997).
360
Letter from Ngarlejy Yorongar to the Inspection Panel at the World Bank (Dec. 15, 2000),
availableat http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/
RequestEnglishtranslation.pdf.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

61

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6

170

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

1.

[Vol. 116

Projects Requiring Consent and the Eligibility Test

Not all public works should be subject to community consent. Just as
many projects are exempted from NEPA under what is essentially a costbenefit rationale,3 61 so too should many projects be exempted from any consent
requirement grafted onto NEPA and its counterparts. In this section, I describe
one version of what I call the "eligibility test," a test to determine whether a
project should in fact trigger the consent requirement. After discussing this test
(and an option for rebuttal in special cases), I go on to address what role, if any,
consent should play in projects and regulations that tend to enhance the natural
environment rather than cause it harm.
When should a project trigger the requirement of consent? In the introduction, I suggested that consent should only be mandatory when the project
will (1) have a "significant" impact on the environment, and (2) yield a profound disconnect between those who enjoy its benefits and those who bear its
environmental costs. As will become more obvious, it will take a fairly special
project to satisfy both criteria. A ready example would be a large hydro-electric
dam that forces upstream subsistence farmers to relocate while the energy fuels
a big city hundreds of miles away. While this project would satisfy the two criteria-significance and a profound disconnect-most projects would not.
a.

SignificantImpact

Under NEPA, the responsible agency only prepares an EIS for projects
having a "significant" effect on the quality of the human environment. 3 62 "Significant" is defined to require consideration of the intensity of the environmental effects and the context in which they occur.363 Although regulations enumerate various factors,364 the determination of "significance" is ultimately
made on a case-by-case basis, first by agencies and then, if challenged, by the
courts. 365- Determining "significance" is not an exact science; it is complicated
See Boling, supra note 34, at 319 (explaining that categorical exclusions "were designed to
avoid repetitive analysis of actions that normally do not involve significant impacts"); Moriarty,
supra note 40, at 2312 ("The public need not participate in minor decisions, and requiring them
to do so would only distract them from environmentally significant decisions and unnecessarily
burden agencies. Categorical exclusions thus promote agency efficiency and avoid masses of paper that might otherwise divert attention away from federal actions with real environmental effects.").
362
Anglers of the Au Sable v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F. Supp. 2d 812, 823-24 (E.D. Mich.
2008).
363

40 C.F.R.

364

id.

§ 1508.27 (2013).

See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 446 F.3d 808, 812, 816 (8th Cir.
2006) (holding that issuance of a FONSI constituted final agency action under NEPA and, accordingly, was subject to immediate judicial review).
3
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by the lack of a clear baseline,36 6 and by agencies' incentive to downplay the
impacts of a project to avoid the resource expenditure involved in preparing an
EIS. 6 On the other hand, the agency incentive to avoid an EIS is at least partially counteracted with the jurisprudence on uncertainty (requiring agencies to
prepare an EIS where the uncertainty of impacts may be resolved by further data collection), 6 cumulative impact (requiring agencies to evaluate a project's
"significance" not in a vacuum, but rather in light of "the incremental impact of
the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future
actions"), 36 9 and segmentation (prohibiting agencies from "divid[ing] artificially a 'major Federal action' into smaller components to escape the application of
NEPA to some of its segments"). 3 70 Even if it is sometimes difficult to predict
the outcome of a significance determination, few observers have called for redrawing the line altogether.
The language of "significance" is common throughout the world's EIA
regimes. At the international level, the prospect of significant impacts triggers
the duty to prepare an EIA under such instruments as the Convention on Biological Diversity, 37 1 Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration, 37 2 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.373 In keeping with this trend, the United Nations General Assembly has grouped EIA among the fundamental
principles of international environmental law-along with such staples as the
polluter-pays principle and the precautionary principle-and has suggested that
such assessments "should be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely

366

Kass, supra note 29, at 57-58.
See generally Karkkainen, supra note 8.
368 Nat'1 Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
369
Society Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 180 (3d Cir. 2010); 40
C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2013).
370
Save Barton Creek Ass'n v. Fed. Highway Admin., 950 F.2d 1129, 1139 (5th Cir. 1992).
371
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological
Diversity art. 7, July 1, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (requiring parties "as far as possible and as appropriate ... [to] ... introduce appropriate procedures ... [requiring environmental impact assessment
of proposed projects that are] . . . likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity").
372
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June
3-14, 1992, Rio Declarationon Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1
(Vol. I), Annex I (July 1992), reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 874 ("Environmental impact assessment, as
a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.").
3
See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act, Nov. 1, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 1261 art. 206 (calling for assessment of activities
that have potential effects on the marine environment).
367

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

63

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

172

[Vol. 116

to have a significant adverse impact on the environment." 3 74 At the national
level, significance is the touchstone in the European Union,375 Brazil,376 Cana
da,377 Australia, China,379 India,s 0 and countless other countries.38 1
In sum, significance is the consensus threshold point identified by the
international community. Absent a compelling argument to the contrary, we
should not deviate from this in the context of a consent-based regime.
b.

ProfoundDisconnect

Community consent should only be necessary where it appears likely
that the project in question would produce a profound disconnect between those
who would enjoy the benefits of the project and those who would suffer its environmental harms. To some extent, public projects will always yield asymmetry. If a state builds a road between two cities, some people will see incredible benefits (construction crews and transportation firms), others significant
benefits (businesses from one city with a commodity that is scarce in the other
city), others modest benefits (consumers who might buy newly available goods
or services), and others virtually no benefits (poor people with no reason or
money to travel and with no money to spend on newly available products). And
so it goes with the costs: Some will pay a heavy price (farmers forced to relocate), some a significant but lesser price (residents along the thoroughfare who
face increased pollution), and some very little at all (well-to-do citizens living
away from the thoroughfare).382 In the absence of other aggravating factors,

374
Overall Review and Appraisal of Further Implementation of Agenda 21,
118, U.N.
GAOR, 19th Spec. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/S-19/29 (June 28, 1997).
3
EIA Directive 85/337, 1985 O.J. (L 175) (EEC); see also Paul Grace, UK Environmental
Impact Assessments: The Battle Continues, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 63, 64 (2005).
376
Humberto Dalla Bernardina De Pinho, The Role of the Department ofPublic Prosecutions
in Protectingthe Environment under Brazilian Law: The Case of "Favelas" in the City of Rio de
Janeiro,24 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 735, 739 (2008).
3
See Kamta Prasad, EnvironmentalImpact Assessment: An Analysis of the CanadianExpe-

rience, 30 INT'L STUDIES 299 (1993).
378
See Do You Need Approval Under the EPBC Act?, AuSTL. Gov'T
DEP'T OF THE ENv'T,

http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/approval.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
379
Lemmer, supra note 124, at 293-97.
380
id
3'
See BARRY SADLER, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD: EVALUATING
PRACTICE TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE 118-21 (1996), available at http://www.ceaaacee.gc.ca/Content/2/B/7/2B7834CA-7D9A-41OB-A4ED-FF78AB625BDB/iaia8_e.pdf (discuss-

ing various approaches to determining "significance").
382
One might object that I have ignored the cost of paying taxes. If there is a progressive tax
structure, then wealthy citizens may well pay more (in terms of economic if not environmental
costs) than citizens of modest means. Indeed, I would hope to see policy-makers (and courts)
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however, this would not qualify as a profound disconnect. Change the facts,
and it might.
Sticking with the case of a publicly-financed road, one can imagine a
situation where the costs and benefits flow to such distinct communities and
economic interests that the disconnect demands more than consultation. Imagine that the road will be built between two distant cities and cut through a national park populated sparsely by an indigenous community. The community
has lived in the park's rainforest for centuries, depending on hunting and fishing for food and largely sheltered from outside contact. The road might bring
the park community some benefits-access to medicine, economic opportunity
in the way of increased tourism-but the road is being built for the cities, and
they clearly stand to gain the lion's share of the benefits. The environmental
costs, on the other hand, will be felt disproportionately by the residents of the
park. The road will split the park in two; the trees that are chopped down will
expose fragile soils that will wash into the rivers, fouling the habitat of fish; the
noise and smoke of heavy equipment will make their way into a jungle that has
never known them; and, looking into the future, the road will invite numerous
settlers who will take advantage of the road to practice slash-and-burn agriculture and sell off the timber. The environment will change and the indigenous
community will change with it. Perhaps the community members will welcome
this-or perhaps not. But, either way, they should be given the choice. If the
project sponsor fails to secure the community's consent, the project should not
be allowed.
The above example-based loosely on the ongoing "TIPNIS" conflict
in Bolivia 3 83-would satisfy the criterion of a profound disconnect. But
wouldn't the community in this case-an indigenous group-alreadyhave the
protection of consent under UNDRIP? Aren't you arguingfor something that
the internationalcommunity has already embraced? Not quite. Consent for indigenous peoples under UNDRIP finds its theoretical roots in notions of sovereignty and communal property rights. In my TIPNIS-inspired example, consent
could be invoked under either UNDRIP or the regime I propose, which relies
on a different theoretical foundation. Whereas the UNDRIP version of consent
hinges on a community's status as "indigenous," my own hinges on the degree
of a community's exposure to a disproportionately high share of the costs and a
disproportionately low share of the benefits. This disconnect is frequently seen

consider all costs and benefits when discerning the presence of a profound disconnect. I have left
out the matter of taxes in the above example for brevity's sake alone.
383
See generally Nicholas Fromherz, The Rise and Fall of Bolivia's Evo Morales, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Oct. 18, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/the-rise-and-fall-ofbolivias-evo-morales [hereinafter, The Rise andFall].
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with projects in indigenous territory, but it is likewise common in nonindigenous communities.384
c.

Rebutting Consent

Although satisfaction of the above two criteria will typically occur in
cases where a right of consent is normatively desirable, one can envision atypical cases-cases in which, despite satisfaction of the eligibility criteria, a right
of consent would be unfair. In many ways, the consent regime can be thought
of as a tool for environmental justice. If granting a consent right in a given case
would, despite satisfaction of the eligibility criteria, undermine rather than further the goal of environmental justice, the consent right should not pertain.
A concrete example will help to clarify the point. For more than a decade, controversy over a proposed offshore wind farm ("Cape Wind") has embroiled Cape Cod, Massachusetts.
The plan calls for the construction of 130
turbines some 4 to 11 miles offshore, in an area of Nantucket Sound known as
Horseshoe Shoal. 386 Though it might surprise Melville-and the not insignificant numbers of year-round residents who live below the national poverty
line-the Cape and its neighboring islands of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket
have come to be associated with wealth and privilege.387 The Kennedy Compound in Hyannis Port is perhaps the most potent symbol of the area's lofty status in the American conscious. The Kennedy residence commands a breathtaking view of the waters over Horseshoe Shoal-precisely where Cape Wind
developers hope to plant their turbines.38 8
If applied rigidly, the eligibility criteria might point in the direction of
consent rights for the communities surrounding the Cape Wind site. Cape Wind
certainly qualities as a "significant" project for purposes of NEPA, and there is
a reasonable argument that the communities within eyesight of the turbines will
suffer a disproportionate share of the environmental costs of the project. Under
one version of the narrative, while the broader population will enjoy the benefits of cleaner energy, it is only the close-in communities that will suffer de-

See, e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 3-8 (1994) (discussing race-and-class-based discrimination in the siting of toxic dumps
and municipal waste facilities in the United States).
385
See generally WENDY WILLIAMS & ROBERT WHITCOMB, CAPE WIND: MONEY, CELEBRITY,
CLASS, POLITICS, AND THE BATTLE FOR OUR ENERGY FUTURE (2007).
384

386

Susan Lorde Martin, Wind Farms andNIMBYS: Generating Conflict, Reducing Litigation,

20 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. REV. 427, 450 (2010).
387
Roger L. Freeman & Ben Kass, Siting Wind Energy Facilitieson Private Land in Colorado: Common Legal Issues, 39 COLO. LAW. 43, 44 (2010).
388
See Elinor Burkett, A Mighty Wind, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, at 48; Wayne Drash, Nine-

Year Wind Farm Fight Splits Cape Cod, CNN (April 20,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/04/20/cape.cod.wind.farm/index.html.
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creased property values and a disrupted fishery. 389 Although it is not clear that
this particular distribution of costs and benefits would be so asymmetrical as to
meet the requirement of a "profound disconnect," the mere fact that one could
make this argument calls for a response. If consent is to be a tool of environmental justice rather than a lever of NIMBYism, it follows that consent should
not empower naysayers who favor off-shore wind in the abstract-and who
benefit from countless other initiatives-but who would rather not play host.
One way to mitigate this risk is to view satisfaction of the eligibility
criteria as giving rise to a rebuttable presumption. If the agency determines that
a project is both significant and likely to distribute costs and benefits in an
acutely asymmetrical manner, this gives rise to a presumption of extending a
consent right to the disproportionately burdened community. Yet, if the agency
discerns that the disproportionality in the case at hand is offset by an inverse,
favorable disproportionality in other past initiatives-where the community has
received a disproportionate benefit from other environmentally significant projects or policies-the community should have no right to consent.
Consent's appeal is strongest when the distribution of costs and benefits follows a historically unjust pattern, when the community saddled with the
costs in a given case has been on the outside looking in many times in the past.
The appeal of consent diminishes as the uneven cost-benefit distribution begins
to appear less like a pattern and more like an anomaly. There may be situations,
of course, where the distribution at issue is so severely lop-sided that it would
be unfair to consider the off-set effect of past initiatives. This is why a situation
that has satisfied the eligibility criteria should trigger a presumption in favor of
consent, a presumption that can only be rebutted when the community has, in
the aggregate, enjoyed disproportionate benefits from past initiatives. Consent
should primarily be a tool for marginalized communities in the fight against
environmental injustice.
2.

The Problem of Conservation-Enhancing Projects,
Regulations, and Withdrawals

In 1996, Bill Clinton used his authority under the Antiquities Act390 to
create the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in Utah. 39 1 At 1.9
million acres, it was the largest National Monument ever created in the conti-

See Dominic Spinelli, Historic Preservation & Offshore Wind Energy: Lessons Learned
from the Cape Wind Saga, 46 GoNz. L. REv. 741, 746-48 (2011) (summarizing positions for and
against Cape Wind); Iva 2 ifa, Siting of Renewable Energy Facilitiesand Adversarial Legalism:
Lessonsfrom Cape Cod,42 NEW ENG. L. REv. 591, 595 (2008).
390
16 U.S.C. § 431 (2012).
391
Proclamation No. 6920, 3 C.F.R. § 64 (2013).
389
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nental United States.3 92 It was also one of the most controversial. 393 Sitting atop
some 62 billion tons of coal, the land that became the Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument was coveted by the energy industry and, regionally, looked upon as a great source of future employment.394 By all accounts,
the people living in and around the area did not want the monument; it was
foisted upon them despite their vigorous objections.395
The Grand Staircase-Escalante controversy highlights a potential problem with requiring consent: what to do in the case of conservation-enhancing
projects, regulations, and withdrawals? The simplest answer is to say that consent should not be required when the government proposes a conservation
measure, but only in the case of a project that could potentially damage the
environment. This simplest of answers is the right one, but it takes some explanation.
The explanation lies in the raison d 'tre of environmental law. NEPA
and its counterparts are designed to encourage environmental protection, not to
place obstacles in its path. Though NEPA's procedural safeguards "may be
used to benefit those who assert development interests, just as the safeguards
may be used to benefit those who assert conservation interests,... NEPA's
policy objectives must not be thwarted in the process."39 6 Applying NEPA so as
to unduly hamper conservation projects-such as designating lands roadless,
restricting timber harvests, creating new parks, etc.-is to turn the statute "on
its head." 3 97 Because NEPA and its foreign counterparts aim to protect the environment by requiring agencies to consider environmental impacts, requiring
community consent in the case of a conservation-enhancing proposal would be
at cross-purposes with the underlying regimes. 9 While U.S. courts have failed
to rule consistently on the extent to which NEPA applies in the case of conservation projects or measures, 39 9 there is no good reason to tack on an additional
procedural obstacle such as consent.
Janice Fried, The Grand Staircase-EscalanteNational Monument: A Case Study in Western Land Management, 17 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 477, 477-78 (1998).
393 See generally Eric C. Rusnak, The Straw that Broke the Camel's Back? Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument Antiquates the Antiquities Act, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 704-07
(2003).
394 id
3
See John D. Leshy, Shaping the Modern West: The Role of the Executive Branch, 72 U.
COLO. L. REv. 287, 308 (2001).
396
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002).
392

398 One possible exception might be in the extreme case where a government proposes
a conservation withdrawal or regulation in bad faith, e.g., out of a desire to punish a certain group of
people.
3
Compare Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen a federal agency takes an action that prevents human interference with the environment, it need not
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Defining the Local Community

The foregoing points have dealt with the scope of the consent requirement primarily in terms of the nature of the project. That is perhaps the most
important part of the equation, but the question of scope also extends to population. I have stated that the "local community" holds the right of consent, but
who exactly belongs to that community? The ongoing TIPNIS struggle in Bolivia demonstrates how important-and complicated-this question can be.
At first blush, the TIPNIS case would appear an easy nut to crack-at
least as concerns the issue of defining the affected local community (i.e., the
community that would hold consent rights under my proposal). The Bolivian
government proposed building a road between two departments (counterparts
to the United States), with the road cutting through a national park and protected indigenous territory (known as "TIPNIS").4 0 0 As one might predict, public
opposition to the road overwhelmingly concerned the path through TIPNIS; the
proposal to build a road connecting the two departments was not, as such, the
subject of controversy. 401 After months of wrangling, the government finally
decided to consult the affected community.4 02 But if that decision brought closure to one debate, it only initiated another: exactly who should be able to participate in the consultation?40 3 Because the "consultation" was understood to be
something more like a referendum-the government implicitly acknowledging
that it would need community approval to move forward with the projectdefining the eligible public was of critical importance.404
Yet, as I say, the TIPNIS case appears an easy one. Because the road
was to cut through a park and protected indigenous territory-and it was that
particular detail that sparked the protests and marches--one might fairly conclude that, under a consent regime, park residents alone should hold consent
rights. Facts on the ground, however, complicate matters. For starters, the park

prepare an EIS."), with Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. v. Norton, 294 F.3d 1220, 1231
(10th Cir. 2002) (ordering the FWS to prepare an EIS in connection with proposed critical habitat
designation).
400
The Rise and Fall,supra note 383.
401
See Nicholas Fromherz, Waking from a Dream in Bolivia: The TIPNIS Victory That Never
Was, TERRANULLIUS (Feb. 20, 2012), http://terra0nullius.wordpress.com/2012/02/20/wakingfrom-a-dream-in-bolivia-the-tipnis-victory-that-never-was/#more-2498 [hereinafter Waking from
a Dream].
402
See Emily Achtenberg, Bolivian CongressAdopts ControversialTIPNIS ConsultationLaw,
N. AM. CONGRESS ON LATIN AM. (Feb. 10, 2012), https://nacla.org/blog/2012/2/10/boliviancongress-adopts-controversial-tipnis-consultation-law (discussing "the critical issue of who will
be consulted").
403
id
404
Interview with Mauricio Sanchez Patzy, Professor of Sociology, Universidad de San Simon, in Cochabamba, Bol. (Sept. 27, 2013).
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is roughly the size of Connecticut. 405 With groups of people distributed unevenly throughout the park's reaches, it is not obvious that everyone living in the
park would be affected in even approximately the same way.406 While communities that straddle the path of the road would feel its impacts immediately,
people living far from the road might not feel its effects for years to come.
So there is the geographic factor. In addition, there is the even thornier
question of demographics. Despite its name, many would argue that not everyone living in the park is "indigenous"--or at least that not everyone merits that
title for purposes of determining the park's future. The indigenous peoples
"originally" from the territory encompassed by the park belong to three tribes:
the Moxefio, Yuracard, and Chimane.4 o? Yet these people are not the only ones
who live or work in TIPNIS. Following the collapse of Bolivia's mining industry in the 1970s and 1980s, thousands of highlanders came to the area surrounding TIPNIS and began to cultivate coca.408 These people overwhelmingly identify themselves as "indigenous"-of indigenous Andean descent-and it is hard
to argue with that assessment.4 09 But they are not indigenous to the immediate
area of TIPNIS, 410 a tropical rainforest strikingly different from the high plains
to the west, so many say they should not participate in the consultation. 4 11 This
Noah Friedman-Rudovsky, Bolivia's Battle over a Road and a Way of Life, YALE ENV'T
360
(Aug.
27,
2012),
http://e360.yale.edulfeature/videoboliviabattles over-highwayand way of_1ife/2565/ (documentary film).
406
Consulta a los Indigenas del Territorio y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure, FUNDACI6N
TIERRA,
http://www.ftierra.org/ft/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=10916:rair&catid=10
1:graficos&Itemid=149 (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (map showing park and community sites).
407
Franz Chavez, BOLIVIA: Morales Clashes with Natives Protestors over Road Through
Tropical Park, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/08/boliviamorales-clashes-with-native-protesters-over-road-through-tropical-park/.
408
See BENJAMIN DANGL, THE PRICE OF FIRE: RESOURCE WARS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN
BOLIVIA 31-58 (2007); Interview with Mauricio Sanchez Patzy, supra note 404.
409
See Interview with Mauricio Sanchez Patzy, supra note 404; Denuncian Que Consulta en
(July
30,
2012),
Presion
Cocalera,
EL
MUNDO
TIPNIS
Tiene
http://www2.elmundo.scz.in/index.php/nacional/10116-denuncian-que-consulta-en-tipnis-tienepresion-cocalera.
410
See Denuncian Que Consulta en TIPNIS Tiene Presion Cocalera,supra,note 409; see also
DEP'T OF REG'L DEv., ORG. OF AM. STATES, Case study 5 - The Chapare regionstudy, Bolivia, in
INTEGRATED REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: GUIDELINES AND CASE STUDIES FROM OAS
EXPERIENCE (1984), available at http://www.oas.org/dsd/publications/Unit/oea03e/chl0.htn#iv.
implementing the recommendations (discussing government-sponsored and spontaneous colonization of region surrounding TIPNIS).
411
See MSM: Consulta Solo Debe Hacersea Los Tres Pueblos Indigenas,LA PATRIA, Oct. 13,
2011, http://lapatriaenlinea.com/?nota=85431 (reporting position of opposition party leader, who
maintains that the government consultation "should only apply to the three indigneous peoples
[who inhabit TIPNIS] ... and which have nothing to do with the colonoziers, loggers, and coca
growers") (author's translation)); Interview with Mauricio Sanchez Patzy, supra note 404.
405
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is no academic issue; the coca growers are generally die-hard supporters of the
Morales government and the planned road.412 If they were to be included in the
consultation, the outcome could change altogether.4 13
The point of this story is not to suggest a particular approach in the
TINPIS case or any other controversy. Rather, it is to acknowledge that it is no
easy task to identify the local, affected community for purposes of a regime
based on consent. That being said, one can sketch a basic framework for approaching the issue, recognizing that adjustments may be required in individual
cases.
The starting point should be a presumption in favor of narrowly defining the affected local community. Even with the limits I propose, consent is a
powerful tool that should only be invested in communities clearly finding
themselves on the wrong side of the cost-benefit disconnect. Using the existing
hierarchy of geopolitical units, the smallest unit should be favored as that
whose inhabitants exercise consent. So, if a dam is to be constructed in Municipality X of County Y, the community with consent rights should be Municipality X unless all other municipalities within County Y are equally affected.
Whether we think of this as a riff on the principle of subsidiarity 414 or as a way
to curb dilution of local interests by regional interests, the presumption in favor
of narrowly defining the affected community is sound.
To ensure some degree of order, the agency in charge of permitting the
project should probably be assigned the task of initially defining the local
community in light of this principle. While employing the presumption in favor
of narrowly defining the affected community, the agency should still be granted
discretion to consider the various factors-ecological, economic, and socialthat reasonably inform this judgment call. Essentially, the determination of the
relevant community for purposes of consent would be a "scoping" task.415 Under NEPA, this determination would be subject to judicial review, but only following final agency action, and even then the decision would be somewhat insulated through the abuse-of-discretion standard.4 16 However, given the
importance of this decision, it might make sense to allow interlocutory review,
at least in exceptional cases.

.1

412
The Rise and Fall,supra note 383; see also Interview with Mauricio Sanchez Patzy, supra
note 404.
413
See Wakingfrom a Dream, supra note 401.
414
Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation:Dividing the Local from the State in Congressional
Decision Making, 30 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 321, 359 (2012).
415
Under NEPA, an agency has "the discretion to determine the physical scope used for
measuring environmental impacts" so long as the scope of analysis is "reasonable." Idaho Sporting Cong. Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 973 (9th Cir. 2002).
416
Kootenai Tribe ofldaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1235 (D. Idaho 2001).
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Consent as a Necessary but Insufficient Condition

Some readers might claim that it is unprincipled to treat consent as a
necessary but insufficient condition for a project. Why should a community effectively hold a veto right (in the event that it rejects a project) yet not hold a
corresponding right to authorize a project? Why give the "people" great power
when they are against a project, but only limited power when they are in favor
of a project? There is a very simple answer to these questions-an answer that
points to a neutral principle rather than bias in favor of a particular outcome.
Simply put, a power to veto an otherwise proper government action is categorically different than a power to determine or authorize a government action.
While the former represents a limited check on government power, the latter
represents appropriation-and perhaps even usurpation-of government power.
An analogy to the relationship between Congress and the President
serves to illustrate the point. While the President has the power to veto a bill
with which he disagrees-and thus scuttle an otherwise lawful act of Congress-his favorable opinion of a bill does not automatically make it law. Rather, while the President must sign the bill for it to become law, the bill must
first garner majority support from both the House and the Senate. 4 17 Furthermore, if the act is challenged in court as unconstitutional, the President's approval will not save it from the court's judgment. And while the President has
the right to veto a bill with which he disagrees, that right becomes a duty only
in the limited case of unconstitutional (as opposed to imprudent) legislation.4 18
The power of a community invested with a right to consent is thus
similar to the President's power in relation to legislation. Consent is a check on
a power that is wielded by a government institution. It is not a means to transfer
that power from an agency to a community, just as the Presidential veto power
does not transfer legislative authority from the Capitol to the White House.419
Instead, like the Presidential veto, it is a bargaining chip that a community may
use to re-calibrate the balance of power.420 Viewed in this light, consent is more
like a tool of negotiation (whose force is palpable whether or not the communi-

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
See Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2127 (1989).
419
See Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of a Separation of
Powers, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 31 (2003) ("[A]lthough legislative power is distinctively associated with Congress, the President has considerable claim to exercising this power as well, contributing to the lawmaking process through the presidential veto and the power to propose legislation.").
420
See Sidak, supra note 418 ("The President is free under the Constitution to use his veto
threat as a bargaining chip in the lawmaking process. He can agree with Congress to withhold a
veto of one bill in order to secure their passage of a different bill he values more.").
417
418
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ty exercises the right formally) than a blunt instrument to override legitimate
policy choices.421
In some limited sense, of course, to grant a community the right to
consent is to giant a community the right to authorize. But this is so only in the
narrowest of ways: A community may "green light" a project which otherwise
complies with all relevant laws and has the support of the government or agency in charge. It may not "authorize" a project that is otherwise legally deficient
or in want of political support. Any broader interpretation of consent's power to
authorize would allow the community to exercise core government functions,
even to the end of forcing the government to spend public funds on projects
that only benefit the community empowered with consent. This would turn the
principle on its head. Consent should be a shield against unjust projects, not a
spear for hunting pork.
C.

By What Process?

It is one thing to argue that consent represents an improvement from
consultation, at least when cabined by the limits described above. It is quite another to overcome the perceived and real barriers to establishing a just process.
Apart from limiting the situations in which consent would be required-and
advancing the critical rule that consent would in all events be a necessary but
insufficient condition-I propose three procedural approaches to ensure that the
community (1) is sufficiently informed; (2) sufficiently participates; and (3) exercises consent freely.
1.

Informing the Community: A Deferential Approach

The only consent worth the name is informed consent. Informing the
public about the environmental effects of proposed actions has always been a
goal of NEPA and similar regimes.422 Whether the regime is one of consultation or consent, it is only an informed public that can participate in a meaningful way.
As discussed above, the voluntary nature of participation under consultation models leads to a situation where only the most informed and (already)
interested inject themselves into the process.423 In other words, those who participate are likely to be informed. On the other hand, consultation fails to encourage a broadly informed public: It fails to provide those who should be interested with the necessary incentive to become informed and, thereby, to
recognize the depth of their interest.

421

See id.

422

Tabb, supra note 32, at 207.
See supra Part Il.D-E.

423
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How, then, to inform the public about a pending project while at the
same time avoiding manipulation? Readers familiar with NEPA might see this
question as a non-starter. Under NEPA, the agency in charge of preparing the
EA or EIS is also responsible (in conjunction with the EPA) for making it
available to the public. The public comment period formally begins with publication of the notice of availability of the draft impact statement in the Federal
Register. The public then has a period of time, usually 45 to 60 days in the case
of draft impact statements, to register comments.424 While the agency preparing
the EIS must automatically send a copy to interested federal, state, and local
agencies, the law does not require active dissemination to the public at large.425
If the agency so chooses, it may legally require civil society either to make a
426
request or search for the document in the Federal Register. In practice, agencies have proven more generous. Recognizing that outreach efforts and a critical mass of public input builds legitimacy and goodwill, agencies frequently
establish websites soliciting commentS427 and hold town-hall meetings to receive oral input.428 Combined with NGO efforts, actively interested members of
the public have reasonable access to the relevant information.
Yet, under the rubric of consent, this model of dissemination is insufficient because (1) the heightened authority embodied in consent demands a
more informed public, and (2) in many developing nations, on-the-ground factors dictate a more active approach. The first point is fairly intuitive. If you are
going to enhance the power of the people, you should also take further steps to
ensure they are informed. Of course, one should not take this notion to the extreme-requiring literacy or conditioning participation on a knowledge test
would at best disproportionately impact the poor and more likely be intentionally employed to disenfranchise critics.42 9 Still, a minimally and broadly informed community-not just groupings of people-is required if consent is to
work. This may seem daunting, but keep in mind that we are not talking about
informing an entire nation or even region-we are usually talking about a distinct community that is relatively small in size. The task is achievable.
As I mention, however, on-the-ground factors in developing nations
must also be considered .Among these factors are corruption, intimidation, illiteracy, and deep-seated mistrust of state authorities and foreign actors alike.
Although these factors pose particular problems under consultation regimes

424
425

40 C.F.R. § 1506.10 (2013).
Id. § 1502.19.

426

See id.

427

See,

e.g.,

Forest

Service

NEPA

Information,

USDA FOREST SERVICE,
http://www.fs.fed.us/nepa/nepa home.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
428
Clifford Rechtschaffen, Advancing EnvironmentalJustice Norms, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
95, 121 (2003).
429
Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 353 (1998).
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(which, by their opaque nature, invite manipulation and misinformation), they
are solvable under consent.
So, if the NEPA-style approach to informing the public is insufficient
in cases requiring consent, what should take its place? The answer depends on
just how creative we are willing to get. From one perspective, the fresh approach that consent embodies militates in favor of re-thinking the ways in
which information is disseminated in all voting situations. From another perspective, it does just the opposite. Adopting a model of consent is change
enough; incrementalism and political realism suggest a conservative tack when
addressing related issues like the delivery of information.
To my way of thinking, the latter argument is superior. This means, in
practical terms, that the state (or its agency) should have discretion over how it
will disseminate information in situations requiring consent. This will often
mean that the state adopts the very model used in other local voting scenarios,
but it may occasionally imply the creation of a new procedure altogether.
Why should states be given this discretion when they are, under my
proposal, denied the discretion to choose consultation over consent? To begin
with, consent is the more important principle-the higher goal-and it certainly
seems that individual states would be more likely to adopt consent regimes if
they felt like they at least had some latitude with the corresponding procedure.
Apart from this concern-what we might call a "marketing" concern-we have
the subsidiarity principle and considerations of efficiency. The subsidiarity
principle holds that "power and responsibility should be devolved to the lowest
level of government capable of exercising it well."430 In regions with high literacy rates and reliable postal service, distribution of a written pamphlet (with
equal content supplied by both proponents and opponents) might be appropriate. In regions with low literacy, radio and television programs might be the
way to go. In cultures with a strong tradition of oral deliberation, the superior
method might be town-hall meetings and project presentations. Individual
states are in the best position to identify what works regionally and locally, and
attempts to specify granular procedural rules may do more harm than good. In
addition to the subsidiarity principle and the context-dependent nature of effective procedures, moreover, the status quo should be favored to avoid the costs
of implementing new information-delivery rules.
That being said, existing models should be defaults and discretion must
have its limits. Procedures adopted by states can and should be replaced if they
fail to meet the basic goal of a broadly informed public. Further-and this may
be the more critical point-developing nations proceeding in good faith may
often struggle to muster the financial resources necessary to finance their information programs. To overcome this barrier, a multilateral fund supported by
developed nations would likely be required. Developed nations would have an

430

Decker, supranote 414, at 359.
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incentive to support such a fund because, over the long run, the certainty and
conflict-reducing nature of consent regimes would engender a more stable environment for foreign investment in development projects. Rule-of-law programs
in general, 4 3 1 and the European Union's work in implementing the Aarhus
Convention in Central Asia in particular,432 suggest that the Global North
would be willing to allocate money to this effort.
2.

Ensuring Sufficient Participation: The Case for Mandatory
Voting

If I am ready to show deference to governments in the delivery of information, I am less inclined to do so when it comes to ensuring participation.
The model I propose would require mandatory voting by all adults living within
the affected community. This may seem over the top. Why require people to
vote? Why not just give them the right to do so and then the allow them to decide for themselves whether they wish to exercise that right? The answer to this
question is that the absence of a strong, universal rule could lead to troubling
situations-situations that would not only defeat the purpose of consent but that
would further entrench existing injustices.433
To citizens of the United States, mandatory voting sounds odd and potentially inconsistent with democracy.43 4 For many around the world, however,
mandatory voting is the norm and an effective way to enhance participation and
curb voter apathy.4 35 Compulsory voting in elections exists and is enforced in
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Luxembourg, Nauru, Peru, Singapore, and Uruguay. 436 Compulsory voting also exists-but is rarely or unevenly enforced-in Belgium, Bolivia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Greece, Honduras, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Thailand.437 Even if mandatory voting is not a global norm,
431 See,
e.g.,
ABA
Rule
of
Law
Initiative,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule of law.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
432
Focus on the Aarhus Convention in Central Asia, STRENGTHENING PUB. PARTICIPATION
AND CIV. Soc'Y SUPPORT TO IMPLEMENTATION OF AARHUS CONVENTION, July 2008, available at

http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/Media/TACISJuly_2008 CARegion.pdf.
433 See Brant McGee, The Community Referendum: ParticipatoryDemocracy and the Right to
Free,Prior,and Informed Consent to Development, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 570 (2009) (for a
defense of using community referenda as the appropriate mechanism to implement FPIC).
434 Eric
Liu,
Should Voting
be
Mandatory?, TIME
(Aug.
21,
2012),
http://ideas.time.com/2012/08/21/should-voting-be-mandatory/.
435 Amanda Kelley Myers, Importing Democracy: Can Lessons Learnedfrom Germany, India, and Australia Help Reform the American Electoral System?, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 1113, 1149
(2010).
436

Compulsory

Voting,

INTERNATIONAL

INSTITUTE

FOR

DEMOCRACY

AND

ELECTORAL

ASSISTANCE, http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory voting.cfm (last updated Mar. 21, 2012).
437 Id
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it is standard practice in a number of nations covering a broad range of cultural
and economic constituencies.
Some might argue-validly so-that subjecting every nation to the voting preferences of a few nations would be unjust. But that is not what I am proposing. Rather, I am suggesting compulsory voting in the limited category of
certain public projects, where the persons required to vote are only those persons who live in the local community that would bear the brunt of the negative
environmental consequences. The fact that many nations have embraced compulsory voting for national elections tends to show that compulsory voting in
these limited circumstances is less radical than it might otherwise seem.
But this still does not answer the question: Why require voting by everyone? Why not determine the presence of consent based on the majority of
ballots cast, however many that may be? The answer is two-fold: (1) to ensure
that the majority of the community is actually in favor of the project and (2) to
curb intimidation of community members in expression of their positions. By
requiring compulsory voting, in other words, the outcome has more legitimacy
as a matter of both substance and procedure. One of the major problems with
consultation regimes is that, even when ideally designed and executed, they
necessarily cater to the most vocal participants.43 8 Minority factions can create
the illusion of majority support for their positions by playing an outsized role in
the consultative process. Supplementing this process with optional voting tends
to reduce the danger of domination by minority factions, but not as effectively
as mandatory voting. In addition-and this is a pressing concern in many developing nations-mandatory voting serves to counter intimidation of would-be
voters. Just as the secret ballot precludes deterrence through after-the-fact retaliation,439 mandatory voting precludes efforts to intimidate or deter voters before
they cast their ballots. When a person chooses to exercise a right rather than
satisfy a legal duty, she is more vulnerable to external pressure.
Finally, there is little to the argument that mandatory voting violates
democratic principles. The contention here is that voting should be a right, not
a duty, because the freedom voting embodies is not simply freedom of choice
(choosing between alternatives) but also the liberty to participate or opt out altogether. This argument has conceptual power, but only when directed against a
rather extreme vision of compulsory voting-a vision I do not share-and
which at any rate seems less applicable in the context of environmental decision-making.

438
See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, FilterFailure,andInformation Capture,
59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1349 (2010) (describing the influence of a "vocal constituency of unhappy
interest groups").
439 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, and Governance: Toward Conservation
Stewardship of Private Land, in Cultural and PsychologicalPerspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv.
423, 482 n.332 (2003).
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Certainly, in the case of national elections for political office, mandatory voting could pose problems if the public were simply given the choice between a few candidates representing a limited range of the political spectrum.
Even if the "Tweedle Dee or Tweedle Dum" scenario is not endemic to compulsory-voting systems, it seems more problematic if the people are forced to
choose between undesirable alternatives and not given the option to boycott the
process altogether. But mandatory voting need not place people in this position
even in the extreme case of national elections-and, in many nations, it does
not. In Bolivia, for instance, citizens are deemed to have complied with their
duty by casting a blank ballot. 44 0 Voters unsatisfied with the choices or the process are allowed to express that frustration.44 1
Still, even if a vehicle for boycott is preserved, "Tweedle Dee or
Tweedle Dum" scenarios are troubling for more fundamental reasons. If a consent regime encouraged these scenarios, then that would be considerable
grounds for its rejection. Yet, there is no reason why this should happen. Just as
NEPA requires consideration of alternatives-including the alternative of no
action-a regime incorporating consent would function within this larger
framework.44 2 Ultimately, a local community would be asked to grant or withhold its consent for a specific version of a project, but that vote would take
place against the background of other alternatives. Again, consent does not displace consultation, but rather supplements it. A consent regime might not ameliorate the frustration expressed by some critics that NEPA and other consultative regimes fail to promote consideration of true alternatives," but neither
would it aggravate that frustration.
3.

Free Exercise of Consent

In April 2012, after the Bolivian government had agreed to consult
TIPNIS residents on the matter of the road, local news stations broadcast images of President Evo Morales visiting select communities with gifts in hand. 4
The gifts ranged from outboard motors to promises to construct a sports stadi-

440
El Gobierno Dice Que Voto Nulo es un Derecho, Los TIEMPOs (July 21, 2011), available
at http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/politica/2011072 1/el-gobiemo-dice-que-votonulo-es-un-derecho-un-hace_134638_274007.html (recounting Vice President's acknowledgment that casting a blank ballot is a constitutional right).
441
See Bolivia: El Voto Nulo Domina Elecciones, EL UNIVERSAL (Oct. 17, 2011), available at
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/intemacional/74756.html (describing situation where 44% of
Bolivians cast blank ballots in elections for the Constitutional Court).
442

42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii) (2012).

See, e.g., Michael E. Lackey, Jr., Misdirecting NEPA: Leaving the Definition of Reasonable Alternatives in the EIS to the Applicants, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1232 (1992).
44
Nicholas Fromherz, The Cruelest Month: April in Review, S. AM. L. & POL'Y (May 3,
2012), http://southamericanlaw.com/2012/05/03/the-cruelest-month-april-in-review/.
4
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um.4 4 5 With the "consultation" being interpreted and planned as a binding decision-in effect more like an exercise in consent-Morales was clearly trying to
curry favor with those who had a say. Opponents of the road, both inside and
outside TIPNIS, panned the move as a brazen attempt to buy votes. And so
perhaps it was. But the fiercest of criticisms were directed not at the distribution of gifts per se, but at the discriminating nature of that distribution. Morales
didn't give gifts to everyone in TIPNIS; he targeted only those communities
and leaders who he thought were predisposed (or who could be swayed) to
support the project. It was a classic case of divide and conquer.446
This chapter of the TIPNIS saga illustrates another obstacle to consentbased regimes. Absent effective safeguards, a framework based on consent will
invite coercion. Whether through the threat of a stick or the promise of a carrot,
political and economic factions that support a project may try to execute an
end-run around the requirement of consent by influencing the people to decide
in their favor.
One approach to this problem-perhaps the most obvious-is to ban all
attempts to influence the peoples' decision through material means. In other
words, proponents and opponents of the project must sway the community
through arguments based on the merits of the project and nothing else. While
tempting, this approach would go too far, and its limits would be difficult to define in practice. Would an alternative iteration of the project-one that mitigated costs and amplified benefits to the site community-be off limits? And what
if, rather than adjusting the nature of the project itself, the sponsor packaged the
project with development aid specifically earmarked for public health and education? Even if the motive were anything but altruistic, would we want to prohibit such a move as coercive?
There is no need for a sledgehammer when a flyswatter will do. Rather
than prohibiting all attempts to influence the process through material means,
the better approach is to condemn only those "gifts" that tend to benefit particular individuals or groups within the community rather than the community as a
whole. Thus, returning to TIPNIS, the law would prohibit the government from
distributing outboard motors but would potentially allow investment in public
education and health facilities. I say "potentially" because, even then, the law
should allow for challenge where there is reason to believe that the side project
will inure to the benefit of one sector of the community rather than the community as a whole. If the intent and effect are to divide and conquer, that should
not be tolerated.
Two final points should be made. First, note that we are considering the
case of gifts or investments adjacent to and separatefrom the project itself. If
"
Emily Achtenberg, New Twist for TIPNIS Road: Bolivia Cancels Highway Contract, N.
AM. CONGRESS ON LATIN AM. (April 16, 2012), https://nacla.orgIblog/2012/4/16/new-twisttipnis-road-bolivia-cancels-highway-contract.
446

Id.
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the basic project design is modified to respond to local concerns or enhance local benefits, there is less reason for skepticism and this rubric does not apply.
Second, even within the category of investments adjacent to the main project,
not all such investments are created equal. I would not have the law categorically prevent a government from cutting checks to all local households to influence their vote, 4 47 but neither should this be encouraged or viewed as the normative equal of, say, building a public health clinic. How this distinction
should be effectuated-and whether it is the task of law or other forces-is a
valid question, but one for separate consideration.
D.

Consideringthe Consent Frameworkfrom a Rawlsian Perspective

In addition to some of the more specific objections that I have tried to
address along the way, I anticipate that many readers may harbor a more generalized reticence to move from consultation to consent. One way to test the legitimacy of such generalized reticence is to consider the matter from the "original
position" described by John Rawls. 4 4 8 If we would favor consent over consultation from this original position, then our reluctance to accept it would appear to
be based not in normative preference but in considerations of practicalities or,
more disturbingly, as a function of our unique identities. In other words, we
might hesitate to move towards consent because we think it difficult as a practical matter or because we find it hard to identify with those who suffer under
the current regime. If these are the reasons for our resistance-reasons that are
not normative-addressing them becomes more straightforward.
In Rawls's version of social-contract theory, the original position is the
state from which free and equal citizens negotiate the rules of society.449 It is a
hypothetical position designed to identify the basic norms we would agree to if
our judgment was not blurred by the power asymmetries that exist in real
life. 4 50 Rawls's most significant contribution to social-contract theory does not
lie in the idea of the original position itself, however, but in his characterization
of this position through the "veil of ignorance." 4 5 1 The veil of ignorance asks us
to ignore much of what we know about ourselves: whether we are intelligent or
slow, endowed with a strong constitution or prone to sickness, diligent or distracted, wealthy or poor, and so on. 452 It also strips us of the ability to know the

44
But note that, in such a case, the definition of the impacted local community would become
even more important.
448
JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15-19 (rev. ed. 1999).
44
450

Id. at 248.
See generally Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in ConstitutionalLaw, 111 YALE

L.J. 399, 399 (2001).
451
See RAWLs, supra note 448 at 136-42 (describing veil of ignorance).
452
id.
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statistical likelihood that we will draw one of these lots over another.4 53 Rawls
posits that, behind the veil or ignorance, the principles we would select are inherently just principles because, forcing us to imagine ourselves in a range of
positions of societal advantage and disadvantage, we are likely to select norms
that would be considered fair by everyone. The veil of ignorance is thus a simple and powerful construct that allows us to identify the rules we would select
if we know little about our identities and accompanying strengths and weakness. Significantly, although Rawls originally applied the veil of ignorance to
free and equal individuals within the same society, human-rights scholars have
extended the veil to include the possibility of life within any one of the world's
nations or societies.454 Viewing matters behind this even thicker veil, persons in
the original position would not know whether they were to live in a developed
or developing nation.
Rawls's veil of ignorance, modified with the additional unknown of national origin, provides a compelling vantage point from which to evaluate consent versus consultation. Standing a chance of being in a disadvantaged position vis-A-vis a publicly-sponsored project-say, a subsistence farmer living in
the reservoir site of a proposed dam-one is more likely to favor rules that
dampen rather than deepen asymmetries of power. Consent does just that. Indeed, a regime based on consent flows quite naturally from a Rawlsian original
position because it maximizes the prospects of the least advantaged in comparison to other alternatives.455
All this is not to suggest that one must view consent as superior to consultation from a normative perspective. Strong utilitarians will reject the
Rawlsian framework as flawed from the very start.456 But because many people

453

Id

See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, The Elusive Quest for Global Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
249, 268 (1997); Dennis C. Mueller, Rights and Liberty in the European Union, 13 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 1, 9-10 (2005).
455
Note that this this principle, known as the "maximin criterion," does not rule out all social
inequality. It simply asks us to pick a rule with which we would be comfortable if our enemy
could choose our place in society. With this in mind, "Rawls reasons that people behind the veil
might be open to some social inequality, but only if they are guaranteed a minimum threshold of
civil liberties and material welfare, and only if departures from an egalitarian distribution serve to
increase the social pie and make even the lowest member of society better off than they otherwise
would be." David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation after Stephenson: A
Rawlsian/BehavioralEconomics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279, 291
(2006). Further, Rawls does not insist that the maximin principle applies to all choices. As common sense indicates, even rational actors are willing to gamble when even the worst outcome
isn't all that bad. In contrast, people in the original position will employ the maximin approach
when making decisions that "affect [their] life-prospects." John Rawls, Some Reasons for the
Maximum Criterion,AM. EcoN. REV., May 1974, at 141, 144.
456
David A.J. Richards, ContractualistImpartiality in the American Struggle for Justice: A
Comment on Professor Allen's "Social Contract Theory in American Case Law," 51 FLA. L.
REV. 41, 43 (1999).
454
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accept Rawls's framework as a helpful thought experiment, critics should at
least consider the analysis when discerning normative objections to this proposal.
V. A PAIR OF OBJECTIONS
In this final Part, I briefly discuss what I consider to be two of the more
salient objections to my proposal. These objections are (1) that the proposal is
anti-development, and even anti-sustainable development and (2) that granting
consent rights to non-indigenous peoples would undermine consent rights for
their indigenous counterparts.
A.

This ProposalIs Anti-Development

One reaction to my proposal runs something like this: By advocating
consent rather than consultation, you are in effect advocatingfewer projects
that affect the environment. You are seeking a substantive end that is antidevelopment, perhaps even anti-sustainable development. And you are doing
all this by creating an opportunityfor a minority to override the desires of the
majority.
The response to this critique is multifaceted, and it begins with a candid acknowledgment: A requirement of consent would indeed represent a hurdle to many projects and activities that require or could require government action or permitting. Yet, having admitted as much, there are three additional
points to consider.
First, it is unfair to judge the consent proposal by its effects on "development" in the undifferentiated aggregate. Unless we are ready to deem all
such "development" change for the better-a dubious proposition in the twenty-first century-we have to differentiate between projects that represent sustainable advancement for communities (and the global community at large) and
those that do not. If consent would tend to screen out projects that are not environmentally sustainable-or that are not worth the candle in terms of community sacrifice-then a dip in the aggregate level of "development" might actually
represent an improvement in the overall quality or composite of development.
Second, and related to the first point, is the notion that we urgently
need a reduction both in aggregate development and in resource-intensive development. Since 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), hardly an alarmist organization, has maintained that warming of the
earth's climate system is "unequivocal," and that "[m]ost of the observed increase in global average temperatures . . . is very likely [i.e., between 90-95%]

due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentra-
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tions." 4 57 Meanwhile, there is a strong consensus within the scientific community that we are living smack in the middle of the sixth great mass extinction.4 58
But this time the die-off is not the result of an asteroid-it is the fruit of human
activity. 459 If we don't slow down-if we do not complement sustainable development (where it is needed) with sustainable contraction (where it, too, is
needed)-we are headed for disaster.4 60
Third, the contention that the consent-based regime would stifle genuine sustainable development and projects required to meet basic human
needs-all while allowing a minority to frustrate the legitimate desires of the
majority-only works if one ignores the limits built into the model. A quick
example will serve to illustrate this. Suppose that a growing town in the developing world lacks a plant for the treatment of wastewater. Health studies have
shown a direct relationship between the growing sanitary issue and increasing
outbreaks of typhus and other diseases. Almost everyone in the town wants the
government to build a plant-even if that means they foot the bill with public
tax dollars-but when it comes time to pick the site, the erstwhile supporters
become critics. Everybody is in favor of improved sanitation, but nobody wants
the facility in their neighborhood. And so, alternative site after alternative site,
the government fails to obtain local consent. In the end, the government scraps
the plan, leaving in place a status quo that is both politically unpopular and environmentally unsustainable.
Would this sort of scenario occur under the consent regime that I have
proposed? No. While the construction of the plant might indeed qualify as environmentally "significant," there would not clearly exist a profound disconnect
between costs and benefits. Virtually everyone in the town would benefit from
the construction of such basic sanitary infrastructure. While some might feel
the costs more than others-those living in the neighborhood ultimately picked
for the site-it would be a stretch to call them victims of a project that distributed costs and benefits in a deeply asymmetrical way. In this situation, then,
consent would not be required. Consultation would apply just as it (hopefully)
would today.
Understanding and Attributing Climate Change, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
http://www.ipcc.ch/publicationsand-data/ar4/wgl/en/spmsspm-understandingand.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
458
Timothy E. Wirth, Environmental Policy and International Cooperation: A Framework for
the 21st Century-Despair or Determination?, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 221, 225 (1999); see also
Thomas Lovejoy, Biodiversity: Dismissing Scientific Process, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Jan. 2002,
at 69.
459
Wirth, supra note 458, at 225.
460
See generally Paul Ekins, The Sustainable Consumer Society: A Contradiction in Terms?,
457

CHANGE,

3 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 243, 243-57 (1991); cf Robert Goodland & Herman Daly, Environmental

Sustainability: Universal and Non-Negotiable, ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1003-13 (1996) (suggesting that "[fluture Northern growth should be sought from productivity increases in terms of
throughput (e.g., reducing the energy intensity of production)").
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Yet, if we take the wastewater-treatment scenario one step further, we
can see how the consent regime would allow governments flexibility even
when the initial triggering conditions are satisfied. Imagine that instead of siting the plant within city limits, the government or agency proposes to build the
plant fifteen miles away, in a small rural community just marginally integrated
in the urban economy. The rural community has no immediate need for the
plant's services-its land base is sufficient to assimilate the waste produced by
the small, spread-out population-yet it is being asked to host the plant and the
odors and risk of water-contamination that come with it.4 6 1 Under these circumstances, the triggering conditions for consent would appear to be satisfied: (1) a
"significant" project that (2) exhibits a profound disconnect between those who
benefit from the project and those who suffer its environmental costs. Of
course, the government could try to obtain the consent of the rural community-and it might just succeed. But assuming that it wouldn't succeed-and assuming that it still wanted to continue with the project-the government could
modify the project in a number of ways. The government might make modifications either (a) to bridge the demographical disconnect (perhaps by granting a
preference to local construction and operation labor) and thus avoid triggering
the requirement of consent, or (b) to mitigate the perceived environmental impacts, thus securing community approval within the very rubric of consent.
Admittedly, this might entail hard choices for a cash-strapped government (and, by extension, for a city desperate for sanitation). But if a government or part of its constituency proposes an environmentally significant project
that distributes costs and benefits in such a lopsided fashion, it hardly seems
unfair to demand that these choices be made.
B.

Extending Consent to Non-Indigenous Peoples Would Dilute
IndigenousRights

Native peoples fought long and hard to secure FPIC as a core component of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
While some indigenous-rights advocates favor consent for non-indigenous peoples, others fear that expanding this right could lead to dilution. They worry
that a broader regime might trade in a strong form of consent for some for a
watered-down version of consent for all. Even organizations that insist upon
broad-based public participation for all projects have acknowledged "the understanding that the rights of all communities cannot be considered the same as

461
Although the hypothetical scenario I sketch takes place in a developing nation, readers
from Ireland might find parallels in a recent controversy regarding the development of
wastewater treatment plant outside Dublin. See Marie O'Halloran, Sewage Plant to Serve a Million People but "Not One House" in Fingal, FF Claims, THE IRISH TIMES, June 11, 2013,
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/environment/sewage-plant-to-serve-a-million-people-but-notone-house-in-fingal-ff-claims- 1.1423797.
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the rights of Indigenous Peoples with regard to consent."46 2 This is correct as a
descriptive matter, but it fails from a prescriptive standpoint.
First, there is simply no convincing reason to categorically grant consent rights to indigenous peoples yet categorically deny those rights to nonindigenous peoples. 46 3 Though there may be differing rationales-notions of
sovereignty, property, and cultural preservation auguring in favor of consent for
indigenous peoples; ideas of democracy and stake supporting consent for all
others-the result should be the same. Would anyone seriously argue that consent should control a project in rural Ecuador (where the indigenous/nonindigenous dichotomy finds purchase) but not control a project in rural Africa
(where this framework may not be so familiar)? 464 Or, if the keys are historical
property rights and cultural preservation, are these interests really only limited
to "native" peoples? What about a community like the N'djuka people in Suriname, who were brought over as slaves and, following escape centuries ago,
have lived ever since as a tight-knit tribe? 465
Second, differential treatment for indigenous and non-indigenous peoples could create new tensions or aggravate existing tensions between these
peoples.466 Projects that affect indigenous peoples also often affect nonindigenous peoples. Even if the ethnic or cultural distinction between these
peoples is clear-hardly a given-requiring consent from one group but not the
other can cause resentment, driving a wedge between the communities and
fueling backlash against the developer.467 Recognizing as much, groups representing the diverse interests of environmental protection, human rights, and development have all advocated for only a subtle distinction between FPIC (for
462

CHRISTINA HILL, SERENA LILLYWHITE & MICHAEL SIMON, GUIDE TO FREE PRIOR AND
INFORMED CONSENT 6 (2010).
463
See Robert Goodland, Free, Prior, Informed Consent and the World Bank Group, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY 69 (2004) (for a terse but strong argument in favor
of extending FPIC to non-indigenous peoples).
464
See Megan Davis, Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting:The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 MELB. J. INT'L L. 439, 442-44 (discussing the concerns of Asian and African states regarding the definition of "indigenous" peoples); cf Willem
van Genugten, Protection of Indigenous Peoples on the African Continent: Concepts, Position
Seeking, and the Interaction of Legal Systems, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 29, 38 (2010) ("[M]any aspects of the classical approach to indigenous rights ... clearly do not fit the African situation.").
465
See Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 (June 15, 2005), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/124-ing.html.
466
AMY K. LEHR & GARE A. SMITH, IMPLEMENTING A CORPORATE FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED
CONSENT
POLICY:
BENEFITS
AND
CHALLENGES
7
(Foley
Hoag
2010),
http://www.google.com/urlsa--t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=OCEcQFjAD&ur
l=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.foleyhoag.com%2F-%2Fmedia%2FFiles%2FPublications%2FeBooks
%2FFOLEY-HOAG-Informed ConsentPolicy eBook.ashx&ei=NOP2UOzGIKWVjAkcplHY
BQ&usg--AFQjCNF16nb5UWatGHslbrPMBjs6UAtl iQ&bvm=bv.41018144,d.cGE.
467
Id at 7.
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indigenous peoples) and consultation (for non-indigenous peoples).46 8 Whether
the motivation is risk prevention or the sentiment that all peoples deserve a say,
the general consensus is that FPIC principles should "guide" if not control consultation for non-indigenous peoples.4 69
Third, rather than diluting indigenous rights, consent for nonindigenous peoples would reinforce those rights. If the goal is differential
treatment for its own sake, then expansion of the consent model would admittedly cut against this-the right of consent would become theoretically universal, its applicability depending on the nature of the project and the likely effects, rather than the ethnic or cultural character of the community at hand. But
if the real concern is erosion of the right itself-FPIC backsliding into normal
consultation by virtue of extension to non-indigenous peoples-this seems possible only if consent for non-indigenous peoples is somehow watered down. If
consent is expanded to cover both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, then
there will be only one interpretation of what this means. If "consent," so universalized, were to mean something less than FPIC, then indigenous-rights advocates would have a legitimate gripe. But the regime I envision would only
strengthen consent rights for indigenous peoples, clarifying that consent entails
the power of veto. 4 70 Fears of a poorly fashioned consent regime shouldn't stop
us from approaching the matter altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION

If NEPA is the "Magna Carta of environmental law"-providing a fundamental structure for decision-making and informing legal regimes the world
over-then perhaps it is time for an update. Just as we look back on the emergence of the Magna Carta as a watershed moment in the history of the rule of
law, so too do we revere NEPA for its impact on how we make choices in a
fragile world. But reverence is not the same as satisfaction. Experience reveals
room for improvement, and, hopefully, we have the courage to act on that.
The consultative approach to environmental decision-making should
not be scrapped, but it should be modified. At least in the most serious of cases-where the decision will have a significant impact and there is a profound
demographical disconnect between costs and benefits--consent should replace
consultation.

468

See HERZ ET AL., supra note 314, at 7-11; Lehr, supra note 466, at 28-29.

Lehr, supra note 466, at 28-29.
In the consent-based framework proposed in this Article, the requirement of informed consent would confer a veto right. In contrast, the presence of a veto right under UNDRIP is unclear.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text. By making the presence of a veto right explicit, the
proposed framework would tend to strengthen the rights of indigenous peoples rather than dilute
them.
469
470
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Requiring consent in this limited set of cases would represent the responsible democratization of the law of environmental decision-making. The
current model (public consultation) implicitly recognizes the value of public
input in decisions impacting the natural environment. Yet this model stops
short of giving the public (or any subset thereof) a power of veto. This makes
sense in what may well be the majority of environmentally significant decisions. In many cases, the costs and benefits of a project are distributed in a
roughly even way.4 71 In these situations, where everyone has approximately the
same stake, it would be unfair to require the consent of-and thus grant a veto
right to-a particular subset of the population. A public referendum open to all
would be less objectionable, but placing the final decision in agency hands, following an opportunity for public comment, hardly seems unreasonable.
Yet not all projects are characterized by a balanced distribution of costs
and benefits. Instead, many public projects produce a split distribution: The
benefits inure to one segment of the population while the costs are borne by another. And frequently this asymmetry follows a pattern of broader social inequity, such that already marginalized groups are further marginalized through
environmental decision-making. In these scenarios, it is unfair to grant equal
participation rights to the entire population. Although the consultation model of
environmental decision-making is hardly an exercise in raw democracyagency officials, typically unelected, still have the final call-public participation means that the governed do have at least some say in the process. My proposal to grant a consent right raises the stakes, prompting reflection on when, if
ever, a minority may trump the will of the majority or an arm of government (in
this case, an administrative agency).
The appeal of majority-rule is at its strongest when the minority is,
despite its opposition, compensated for its sacrifice and duly included in the
decision-making process. In the case of projects that drastically affect the local
environment to the benefit of non-local interests (or local but demographically
narrow interests), neither of these preconditions is satisfied. The local community is not materially compensated for its sacrifice, and its inclusion in the decision-making process is inadequate as both a matter of law and fact. Formally,
NEPA-style consultation regimes grant every member of the public an equal
right to participate in the decision-making process. Yet, even if this right is exercised in equal measure and given equal effect (and it is not), it seems unfair to
extend identical participation rights to both the underwriters and the beneficiaries. At least when a project yields a profound disconnect between the distribution of costs and benefits, the government should first be required to obtain the
consent of the disproportionately burdened community.
Adding a narrow consent requirement to NEPA and other EIA regimes
would not amount to a revolution but rather an evolution. The consultation
Or, even if the distribution of costs and benefits of a given project is uneven, the distribution levels out in the aggregate (when the distribution of other projects is considered in the mix).
471
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model inherently recognizes the need for public input in environmental decision-making. It recognizes that, for all their expertise, agencies still need to
hear from voices outside the administrative state. In some cases, though, hearing from the public is not enough. In these extreme cases, the disproportionately burdened community should be able to say "no."
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